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Abstract 
The research objective is to study and analyse different factors potentially involved in 
influencing the measuring of auditor behaviour and audit quality that would lead to 
auditorsꞌ failure. It covers areas related to auditing, accounting, and corporate 
governance. The first empirical study assesses auditors' behaviour against audit firm 
factors (time deadline, time budget and performance evaluation). It also explains how 
behaviour may differ among experienced auditors and audit trainees. The results show 
that the majority of auditors commit dysfunctional behaviour but they try to avoid it in 
technical audit areas. The majority of auditors knowingly commit dysfunctional 
behaviour for the sake of better performance. It is noted that some of dysfunctional 
behaviour acts are due to a misperception of the concept of dysfunctional behaviour 
during an audit assignment. Auditors assume they are contributing to the benefit of an 
audit assignment while in fact they are committing dysfunctional behaviour. 
The second empirical model is constructed to assess the theoretical and statistical 
relationship between audit quality and clients' corporate governance characteristics. As 
for corporate governance mechanisms, the results show that audit quality has a 
significant positive relationship with board of directors' size and independence and a 
negative relationship with role duality. It can be concluded that within the British 
context, a bigger board of directors with diverse backgrounds leads to better audit 
quality. Also, more independent directors lead to better audit quality.  
For audit committee variables and their impact on audit quality, the results show that 
there is no significant statistical relationship between audit committee independence and 
size and audit quality; but there is a positive significant relationship between audit 
committee meetings and audit quality. This result gives an indicator that the more active 
audit committees in British companies, the better audit quality is achieved.  
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The auditing profession and the behaviour of auditors have become controversial issues 
in recent years. Corporations have a tendency to expand more and to gain competitive 
advantage continuously (Porter, 1998). This competitive advantage helps companies to 
gain better market share that will lead to better financial and non-financial performance. 
One of the key factors to become a reputable trustworthy corporation in a selected 
market(s) is to have credible financial statements and effective reporting processes. It is 
not enough to hire a competent top management team for companies to gain the trust of 
their customers. One major factor to achieve an effective reporting process is to hire 
reputable external auditors who are able to produce a good quality audit. The auditing 
profession plays a role in helping corporations to issue credible financial statements. 
Also, issuing audited financial statements is a requirement for some corporations, 
especially listed companies, in different stock markets.  
External auditors are perceived to be competent individuals who play an independent 
and objective role when auditing companies' financial statements. The objective of this 
research is to analyse audit quality dynamics. It commences by analysing factors 
pushing external auditors to commit dysfunctional behaviour (Pre-mature sign-off and 
under reporting of chargeable hours). Then, analyses governance mechanisms that affect 
audit quality. The dependent variable of the first model will have a direct conceptual 
impact on audit fees which is used as a proxy of audit quality in the second model. 
Auditing is more about understanding the business environment of companies, assessing 
different risks that may vary between control risk, inherent risk, business risk, 
information technology risk and other kinds of risks, designing and testing internal 
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controls and substantives testing followed by test of details, and in the final stage 
audited financial statements are issued (Elder et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the role of auditors and the quality of audit they are producing have 
increasingly risen in recent years, especially after the recent accounting scandals. The 
audit quality has been looked at as a requirement by companies to assign/re-assign 
auditors. The general perception is that the Big Four audit companies (Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers) can produce a better quality audit. Their 
reputation is gained from investing in their “reputation capital” (Beatty, 1989).  Big 
Four audit firms are perceived to provide better audit quality than non-Big Four audit 
firms due to their competence (Khurana and Roman, 2004). Competence is achieved 
from huge investments in training related to international accounting standards, codes of 
ethics, international standards on auditing, and different investments in human capital. 
What is meant by audit quality is that audit has been performed by competent, 
experienced and highly qualified auditors. In other words, companies that do not hire 
Big Four audit firms still possess credible financial statements. The ownership structure 
of companies, management philosophy, control environment and corporations' financial 
performance are all considered factors for companies to change lower quality auditors to 
higher quality auditors and vice versa. 
One of the agency theory fundamentals is that shareholders assign top management to 
serve for their benefit and to meet their goals. When management does not meet 
shareholders' goals, a conflict takes place. Different levels of corporate governance 
mechanisms are established to manage this conflict and to serve corporations' benefit. 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be internal mechanisms such as board of 
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directors, audit committee, remuneration committee, and nomination committee and 
external mechanisms through hiring external auditors. 
The quality audit concept is directly related to the individuals' behaviour who are 
performing the audit assignments: the auditors. As mentioned before, auditors are 
perceived to be competent professional individuals. Previous literature has related audit 
quality to change of auditors, whether an auditor is a Big Four audit firm or not, and if a 
going concern paragraph is disclosed in the audit report after the audit opinion (Lin and 
Liu, 2009; Uang et al., 2006), audit firm size (Hussainey, 2009), non-audit fees (Zaman 
et. al, 2011; Basiruddin, 2011), and specialised auditors (Basiruddin, 2011). The 
concept of audit quality is directly related to competent auditors. This competency and 
professional perception plays a significant role in increasing the quality of audit. 
Therefore, the behaviour of auditors is critical as it is not enough to assign/re-assign 
auditors but also auditorsꞌ behaviour should be professional and sceptical enough to 
maintain a good audit quality. What is meant by ꞌꞌprofessionalꞌꞌ is that individuals are 
able to perform a task others cannot perform with the same level of output (Elder et al., 
2010). 
1.1.1 UK context 
It is expected in weak corporate governance environments to identify many factors that 
would lead to a poor audit quality. The UK context is perceived to be one of the leading 
developed markets worldwide. Three out of four firms of the Big-Four audit firm has 
started their businesses originally in the UK (PwC, 1874; KPMG, 1911; Deloitte, 1843). 
The UK is said to be one of the pioneers in establishing and implementing corporate 
governance codes as it has been the first country to introduce a corporate governance 
code ꞌꞌCadbury reportꞌꞌ in 1992 compared with other developed countries (Statement of 
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Corporate Governance ꞌꞌUSAꞌꞌ, 1997; Circulo de Empresarios ꞌꞌSpainꞌꞌ, 1996; Vienot I 
report ꞌꞌFranceꞌꞌ, 1995; Corporate Governance, Share Option and Other Incentive 
Schemes, 1999 ꞌꞌIrelandꞌꞌ).  
Within the American context, it is concluded that senior and staff auditors' stress 
perception is directly affected by the increase in time pressure and time budget 
pressures (Margheim et al., 2005). There is a lower audit quality reduction by senior 
auditors within the French context (Herrbach, 2001). Senior auditors' behaviour, 
motivated by performance evaluations, is threatening audit quality within the Irish 
context (Otley and Pierce, 1996). Companies characterised by indicators of weak 
corporate governance, role duality and block holders, tend to assign lower quality 
auditors within the Chinese context (Lin and Liu, 2009).  
The availability of data collection and the access to the UK Big-Four audit firms in the 
first model complements the second model which is related to governance mechanisms 
for listed companies at the FTSE 350. Accordingly, behavioural and governance 
approaches are implemented to analyse the dynamics of audit quality.  Results can be 
generalised over developed countries as auditors employed at the Big Four have almost 
the same policies and procedures in other developed countries. Also, listed companies 
in the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) have requirements that are closely 
similar to other stock markets in developed countries.  
Mainly, the study is intended to answer the following research questions: 
 Do audit firms' policies and procedures play a significant role in auditors' 
behaviour?  
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 Do audit trainees and experienced auditors have different perceptions of 
dysfunctional behaviour? 
 Do corporate governance mechanisms affect Audit Quality? 
The first two research questions relate to the objective and hypotheses set for the first 
model. They highlight the main factors that contribute to the dysfunctional behaviour of 
auditors. Also it differentiates between the behaviour of experienced and non-
experienced auditors. The results help to mitigate behavioural habits exercised by 
auditors that are perceived to be accepted but in fact they are one kind of another of 
dysfunctional behaviour. 
The third research question complements with the other research questions for the sake 
of understanding audit quality dynamics. Unlike the first two research questions that 
deal with audit firms' factors, the last research question analyses clients' (companies)   
governance mechanisms and characteristics that may affect audit quality. 
1.2 Research Objective 
The role of auditors has been a controversial issue especially after the recent accounting 
scandals that took place (WorldCom, Enron, Paramalat SpA, Waste Management Inc, 
Xerox Corporation, and Société Générale). In most of the accounting scandals and 
lawsuits, a question is being frequently asked “Where were the auditors?”  Many 
lawsuits have been settled by external auditors worldwide. The case of Nuevo Mundo 
bank, which has been liquidated in 2004, is one example of a law suit against PwC for 
negligence behaviour. Ernst and Young settled claims in Canada to Sinor-Forest, a 
Chinese company, for fraud activities. In addition to one of the most popular examples 
which is the collapse of Arthur Andersen after the famous Enron case (Aubin, 2013).  
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There is an increasing risk and international threat against audit firms worldwide. 
Claims and lawsuits are not limited to corporations only. Regulators and liquidators are 
bringing lawsuits on behalf of investors leading to big settlements (Aubin, 2013). 
Whom to be blamed as a result of the many scandals that took place? External auditors 
might be blamed. Shall we blame auditors as individuals or as audit firms? 
Corporationsꞌ management could be blamed; weak corporate governance mechanisms 
and weak regulatory framework could be another reason that contributes to bankruptcy 
and liquidation of big organisations.  
The objective of this research is to study audit firmsꞌ based factors and companiesꞌ based 
factors. In other words, before blaming auditors, the study is identifying factors that 
may affect auditorsꞌ behaviour which may push them to behave dysfunctionally. This 
possible dysfunctional behaviour may or may not lead to a scandal, bankruptcy or 
nothing. Also before blaming companiesꞌ management, the study is assessing different 
governance mechanisms that are directly related to the scope of audit work. Assessing 
auditorsꞌ behaviour and analysing audit quality determinants from different perspectives 
will help to have a macro view of what are the potential drivers for audit quality. What 
mechanisms play a positive/negative role in pulling audit quality upwards or pushing it 
downwards. What is meant in audit quality in this research is explicitly related to the 
mandatory financial audit and not to any other voluntary non-audit or advisory 
service(s).  
Through analysing different audit quality drivers, the research questions are answered 
by identifying auditorsꞌ perception about dysfunctional behaviour during an audit 
assignment which subsequently will harm audit quality. Thus, it will be clearer whom to 
blamed, auditors as individuals or audit firmsꞌ common practices and related policies 
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and procedures. Also, governance mechanisms are highlighted to identify those that are 
pushing audit quality downwards.  
1.3 Research Contribution 
Different studies have been conducted to relate between the accountancy/auditing 
profession and corporate governance (Imhoff-Jr, 2003). Researchers, decision makers, 
regulators, and auditors are continually trying to minimise the gap between auditors and 
different clients and stakeholders, mainly audit expectancy gap (Iskander, 2008). This 
research is contributing not only to previous and academic literature but also presents 
possible solutions related to the accountancy challenges. 
The majority of studies focus on the behaviour of audit trainees and senior auditors 
only. Also, the majority of auditors' behaviour studies have focused on timing issues 
(time budget, time deadline) affecting auditors' behaviour. This research has combined 
timing factors with performance assessment factors (time budget, time deadline, 
performance evaluation). Additionally, levels of auditors are tested in the sampled 
population (audit trainees, senior auditors, audit managers, and partners). One additional 
contribution is that a difference between behaviours among two groups of auditors is 
also included in this research. Audit trainees and experienced auditors are categorised, 
and difference between their behaviour is analysed.  
By analysing the tested sample, the results highlight challenges faced by auditors and 
the trend of audit firms regarding hiring and promotions. It can be noted that audit firms 
currently care less for graduate degrees and prefer more professional qualifications. The 
research also highlights challenges faced by audit firms to retain experienced auditors. 
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The research has indicated, analysed and linked professional qualifications to auditors' 
tenure as part of the descriptive statistics section. It is revealed that audit managers are 
mostly the auditors who spend the least time with their current employers. Auditors 
employed at the Big Four audit firms are selected to participate in this study. Such 
auditors are expected to contribute to the study by their constructive feedback and 
objective replies. 
The other part of the research investigates the statistical relationship between audit 
quality and corporate governance characteristics.  Many studies have been conducted to 
understand audit fees in relation with different governance mechanisms and financial 
performance measures. Zaman et al., (2011) argue that the wider the audit scope, the 
better audit quality. The researchers analysed non-audit fees to support the argument of 
the study that was conducted covering a period from 2001 to 2004. Oꞌsullivan (2000) 
concludes that role duality and block holders have no impact on audit fees. Audit 
committee characteristics are excluded from this study which was conducted on a 
sample between 1992-1994. The first corporate governance code was established by that 
period (Cadbury Report, 1992) where compliance with governance codes was at its 
early stages.  
Better audit quality reduces manipulated earnings (Basiruddin, 2011). Non-audit fees 
and specialised auditors are used as measures for audit quality in addition to audit fees. 
Previous literature show different results. Non-audit fee is a proxy for auditorsꞌ 
independence (Knap, 1985) and specialised auditors could be a biased proxy for audit 
quality (Cahan et al, 2011). Hussianey (2009) states that investors perceive higher audit 
quality if the financial statements are audited by Big-Four audit firms. This argument 
cannot be applicable in the current research. The sample consists of listed companies at 
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the FTSE 350 where 97 per cent of these companies are audited by Big-Four. Big firms 
were involved in most of the accounting scandals that took place which raise doubt 
about using audit firmsꞌ size as a proxy for audit quality (Dang, 2004). 
It is noted that most of the previous literature focused on audit fees inclusive voluntary 
and mandatory audit and non-audit services. When considering audit firmsꞌ size, the 
majority of researchers did not differentiate between audit market share from mandatory 
audit services and market share from voluntary audit services that can include many 
other services besides financial audit (Advisory, consultancy, transaction services, and 
tax services). Other studies have focused solely on audit fees where audit quality is 
assessed implicitly rather than explicitly. 
The findings and conclusions presented in this research are supported by sensitivity 
tests that give more reliability and robustness for the research results. The Mann-
Whitney test, which is equivalent to the Wilcoxon rank sum test, is used to analyse the 
significant differences between the two stratified groups; audit trainees and experienced 
auditors. The Mann-Whitney test is considered the most appropriate test to give higher 
efficacy in non-parametric data (John and Priebe, 2006). For sensitivity analysis, the t-
test is also used. The t-test is usually used to meet the assumption of normality. This 
analysis highlights on certain factors that are causing dysfunctional behaviour for some 
auditors while it is not the case with another auditors. 
The random effects regression test (GLS) is used as the primary test to analyse the 
relationship between audit quality and companies' characteristics. The Hausman test has 
been used to support the use of the GLS test. In addition to the previous studies that 
state collinearity threshold to be acceptable up to 80% (Gujarati, 1995), the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) has been included in the correlation matrix indicating no major 
11 
 
problems in multicollinearity among variables. Additional sensitivity tests have been 
conducted to give more robustness to results; 2SLS regression test and fixed effects 
regression tests. Also, another GLS test has been conducted using different proxy for a 
control variable. 
It is the first study, to my knowledge, that analyses audit quality from two different 
perspectives: Behavioural and governance approach. A conceptual framework is 
explained through auditorsꞌ behaviour assessment and the potential effect of this 
behaviour on audit quality.  In addition to an econometric model to analyse audit quality 
against selected corporate governance mechanisms that are closely to the audit scope. 
Combining the two models, the research introduces recommendations to corporations 
and audit firms to mitigate dysfunctional behaviour and a lower audit quality. The 
research can be used as a tool for audit firmsꞌ to identify certain weaknesses in their 
common practices. The recommendations might help audit firms to mitigate any 
possible failure and claimsꞌ settlement in the future. Listed companies in the UK may 
identify governance mechanisms that are negatively affecting audit quality. 
1.4 Audit Quality: Auditors and Corporate Governance Drivers  
The role of external auditors has always been an issue of debate regarding the nature, 
responsibility, and scope of tasks performed by auditors. Abdel-Khalik (2002) focused 
on the role of auditors as being an agent to the management. Ussahawanitchakit (2012) 
states that audited financial statements are prepared by external auditors for the sake of 
helping different stakeholders in investment decisions. 
Different factors affect audit quality such as input, output and interaction among key 
stakeholdersꞌ factors. The input factors relate mainly team expertise, their ethical 
behaviour, and the audit process itself. The output factors relates to the legislative 
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requirement and the impact of stakeholders. The interaction among key stakeholders can 
affect the level of audit quality. The communication with those charged with 
governance at the planning phase to assess different risks and critical cycles can be an 
example of such impact on audit quality. Stakeholders perceive audit quality from 
different perspectives (IAASB, 2103). Users of financial statements perceive audit 
quality as a tool to challenge management. It is said that the more resources are 
allocated, the better audit quality. On the hand, managementsꞌ perception of audit 
quality might be related mainly to coordinate with auditors for the sake for finishing 
audit assignments as quickly as possible. Finishing audit assignments in reasonable time 
mitigate any disruption in companiesꞌ operations (IAASB, 2103).  
Francis (2004) mentions that different approaches have been used to study the concept 
of audit quality. Percentage of non-audit fees, auditorsꞌ incentives from legal 
perspective, and hiring alumni auditors; are all considered potential proxies that have 
been researched to measure audit quality. 
Non-audit fee is a signalling proxy for auditor independence rather than for audit 
quality. Delivering many services other than audit assignments by audit firms is also 
considered another factor affecting auditor behaviour (Knapp, 1985). Auditorsꞌ 
independence, in appearance, is impaired as a result of non-audit services provided by 
auditors (Quick et al., 2013). Accordingly investors and readers of financial statements 
may doubt auditorsꞌ opinions. The argument of this study supports the use of audit fees 
as a proxy for audit quality and gives additional justification for not using non-audit 
fees. 
Audit fees has been used as a signalling proxy for perceived audit quality rather than 
actual audit quality (Holm and Birkholm, 2007; Krishnan and Visavanathan, 2009). 
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Actual chargeable hours for an audit assignment can be used as a proxy to measure 
actual audit quality. Dang (2004) concludes that after many accounting scandals which 
took place, there is a wide doubt about the use of audit firm size as a proxy to measure 
audit quality. Accordingly audit fee, rather than audit firm size, is used as a proxy for 
audit quality. 
Auditing is perceived to be a tool of increasing the credibility of financial 
statements (Abott and Parker, 2000). These financial statements are used as a 
monitoring tool by shareholders against management performance and stewardship. 
Abott and Parker (2000) indicate that the selection process of external auditors is 
considered a signalling of a companyꞌs performance. Holm and Birkholm (2007) and 
Abott and Parker (2000) arguments support the selection of audit fees, as a proxy for 
audit quality, in this research. 
As companies have more complex and larger transactions, the probability of auditor 
failure increases (Pratt and Stice, 1994). Pratt and Stice (1994) argue that to maintain 
reasonable audit quality in such companies, auditors incur more hours to obtain enough 
and acceptable audit evidence. Additional audit hours lead to an increase in audit fees to 
maintain audit quality. It is implied that auditors assess risk at a higher level for 
companies cited by the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER). To 
maintain a good quality audit, auditors charge higher audit fees to cover all potential 
risks (Barua and Smith, 2013). 
Previous studies and researchers have used different proxies to measure audit quality. 
Non audit fees, auditorsꞌ specialisation and auditorsꞌ market share are examples of audit 
quality proxies (Hussainey, 2009; Roheida, 2011). Non-audit fee is a signalling proxy 
for auditor independence rather than for audit quality. Delivering many services other 
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than audit assignments by audit firms is also considered another factor affecting auditor 
behaviour (Knapp, 1985). Knapp states that financial statement users will perceive that 
a company’s management will obtain their preferred resolution when there is a conflict 
with external auditors. Wines (1994) states that auditorsꞌ independence is ꞌꞌin doubtꞌꞌ 
when remuneration from non-audit fees exist. Companies with a higher proportion of 
non-audit fees receive more unqualified audit opinion in comparison with companies 
incurring lower non-audit fees and receiving different types of qualified audit opinion. 
Quick et al. (2013) state that non-audit fees impair auditorsꞌ ꞌin-appearanceꞌ 
independence.  
Audit firms auditing same line of industry clients and obtaining large market share; this 
might be an indicator of lower audit quality. There is evidence that specialised auditors 
assign junior staff and spend minimal time on reviewing the control framework that 
could lead to a lower quality audit (Cahan et al., 2011). Kwon et al. (2007) indicate that 
auditor specialisation can have an effective role in improving accounting quality in a 
weak legislative environment. Auditorsꞌ specialisation is a substitute of a weak 
corporate governance mechanism in a weak legislative environment rather than strong 
legal environment. 
The research scope is mainly about the compulsory provisions of audit and the 
mandatory audit assignments rather than other services performed by audit firms. Audit 
fee is used as an audit quality proxy to maintain the coherence between the two 
empirical studies. The first study comprises a survey about auditorsꞌ dysfunctional 
behaviour. The dysfunctional behaviour is measured by pre-mature sign-off and under 
reporting of chargeable time related to audit assignments. The detailed questionnaire in 
the appendix highlights the different areas auditors are questioned about which are 
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related to tasks and scenarios of audit assignments rather than voluntary assignments 
and services. The potential dysfunctional behaviour, measured by under reporting of 
chargeable time, will lead to tight budgets and lower audit fees leading to a lower audit 
quality. Audit quality is measured by total audit fees (Holm and Birkholm, 2007; 
Krishnan and Visavanathan, 2009). 
1.5 Summary of Findings 
The dynamics of audit quality are analysed from auditorsꞌ and companiesꞌ perspectives. 
The results help in enhancing audit quality by looking at different factors affecting it. 
The first empirical study assesses auditors' behaviour against audit firm factors (time 
deadline, time budget and performance evaluation). It also explains how behaviour may 
differ among experienced auditors and audit trainees. The results show that the majority 
of auditors commit dysfunctional behaviour but they try to avoid it in technical audit 
areas. The majority of auditors knowingly commit dysfunctional behaviour for the sake 
of better performance. It is noted that some of dysfunctional behaviour acts are due to a 
misperception of the concept of dysfunctional behaviour during an audit assignment. 
Auditors assume they are contributing to the benefit of an audit assignment while in fact 
they are committing dysfunctional behaviour. 
It is evidenced that auditors facing the three different scenarios tend to work heavily in 
their personal time. One of the most common audit problems, “box-ticking exercise”, is 
not proven to be exercised heavily as per the survey results. It can be due to the increase 
in awareness among auditors to mitigate audit failures and to a better review by 
experienced auditors over the work of audit team members.  
The coordination between different lines of auditors in preparing budgets and allocating 
tasks showed a negative relationship with dysfunctional behaviour and to minimise such 
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behaviour. It is proven that communication among auditors plays an important role in 
minimising dysfunctional behaviour. The communication with those charged of 
governance proved to have no significant impact on dysfunctional behaviour. It is 
implied that external auditors still prefer to do the job themselves with no heavy 
reliance on other parties, though it is allowed by the standards. 
A comparison between audit trainees and experienced auditors took place to highlight 
any difference in perception. It is noted that when a question is targeting a specific 
group of auditors, the other group reply with less conservatism. Experienced auditors 
have a tendency to blame audit trainees more for dysfunctional behaviour and vice versa 
for audit trainees about experienced auditors. Also, some differences were due to the 
nature and responsibilities held by every type of auditor.  
Analysing board of directorsꞌ attributes against audit quality, most of the findings 
support the set hypotheses.  It is noted that the percentage of non-executive directors 
and board of directorsꞌ size have a positive significant relationship with audit quality. 
The results align with the argument that the existence of non-executive directors help to 
minimise agency cost and to reduce the gap with external auditors (Uang et al., 2006). 
The bigger boards of directors, the more diversified technical and educational 
backgrounds members may possess (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) that will help in 
improving audit quality. Role duality has a negative significant relationship with audit 
quality. The gap between external auditors is reduced when there is no role duality 
scenario (Uang et al., 2006). The ease of decisions, as a result of role duality, may 
benefit managementsꞌ (agents) on the expense of shareholdersꞌ one (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). 
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Audit committeesꞌ size and independence show to have no significant relationship with 
audit quality. This might be due to ꞌꞌcollegialityꞌꞌ principle mentioned in Smiths report 
(2003). It is referred to audit committees as subcommittees of board of directors where 
they are collectively responsible for the financial reporting quality. The result is 
consistent with other studies which show that audit committeesꞌ size and independence 
have no impact on auditorsꞌ reporting and earning management (Carcello and Neal, 
2009; Piot and Janin, 2007).  Active audit committees, measured by the number of 
meetings, contribute to a better audit quality. Financial reporting problems are reduced 
by frequent audit committees meetings (Farber, 2005). The result of financial expertise 
within audit committees show to have inverse relationship with audit quality. Financial 
experts are expected to contribute to the effectiveness of monitoring (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993). Agency costs are expected to increase in the absence of financial 
experts that will lead to increasing demand for auditors who are perceived to be an 
important factor in the classic agency problem (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011). There is an 
inverse relationship between audit quality and block holders. It is evidenced that block 
holders prefer lower quality auditors (Lin and Liu, 2009). 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is comprised of seven main chapters related to the core of this 
research, audit quality and auditors' behaviour. The first chapter gives a brief 
introduction to the research topic and the main contribution this thesis is adding to the 
knowledge. Defined research questions are stated in addition to the research motivation. 
Chapter two evaluates prior studies conducted to determine auditors' behaviour and 
audit quality. Some studies initiated empirical studies to measure audit quality, others 
conducted an experiment lab and analysed auditors' behaviour. Some studies used the 
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questionnaire method to analyse auditors' responses and consequently their behaviour, 
while other studies issued interpretive articles via data collection to critically analyse 
previous studies. Chapter two is divided mainly into four main sections: the first section 
describes the history of corporate governance and different mechanisms and principles 
plus an overview of the audit profession and the Big Four audit firms in the UK; the 
second section covers external auditors' tasks against corporate governance principles 
and specifically those that are closely related to auditors: Board of directors, Audit 
committee, and ownership structure. The third section describes auditors' behaviour 
against Big Four audit firm factors and their role in determining specific auditor 
behaviour, the fourth section covers the relationship between audit quality and corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Chapter three describes and explains the theoretical foundation of this research 
related to the impact of audit firm embedded factors on auditors' behaviour and how 
such possible dysfunctional behaviour may affect audit quality. It also focuses on audit 
quality and defined corporate governance mechanisms. Those mechanisms are 
considered to be related to the nature of external audit scope. 
The theory concept helps researchers and individuals to understand the relationship 
between objects and related mechanisms and how the world moves around. The 
existence of a theory requires us also to use our reasonable expectations about objects. 
A theory will not guide us on what to do, when and where to do things or to act, but it 
will help us to eliminate countless options from consideration when we are in a situation 
to choose or to decide between different alternatives (Chambers, 1996).  
Different studies (Chahine and Filatotchev, 2011; Dao et al., 2008) have focused on the 
determinants of audit fees in relation to corporate governance. It is said that external 
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auditors are assigned by Board of Directors (BoD) to solve the information asymmetry 
problem between shareholders (principal) and management (agent). Limited studies 
(Holm and Birkholm, 2007; Krishnan and Visavanathan, 2009)have used audit fees, 
among other proxies, as a signalling tool to measure audit quality. Audit quality plays a 
significant role in the decision-making process. This decision could be made by 
investors, creditors, bankers and many other stakeholders. The level of audit quality is 
also found to play a significant role in reducing the agency conflict from one side and to 
improve clients' and audit firms' credibility and reputation from another side by issuing 
a good quality audited financial statements. It is worth mentioning here that not all 
audited financial statements have the same quality audit. When it is referred to quality 
in auditing, it is not necessarily that the audit is improper or incorrect when financial 
statements are audited with less quality. It is argued in this research that corporate 
governance mechanisms, mainly boards of directors, audit committees, and ownership 
concentration play a significant role in the quality of audited financial statements that 
are prepared by management. Preparation of financial statements is the sole 
responsibility of management where the role of external auditors is to give their opinion 
on the financial statements. Auditors perform audit procedures according to 
International Standards of Auditing (ISA), Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS) or any other defined auditing principles. Financial statements are normally 
prepared in accordance to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  
Chapter four is about the research methodological and philosophical framework. 
The main objective of this chapter is to highlight the methodology used. Many types of 
methodologies are discussed but the selected methodology is justified and supported 
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based on the two empirical models' analysis and findings in addition to the theoretical 
framework of this research.  
The basis of the current research is to analyse auditors' behaviour and the determinants 
of audit quality. This research is conducted on the UK market. The first empirical model 
covers auditors' behaviour in the UK. A survey has been conducted in collaboration 
with the Big Four audit firms in the UK: Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PwC. The second 
model sampled population is made up of non-financial listed companies in the Financial 
Times Stock Exchange 350 (FTSE 350) for a longitudinal time frame between 2007 and 
2010.  
Ontological and epistemological approaches are explained and justified for the selected 
approach to align with the theoretical framework used and to link between different 
components. The methodology plays a linkage role between the two empirical studies 
and harmonises the relationship between them. 
Time budget, time deadline and performance evaluation factors are selected to be 
independent variables against the dependent variable: auditors' behaviour. The research 
is trying to link between accountancy firms’ embedded factors that may play a role in 
committing dysfunctional behaviour and consequently may harm audit quality. 
Moreover, the first study also highlights perception differences between audit trainees 
and experienced auditors. A questionnaire technique is used for this model to assess 
auditors' behaviour. 
The second empirical study complements with the first model by trying to answer the 
cause of audit quality variations. Selected corporate governance variables are defined 
and used as determinants and signalling indicators of audit quality. The concept of audit 
quality has been a controversial issue in recent years. As a result of many scandals, the 
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major question has always been asked “where were the auditors?” Relevant data from 
908 annual reports was manually collected. The data includes financial and non-
financial information of the 908 non-financial listed companies in the FTSE 350. To 
control for this empirical model, companies' size, profitability, leverage, and companies' 
line of service are included as control variables. 
Chapter five represents the first empirical model of this research. It measures 
and assesses auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour. The main objective of this chapter is to 
highlight factors leading to dysfunctional behaviour. The role of external auditors exists 
as a result of management-shareholders unstable relationship leading to information 
asymmetry (DeAngelo, 1981). Due to this critical role of external auditors, previous 
studies (Margheim et al., 2005; Ponemon, 1992; and Kelley and Margheim, 2002) have 
been conducted to analyse auditors' behaviour and what factors may push auditors to 
behave in a dysfunctional manner. This chapter analyses the behaviour of external 
auditors employed at the Big Four accounting firms in the UK. Internal audit factors are 
summarised by time budget, time deadline and performance evaluation. Previous 
literature has indicated that such factors have a major impact on pushing auditors to 
behave dysfunctionally. What distinguish this empirical study from other studies is that 
it is limited to the behaviour of top-niche auditors who are perceived to be the most 
credible auditors in the profession. Also, this model analyses the behaviour of all level 
of auditors and it is not limited to the behaviour of audit trainees or senior auditors.  
The survey conducted is comprised of 48 questions used to analyse auditors' perceptions 
about dysfunctional behaviour. The dependent variable, dysfunctional behaviour (DB) 
is measured using two proxies as signals of dysfunctional behaviour: premature sign-off 
and under-reporting of chargeable time. The independent variables used in this model 
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are time budget pressure, time deadline pressure, and performance evaluation. An audit 
related technical questionnaire is prepared comprises three main sections related to the 
three defined independent variables (time budget, time deadline, performance 
evaluation).  
Responses were well received from the four audit firms that help in generalisation. 
Mean and median results are used to analyse the results at the first stage. In the second 
stage, the sample is classified into two main groups: audit trainees and experienced 
auditors. The Mann-Whitney test, which is equivalent to the Wilcoxon rank sum test is 
used to analyse the significant differences between the two groups. The Mann-Whitney 
test is considered the most appropriate test to give higher efficacy in non-parametric 
data (John and Priebe, 2006). In addition to the Mann-Whitney test, the t-test is used for 
sensitivity analysis purposes. The t-test is usually used to meet the assumption of 
normality. 
Chapter six analyses the relationship between audit quality and corporate 
governance mechanisms. In specific, board of directors' size, board of directors' 
independence, role duality, audit committee size, audit committee effectiveness, audit 
committee independence, audit committee financial experts and ownership structure are 
selected to be the independent variables of the first model in addition to companies' size, 
profitability, leverage and line of industry as control variables to control for the sample 
data. Financial and non-financial data for 908 listed companies in the FTSE 350 were 
manually collected from one source: companies' annual reports. Due to the non-
parametric nature of data collected as per the stated results of kurtosis and skewness, 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) time series panel data with fixed effect regression was 
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used. Also, random effect regression (GLS) testing and pooled OLS was used for 
sensitivity purposes and to achieve more robust results.  
Chapter seven commences by stating the main objectives of the research by 
highlighting the two empirical studies conducted. Then, research technique tools are 
explained to justify and support the research methods used in this research. A summary 
of findings and results is presented in this chapter in addition to research implications. 
The objective of this section “research implication” is to state the impact of the research 
findings on the market. It is also a tool for decision makers, top management, audit 
firms' partners and regulators and many other potential users to use this research either 
to find solutions for possible problems they are facing or to expand their knowledge in 
the accountancy profession. Finally a limitation and future research section is included 
to highlight to future researchers the limitations of this study for the sake of developing 
future studies with similar interests and themes. 
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Chapter Two - Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
During their involvement in different assignments, auditors practice high levels of 
professional scepticism and personal professional judgments. Studies (Coram et al., 
2004; McDaniel, 1990; Margheim et al., 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009) have been conducted 
and many researchers have excelled in determining factors affecting auditors' behaviour 
and audit quality and subsequently the result of such behaviour and quality on the 
audit/accountancy profession and audited clients. 
The current chapter critically evaluates prior studies conducted to determine auditors' 
behaviour and audit quality. Some studies initiated empirical studies to measure audit 
quality, others conducted an experiment lab and analysed auditors' behaviour; some 
studies used the questionnaire method to analyse auditors' responses and consequently 
their behaviour, while other studies issued interpretive articles via data collection to 
analyse previous studies critically. 
This chapter is divided mainly into four main sections: the first section covers an 
overview of the audit profession and the Big Four audit firms in the UK plus a 
description of corporate governance framework; the second section covers auditors' 
behaviour against Big Four audit firm factors and their role in determining specific 
auditor behaviour; the third section covers the relationship between external auditors' 
tasks and responsibilities against corporate governance principles and specifically those 
that are closely related to auditors, board of directors and audit committee, and 
ownership structure; the fourth section describes the relationship between audit quality 
and corporate governance mechanisms. 
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2.2 Audit, Auditing and Auditors  
The word “audit” is derived from the Latin word “audire” which means the act of 
listening. In the audit process, there are two parties; auditee and auditor. Historically, 
the audit process comprised of an accountable person who used to defend his action in 
front of a relevant audience. As Bentham (1907) stated, cited in Harrison (1983), 
accounting is the soul of justice, audit can be presented as a substitute for democracy 
(Power, 1994). Audit serves as an intermediary between a principal and an agent. The 
rising problems of accountability are widely solved by presentation of social 
arrangement reinforced by the audit process. Audit is mainly presenting different 
administrative problems along with their solution. The auditees having such problems 
are not required to implement the auditors' solution since the auditor plays the role of 
“adding-value” to auditee parties. It can be noted here the similarity between the 
concept of UK corporate governance code and the conceptual framework of auditing. 
Both have the tone of recommendations rather than requirement and obligatory mode.  
Audit is not limited to issuing audited financial statements. There is a growing 
frequency of using the word “audit” in the UK as environmental audits, value for money 
audits, management audits, quality audits, forensic audits, data audits, intellectual 
property audits, medical audits and many others besides. The audit practice evolution in 
the UK is due to different problems of controls, mainly regulatory failures, invisibility 
of the audit, and the construction of auditees. 
The term “Big Four” refers to the biggest four accountancy firms worldwide which are 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (Deloitte) Limited, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst 
and Young (EY), and KPMG. 
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Deloitte was established in London in 1843 by an English citizen called William Welch 
Deloitte. He was the grandson of a French emigrant, Count de Loitte, who left France 
during the French revolution. Deloitte started his career at the age of 15 at the 
bankruptcy courts of London. In 1893, he became the president of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants and established a US office during that year. The other founder, 
Sir George Alexander Touché (b.1861) was also an accountant from London and 
established his office in 1899. He specialised in income tax preparation while Deloitte 
was specialised in the audit of the railway industry. In 1975, Touché Ross merged with 
a Japanese firm named Tohmatsu Awoki & Co. In 1993, the firm was named as Deloitte 
Touché Tohmatsu due to the good reputation and the influence of the Japanese firm 
(Articlesbase, 2008). 
PwC is considered to be one of the oldest accountancy firms among the Big Four. The 
history of PwC goes back to the 19th century in London. Samuel Lowel Price (b.1821) 
entered into the accountancy profession at an early stage before becoming a sole 
practitioner. Another founder, Edwin Waterhouse (b.1841) was one of the elite 
accountants in London. William Cooper established a rival accounting firm in London 
with his other three brothers. Samuel Lowel Price and Edwin Waterhouse & Co. merged 
in 1874 and created Price, Waterhouse & Co. It was one of the well-known and elite 
accounting firms in London and established a US office in 1890 in New York, USA. 
The fourth founder was William Lybrand, an American citizen, was operating his 
personal office in the US. William Cooper and William Lybrand merged in 1957 and 
created the Coopers and Lybrand accounting firm. In 1998, Coopers and Lybrand from 
one side and Price, Waterhouse & Co. from another side merged and created what is 
known today by PricewaterhouseCoopers (Articlesbase, 2008). 
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Unlike Deloitte and PwC, EY was initially established in the US but also as a result of a 
series of mergers. Two brothers, Theodore and Alwin Ernst, established their 
accounting firm in Cleveland, USA in 1903. In 1906, Arthur Young & Co accounting 
firm was established in Chicago, USA. Both firms merged with many successful audit 
firms in the UK. In 1989, the major merge took place creating what is known in our 
days by Ernst & Young (Articlesbase, 2008). 
As for KPMG, it stands for the names of the founders as follows: Klynveld, Peat, 
Marwick, Goerdeler. Initially, Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. was established in 1911 as 
a result of a merger between William Barclay Peat and Marwick Mitchell Co. In 1979, 
Thomson McLintock established a group of independent European firms known as 
KPMG. The merge between KPMG and Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. took place in 
1987. It was considered the largest accounting firms merger. It was renamed as KPMG 
Peat Marwick in 1991 until 1995,when it was renamed back as KPMG (Articlesbase, 
2008). 
2.3 Audit Quality 
Stakeholders perceive audit quality from different perspectives (IAASB, 2103). Users 
of financial statements perceive audit quality as a tool to challenge management. It is 
said that the more resources are allocated, the better audit quality. On the hand, 
managementsꞌ perception of audit quality might be related mainly to coordinate with 
auditors for the sake for finishing auditing assignments as quickly as possible. Finishing 
audit assignments in reasonable time mitigates any disruption in companiesꞌ operations. 
Audit committees are established in many countries to assess if audit assignments are 
performed in an effective, efficient, reasonable and timely basis (IAASB, 2013). It is 
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evidenced from the above study the importance of communication between auditors and 
those charged with governance (ISA 265). 
Different factors affect audit quality such as input, output and interaction among key 
stakeholders factors. The input factors relate mainly team expertise, their ethical 
behaviour, and the audit process itself. The output factors relates to the legislative 
requirement and the impact of stakeholders. The interaction among key stakeholders can 
affect the level of audit quality. The communication with those charged with 
governance at the planning phase to assess different risks and critical cycles can be an 
example of such impact on audit quality (IAASB, 2013).  
Francis (2004) mentions that different approaches have been used to study the concept 
of audit quality. Audit tenure, percentage of non-audit fees, auditorsꞌ incentives from 
legal perspective, and hiring alumni auditors; are all considered potential proxies that 
have been researched to measure audit quality. 
Non-audit fee is a signalling proxy for auditor independence rather than for audit 
quality. Delivering many services other than audit assignments by audit firms is also 
considered another factor affecting auditor behaviour (Knapp, 1985). For auditorsꞌ 
specialisation, there is evidence that specialised auditors assign junior staff and spend 
minimal time on reviewing the control framework that could lead to a lower quality 
audit (Cahan et al., 2011). Kwon et al. (2007) indicate that auditor specialisation can 
have an effective role in improving accounting quality in a weak legislative 
environment. Auditorsꞌ specialisation is a substitute of a weak corporate governance 
mechanism in a weak legislative environment rather than strong legal environment. 
Audit fees has been used as a signalling proxy for perceived audit quality rather than 
actual audit quality (Holm and Birkholm, 2007; Krishnan and Visavanathan, 2009). 
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Actual chargeable hours for an audit assignment can be used as a proxy to measure 
actual audit quality (Dang, 2004). It is concluded that after many accounting scandals 
that took place, there is a wide doubt about the use of audit firm size as a proxy to 
measure audit quality. Actual audit quality is also measured by three different proxies as 
suggested by Gunny and Zhang (2012). It is argued that abnormal accruals, restatement 
of financial statements and the existence of going concern are potential proxies to 
measure audit quality (Gunny and Zhang, 2012). The mentioned proxies do fit the 
objective of this research. The research is assessing auditors' behaviour in relation with 
compulsory audit tasks rather than any other services offered by audit firms. Auditors' 
behaviour may overstate or understate chargeable hours that will consequently impact 
perceived audit quality when analysing fees with corporate governance mechanisms and 
companies' characteristics. 
2.4 Regulatory Framework in the UK 
Traditional business structures are changing while markets are facing 
governance revolution. This revolution is witnessed by the collapse of “End of family” 
in Europe and “The end of Tycoons” in Asia (Cheffins, 2001). 
The revolution and transition that took place in Britain identified three main factors to 
be considered as significant factors: “company law, political ideology, and financial 
services”. Previous literature on the UK context indicated a major decline of families' 
ownership and control beginning in the twentieth century (Cheffins, 2006). 
There are two basic principles of corporate governance as follows: effective and not 
only nominal accountability is required, and management should be able to run the 
enterprise without any fear of government interference or fear of displacement 
(Charkam, 1994). 
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In the UK corporate governance, emphasis on the interest of shareholders is much 
higher than corporate stakeholders (Armour et al., 2003). As a result of this emphasis on 
shareholders' interest, the shareholder value model was introduced in the UK context. 
This model did not reach the “end history” as it is not recognised fully. Globally, the 
corporate governance is classified into two categories: mainly outsiders/arm's length 
systems and insider/control-oriented systems. The insider/outsider system refers to the 
level of owners' concentration, while the arm's length/control-oriented system refers to 
the level of activities exercised by shareholders in areas related to corporate governance.  
The UK market is characterised by passive shareholders where 85% of listed companies 
do not have one shareholder owning more than 25% or more voting right. They are 
referred as to passive due to the fact that they have a small amount at stake and 
subsequently they have no incentives in the corporation. Regardless of the passive 
nature of shareholders and their minimal involvement in corporate governance, it is 
concluded that the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
performance is at best weak (Weir et al., 2007).  
Corporate governance is defined to be a set of mechanisms that control and monitor top 
management activities and decisions on behalf of companies' stakeholders (Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008). Other studies defined corporate governance as a system that 
controls and directs companies to give an accountable image to shareholders and 
stakeholders (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). The term “corporate governance” existed 
before the 1990s. It is used along with “fair trade” and “free competition” to achieve 
universal respect (Keaseyet al., 2005). As a result of creative accounting drivers, 
different financial failures, agency cost and problems between management and 
shareholders and the role of auditors, all these factors led to the formation of the first 
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UK corporate governance committee, known as the Cadbury committee, in 1991. The 
committee published the Cadbury report in 1992. The main recommendations of the 
Cadbury report were directions towards areas of control and accountability and 
disclosures related to boards of directors and other committees. Before the Cadbury 
report was introduced, companies were free to disclose their board of directors and 
directors' independence status. 
The code has a tone of being recommended rather than obligatory. The companies were 
asked to include a statement in their annual report related to their compliance with the 
Cadbury report. The recommendations were successfully adopted at least by large 
public companies.  
The Hampel committee was established in 1995 to review comments and criticism on 
the Cadbury report. The Cadbury report is criticised because it is very limited to 
accountability and control areas rather than meeting the main objective of corporate 
governance, which is improving and developing business overtime. The Hampel 
committee issued the Hampel report in 1998 that emphasised the balance between 
accountability and control and improving overall business. It also highlighted the “form 
over substance” assumption. This assumption implies that compliance with the 
corporate governance code is not a ꞌꞌbox-tickingꞌꞌ exercise. 
The Greenbury report (1995) was issued to give guidance and recommendations 
regarding directors' remunerations. It was published as a result of cumulative concerns 
over the dramatic increase of directors' remuneration. While it was mentioned in the 
Cadbury report that a remuneration committee should be established to determine 
directors' remuneration; the Greenbury report explicitly stated that remuneration 
committees should be established exclusively from non-executive directors. Also, it 
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required companies to include detailed disclosure about directors' remuneration, their 
name, nature of remuneration (share option, pension right, cash, bonus etc.). 
In 1998, the Combined code was established combining the Cadbury report, Greenbury 
report and the Hampel reports' recommendations. The three reports have a tone of 
recommendations and guidance rather than an obligatory tone. It consisted of 18 
principles and 48 code provisions. A summary of the previous corporate governance 
codes from the Cadbury report (1992) to the Combined code (1998) is as follows: 
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Cadbury Report Greenbury Report Combined Code 
Directors   
The roles of CEO and chair should ideally be 
separated 
 The combination of the roles of CEO and chair should be 
publicly explained. 
Where the post of CEO and chair are 
combined, there should be a strong 
independent set of NEDs. 
 A senior independent NED should be identified in the 
annual report (regardless of whether CEO and chair are 
combined). 
There should be a minimum of three NEDs of 
which at least should be independent. 
There should be a minimum of three independent NEDs There should be a minimum of three NEDs and NEDs 
should comprise not less than one-third of the board. The 
majority of NEDs should be independent.  
Independent NEDs are those who are 
‘independent of management and free from 
any business or other relationship which 
could materially interfere with the exercise of 
their independent judgment’. 
Independent NEDs are those who have ‘no personal 
financial interest other than shareholders in the matters to be 
decided, no potential conflicts of interest arising from cross-
directorships and no day-to-day involvement in the running 
of the businesses'. 
Definition of NED independence as Cadbury. 
 
Nomination committees should make 
recommendations to the board regarding all 
new board appointments. 
  
Nomination committees should be established (unless the 
board is small) comprising a majority of NEDs, chaired 
by the board chair or NED and all members should be 
identified in the annual report. 
NEDs should be appointed for specified 
terms and reappointment should not be 
automatic. 
 All directors should be required to submit themselves for 
re-election at regular intervals and at least every three 
years. 
Directors' remuneration   
Executive directors’ should be subject to the 
recommendations of a remuneration 
committee comprised wholly or mainly of 
NEDs. 
The remuneration committees should be comprised of 
exclusively of independent NEDs. 
The remuneration committee should consist of 
independent NEDs. 
 The remuneration committee should report to shareholders 
annually. 
The remuneration report should be in the name of the 
board, rather than of the remuneration committee 
Full disclosure is required of directors' total 
emoluments and those of the chair and 
highest paid director (including pension 
contribution and share options). 
Full disclosure is required of all elements of the 
remuneration package (including share options and pension 
entitlements) of each named director. 
As Greenbury. 
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 Remuneration report should provide an explanation of the 
company's policy on the setting of executive remuneration. 
As Greenbury. 
Executive directors' contracts should not 
exceed three years without shareholder 
approval. 
Executive directors’ contracts exceeding one year should be 
disclosed and explained. 
As Greenbury. 
 Shareholder's' approval is required for the adoption of long-
term incentive plans. 
As Greenbury. 
 Share options should never be issued at a discount should be 
phased in rather issued in one stock and should not be 
exercisable in under three years. 
Awards in one large block rather than phased in should 
be explained and justified. 
Shareholders   
  Companies should indicate level of proxy votes logged 
on each resolution proposed at the AGM and the balance 
for and against each. 
  Companies should propose a separate resolution at the 
AGM on each substantially separate issue. 
  The chairmen of the audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees should be available to answer questions at 
the AGM. 
  The notice of the AGM and related papers should be sent 
to shareholders at least 20 working days before the 
AGM. 
Accountability and audit   
Audit committees comprising at least three 
NEDs should be established. 
 Audit committees should consist of at least three NEDs, 
the majority of whom should be independent and all 
members are to be named in the annual report. 
The directors should report on the 
effectiveness of the company's system of 
internal control. 
 The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of 
the effectiveness of the group's system of internal 
controls and should report to shareholders that they have 
done so. 
The directors should report that the business 
is a going concern. 
 As Cadbury. 
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Compliance with corporate governance codes and provisions should be an incentive for 
better competitive advantage for multinational corporations (Windsor, 2009). Requiring 
entities and enterprises to abide by different codes and tightening corporate governance 
codes explicitly means an increase in compliance with international codes and 
guidelines. There are two main perspectives of corporate governance. The first 
perspective highlights shareholder wealth maximisation; while the second perspective 
emphasises that corporate governance is a mix of codes of ethics, transparency, 
disclosures, and accountability (Gill, 2008) 
Effective and efficient corporate governance rests with the integrity and ethical 
behaviour of directors and executives (Cadbury, 2006). Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
(2002) in the US, the UK responded to corporate governance failures by introducing the 
“Comply and Explain” approach. This approach leads to better corporate governance 
rather than having the UK corporate governance codes and provisions regulated and 
legislated (Arcot et al., 2010). The “Comply and Explain” has been implemented to 
encourage companies to abide smoothly by the UK corporate governance code rather 
than performing a “box-ticking” exercise. 
Corporate governance code is highly recommended rather being enforced on companies 
to achieve a better transparent relationship between shareholders and management. The 
code summarises different principles such as leadership, effectiveness, accountability, 
remuneration, and relations with shareholders (UK corporate governance code, 2010). 
As part of applying these principles, different issues are raised that may prevent 
companies to be in full compliance with corporate governance codes, and one of these 
critical issues is the agency cost that is closely related to agency theory. 
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Corporate governance is defined to be a set of mechanisms that control and monitor top 
management activities and decisions on behalf of companies' stakeholders (Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008). The main objective of corporate governance mechanisms is to 
separate between ownership and control using agency theory (John and Senbet, 1998). 
There is a direct relationship between firm value, external financial needs, investment 
opportunities and product market competition with governance mechanisms (Chen et 
al., 2010). The results showed that besides the importance of corporate governance on 
firm value, external forces such as the financial needs and market opportunities are also 
related to corporate governance mechanisms.  
2.5 Corporate Governance Framework 
Dey (2008) conducted a study on the relationship between corporate governance 
and agency conflicts. It was hypothesised that the level of agency conflict is higher in 
larger, more complex and management control companies. The results supported the 
hypothesis indicating a positive relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and agency conflict. It was concluded that companies facing high agency problems have 
good corporate governance mechanisms, mainly independence and effectiveness of 
Board of Directors (BoD) and audit committee, measured by the percentage of outside 
directors and frequency of meetings. Dey (2008) mentions that due to competitive 
pressure on capital, goods, and labour markets, companies facing high agency problems 
have good corporate governance mechanisms. Through empirical research, he 
mentioned that this result supports the theory on corporate governance that describes 
governance mechanisms to be a mirror or endogenous output of every company's 
business and economic environment. This conclusion indicates that ꞌꞌno size fits allꞌꞌ 
when it comes to apply different mechanisms of corporate governance best practices. 
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Dey (2008) mentioned that this result supports the theory on corporate governance that 
describes governance mechanisms to be a mirror or endogenous output of every 
company's business and economic environment. 
Analysing the effects of ownership structure on corporate governance mechanisms was 
studied by Holm and Scholer (2010). The study focused on the transparency factor to 
minimise the flow of asymmetric information. The sample is made up of 100 listed 
companies at the Copenhagen stock exchange, Denmark. It was hypothesised that 
companies with more spread ownership and exposure to international markets have high 
levels of corporate governance transparency.  Holm and Scholer (2010) concluded that 
transparency only, not ownership structure and board independence, is revealed to be a 
significant corporate governance mechanism, but only in the context of two-tier board 
of directors; a BoD charged with the management of the company and board of 
commissioners charged with the supervision of BoD performance over company's 
management. The level of disclosures is found to be irrelevant to the level of 
transparency. This result does not align with Dey's (2008) conclusion, where it was 
stated that companies with higher agency problems have better corporate governance 
mechanisms performance, since Holm and Scholer (2010) found no impact for 
ownership structure and board independence on transparency levels. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) conclude that the level of disclosures is a significant factor 
in economic benefits. The sample of this study is made up of companies in Germany 
which switched to International Accounting Standards (IAS) or to US General Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US GAAP) in their financial reporting process. Effective and 
increased levels of disclosures help investors to gain more confidence in the firm from 
one side and help companies to gain economic and statistical benefits. A study was 
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conducted to analyse the relationship between agency costs and corporate governance 
mechanism, ownership structure and board size (Singh and Davidson III, 2003). It was 
hypothesised that high agency cost is positively related to low asset turnover ratios and 
high Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&A) expenditures. For ownership 
structure it was hypothesised that a positive relation exists between outside block 
ownership and asset utilisation, but negative relation to SG&A. For board size, it was 
hypothesised that board composition plays a significant role in corporate performance 
reducing agency cost. Singh and Davidson (2003) concluded that inside 
ownership/managerial ownership and smaller boards are positively related to reduction 
in agency cost due to the fact that inside shareholders behave better for the interest of 
companies more than outside block holders. The existence of inside ownership is found 
to be insignificant in reducing SG&A expenditures account. For board size, it was 
concluded that outside directors do not have extra power to reduce agency cost. 
The style of leadership is one of many other principles that characterise the code of 
corporate governance. Duality role of a chairman and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
is considered one major attribute in measuring corporate governance mechanisms. 
Henry (2010) concluded that duality role is positively and significantly related to firms' 
asset utilisation. Contrary to Henry (2010), Coles and Hesterly (2000) conclude that 
firms with separate CEO and chairman positions and having a chairman who was not a 
former officer of the firm enjoy a better stock price. The results of the study show that 
combined leadership might be mitigated by having board of directors comprised of 
more independent directors. Unlike Singh and Davidson (2003) who state that 
inside/managerial ownership is positively related stock price and indirectly to better 
firm's performance, Judge et al. (2003) state that such relation between corporate 
performance and inside ownership is only positive in non-retrenchment situations. In 
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other words, inside holders' interest align with the interest of management in normal 
conditions but not in loss or downsizing conditions. Contrary to Henry (2010), where it 
was stated the positive impact of duality role, Jude et al. (2003) conclude a negative 
relation between ꞌꞌinformalꞌꞌ role duality and corporate performance. The word 'informal' 
used to highlight that role duality between a CEO and chairman of the board is 
prohibited in Russia, but it exists in some companies included in the study's sample as a 
common practice. 
2.6 Theoretical Foundation 
Saam (2007) states that in agency theory, the principal exercises more power 
than agents when facing agency problems. But in a hidden information situation, where 
management is exposed more to operations, the agent has more privilege than the 
principal. In such a hidden information situation, audit quality may be affected due to 
the flow of accurate information and data auditors may receive to support their work 
before submitting their reports to boards of directors and consequently to shareholders. 
In an agency relationship, a principal is expected to increase agent's efforts by more 
monitoring, but heavy monitoring has some hidden costs affecting interpersonal 
relationships and reducing social distance (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Due to the 
nature of the auditing profession, which is based on interaction with companies' 
management and personnel, reducing social distance affects the scope and quality of the 
audit. 
Since shareholders elect board of directors who are responsible to assign external 
auditors (UK corporate governance code, 2010), dividends paid to shareholders are 
considered a tool to satisfy agency problems and conflicts (Adjaoud and Ben-amar, 
2010). Audit fees are also considered to be one type of agency costs (Leventis et al., 
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2011). The researchers mention that agency cost cannot be eliminated in practice but 
only in ideal conditions. They accordingly hypothesised an inverse relationship between 
audit fees and competition level. It was concluded that as competition increases audit 
fees decline. Auditors tend to reduce the number of audit hours that will lead to lower 
audit fees. It is argued that in a highly competitive market, managers increase their 
monitoring to be able to compete better. Due to this argument, auditors rely on the 
increased monitoring by managers to compensate the decrease in audit hours and 
consequently lower audit fees (Leventis et al., 2011). 
There is an agency conflict between management and audit committee chairs (Haka and 
Chalos, 1990). This agency conflict is evidenced where internal and external auditors 
align themselves with management highlighting the issue of auditors' independence. 
Moreover, more agency cost through heavy monitoring (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008) 
may lead to a variance in audit quality.  
Agency theory is used to explain the theoretical framework between audit quality and 
governance mechanisms.  Shareholders, through the election of a board of directors, 
establish an external layer of control over management by assigning external auditors. 
Management has incentives for a better quality audit that reflects transparency and more 
reliable financial statements and explanatory disclosures which reduce information 
asymmetry problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This reflects that management 
practices align and serve shareholders’ interest which minimise agency conflict cost. 
2.7 Auditorsꞌ Behaviour and Audit Firm Factors: Gaps and Potential 
Contribution 
Audit firms, through the use of tight time budgets and different norms of 
efficiency, are passing pressure to individual auditors (McNair, 1991). McNair 
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addressed the Management-Control Dilemma and what action plans audit firms are 
implementing to minimise the effect of this Dilemma. He differentiated between quality 
concerns and costs constraints. While the first part of the Dilemma talked about efforts 
to increase audit quality, the other part initiated potential resolutions for efforts reducing 
techniques. McNair emphasised the ꞌꞌcost qualityꞌꞌ trade-off conflict faced by audit 
firms. He raised the issue of pressure concentration where time-budget pressure was 
concentrated at senior levels, who are used to accepting such pressure along with all 
staff members. 
He concludes, from an interpretive framework and data collected through interviews 
with different auditors’ levels, that audit firms are resolving every Dilemma on a case-
by-case basis. This has been considered to be the most risky solution since audit firms 
are relying only on auditor ethical behaviour to solve any conflict. This study was 
conducted in 1991 as mentioned before, where some treatments might be implemented 
by audit firms to resolve any Cost-Management Dilemmas in a structural manner. 
Another study covering areas related to the level of commitment and moral reasoning of 
auditors was conducted by Lord and DeZoort (2001). Unlike McNair (1991) who 
conducted interviews among all levels of auditors, this study used the ꞌꞌcase studyꞌꞌ 
method when testing the populated sample. The researchers hypothesise that obedience 
and conformity pressure play a significant role in auditor behaviour leading to 
inaccurate sign off of audit procedures, and they highlighted also that auditors facing 
more obedience pressure will have higher tolerance misstatement levels than those 
facing conformity pressure. Another assumption was included in this study related to 
social influence and levels of organisational and professional commitment. The level of 
tolerance misstatement is higher with auditors having a lower level of professional and 
43 
 
organisational commitment under social influence. The population sample of this study 
was comprised of 171 audit staff members from one international accounting firm in the 
US. The subjects received materials containing an error of asset valuation. After 
examining the case, they were asked to reply in two questionnaires: organisation 
commitment and professional commitment ones. It was concluded that obedience 
pressure along with superior’s instructions are causing willingness to sign-off an 
account which is materially misstated. 
But for conformity pressure, results and analysis showed there is no major effect of such 
pressure on auditor behaviour. It was also concluded that organisational and 
professional commitment effects disappeared significantly when social influence is 
taking place. 
Lightner et al.. (1982) issued a study about auditor behaviour relating the consequences 
of such behaviour to social, ethical, and motivational factors. Contrary to Lord and 
DeZoort (2001) and McNair (1991), the researchers use the questionnaire method to 
analyse results. The study was conducted to determine the causes of Unrecorded 
Chargeable Time (UCT) only. The researchers analysed in this research the specific 
factors that lead to a UCT. These factors were categorised into three groups 
compromising five independent variables as follows: Motivational Force, Ethical 
Factors (Individual approval to un-record actual chargeable hours), and situationally-
determined variables (supervisors’ request, feasibility of meeting budgets, Actual 
situation). 
The sampled population consists of 1,016 questionnaire-responses from three of the big 
eight national accounting firm in the US. This big sample was separated into two 
groups. The first group (506 replies) was used to discover the relation between variables 
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where a cross-validation procedure was implemented. The second group (510 replies) 
was used to test the consistency of findings in group one. In other words, the second 
group was a “cross-validating” sample. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) was used to 
analyse the surveys’ results. The results showed that “feasibility of meeting budgets” 
was the most explanatory variable leading to UCT. This was due to accountants’ 
perception and unwillingness to be seen as incompetent, their efforts to keep good 
quality service to the client, and to maintain a good percentage of assignment 
realisation. The feasibility for meeting budget variable was also linked to personal 
normative beliefs and their willingness to disapprove or approve the under-reporting 
behaviour (Lightner et al., 1982). 
Coram et al. (2004) analysed Reduction Audit Quality (RAQ) against two factors: time 
budget pressure and risk of misstatement. They hypothesise a negative relation between 
RAQ and the level of risk of misstatement. 103 experienced auditors employed at big 
five (four) audit firms in Australia comprised the population of this research. They were 
given a case regarding an audit of a factitious manufacturing company with outlines 
related to time budget, audit tests to be performed and a section to study two possible 
RAQ situations as follows: 1) Accepting doubtful audit evidence and 2) Truncating a 
selected sample. 
The results showed that accepting doubtful evidence is directly affected by the time-
budget pressure variable but it is not the case for risk of misstatement, but for 
minimising a sample, the risk factor has a conditional effect. In other words, auditors 
tend to minimise a sample when there is a low risk of misstatement. 
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As a result of the above analysis, Coram et al. (2004) concluded that RAQ behaviour 
acts (accepting doubtful audit evidence, truncating a selected sample) are not equally 
treated by auditors. 
The impact of audit seniors is playing a major role in damaging the image of the 
profession (Herrbach, 2001). Herrbach (2001) hypothesises that there is quality-
reduction behaviour leading to negligence behaviour. He chose the elements of 
psychological contract (Human Environment, Salary, Training, Autonomy, and Control) 
between auditors and their audit firms. The dependent variable was defined as quality 
reduction by audit seniors and related to independent variables that are the elements of 
the psychological contract between auditors and audit firms. Moreover, Herrbach 
analysed non-professional behaviour against the following factors: Control Autonomy, 
Training, Salary, Under-reporting of time and affective commitment. He used the 
questionnaire method over a population of 170 auditors (395 sent, 170 received) 
working in a large audit firm in France. 
The researcher concludes that all psychological elements, except salary, are negatively 
related to an increase of audit-quality-reduction behaviour. As far as those variables 
increase, audit quality reduction behaviour decreases. This study was conducted on a 
sample of audit seniors working in one audit firm in France. 
Adverse to the technique used in assessing irregular auditing, Lee (2002) conducted  
in-depth interviews for his study ꞌꞌprofessional socialisation commercial pressures and 
junior staffꞌs, time pressures and irregular auditing – A contextual interpretationꞌꞌ. The 
study explained irregular auditing, causes and effects. Then, Lee (2002) mentioned the 
risk-based auditing that is being implemented by audit firms. It mainly explains areas 
where an auditor can tolerate some misstatements (in low risk areas) to avoid time 
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wasting and time spending. Before conducting his research, Lee (2002) had different 
interviews with partners and senior managers to get their feedback on audit juniors’ 
judgment-learning process. 
The population was made up of staff auditors employed at twelve national audit firms in 
southern England. As a result of interviews made, Lee (2002) concluded that junior 
auditors, under risk-based auditing, are given the professional freedom to decide on the 
time allocated to them, based on budgets. Time would be used efficiently to obtain the 
possible evidence that might reduce material misstatement. This condition is giving 
staff auditors the ability to decide either to limit or to expand their work in areas not 
material to the accounts. In this way, staff auditors are showing commitment in 
compliance with audit methodology from one side and reducing quality audit (irregular 
auditing) from another side, but only in areas not material to the accounts (Lee, 2002). 
Some studies have limited auditor behaviour against time pressure and its 
consequences (McDaniel, 1990). McDaniel conducted an experiment over 179 staff 
auditors from one audit firm to analyse the relationship between time pressure and 
performance (efficiency and effectiveness), audit programme structure and 
performance, and time pressure and audit programme structure interaction. The 
materials package used to perform this experiment was mainly made up of an audit task 
and a set of instructions to be prepared by staff auditors. McDaniel (1990) classified 
four groups from the population of staff auditors, where every group was assigned a 
different deadline to finalise this experiment that ranged from low pressure (plenty of 
time) to high pressure (very short time). After performing the task, a questionnaire was 
distributed in addition to an open-ended question in the last section of the questionnaire. 
McDaniel concluded that as time pressure increases, audit effectiveness decreases 
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where other variables such as audit programme structure increases audit effectiveness. 
But on the other hand, if time pressure increases, audit efficiency increases but not in a 
structural audit programme scenario. Her findings were the result of an experiment on 
auditors from one audit firm in the US. 
In addition to McDaniel’s (1990) research, an empirical study was conducted to analyse 
the effect of Time Budget Pressure (TBP) and Time Deadline Pressure (TDP) defined as 
an independent variables against the following dependent variables: 1) subjective stress 
measures 2) organisational behaviour measures and 3) cognitive problems (Margheim et 
al., 2005). 
The population of this study is made up of three of the Big Four firms and two non-Big 
Four Certified Public Accountants (CPA) firms in the US. Audit seniors and staff 
auditors were the experiment subjects, where they received case materials for the audit 
of a small software company. ANOVA and MANOVA were used for testing procedures 
analysis (Margheim et al., 2005).  
For subjective and organisational stress measures, it was concluded that both types of 
pressures, TBP and TDP, would cause increased levels of stress. No interaction is 
needed between TBP and TDP to cause an increased level of subjective stress measures 
and auditor dysfunctional behaviour, but additional stress is noted when the two types 
of pressure are encountered. As for cognitive problems, researchers had to separate 
senior from staff auditors for accurate analysis. It was concluded that TBP pressure was 
causing cognitive problems more for senior auditors than TDP, while both types of 
pressure had significant effects on staff auditor cognitive problems (Margheim et al., 
2005). 
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Glover (1997) analysed time pressure and related it to the type of information auditors 
were obtaining and it meant that a different treatment of auditorsꞌ behaviour analysis 
was covered by Margheim et al. (2005) and McDaniel (1990). The existence of 
diagnostic and non-diagnostic information and their role in imposing time pressure were 
researched by Glover (1997) in his article ꞌꞌThe Influence of Time Pressure and 
Accountability on Auditorsꞌ processing of non-diagnostic informationꞌꞌ. This study 
linked independent variables of time pressure, auditors held accountable, and the type of 
diagnostic information to the dependent variable: an exhibit of dilution in auditorsꞌ 
judgments.  Glover (1997) hypothesised that auditors facing time pressure and dealing 
with diagnostic and non-diagnostic data will have less dilution in their decisions and 
judgments compared with those not facing time pressure.   
The study was conducted over 156 auditors employed at the big six audit firms in the 
US. The subjects (auditors) were given a laboratory experiment including two audit 
cases. They were asked to assess the audit risk of different cycles. The subjects were 
divided into two groups; ꞌꞌtime pressureꞌꞌ and “auditors in accountabilityꞌꞌ groups. The 
researcher used ANOVA testing to analyse the experimentsꞌ results (Glover, 1997). 
The results of the laboratory experiment show that only the time pressure factor, 
excluding holding the auditor accountable factor, may affect auditorsꞌ judgments. An 
interesting conclusion was reached stating that when auditors are dealing with non-
diagnostic information, the time pressure factor has positive consequences by pushing 
auditors to eliminate non-useful data leading to a reduction in judgmental bias. In the 
case of auditors dealing with diagnostic information only, the results supported previous 
studies that it significantly reduces but does not eliminate dilution (Glover, 1997). 
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Another kind of research was conducted to analyse auditorsꞌ personality characteristics 
rather than dealing with factors of pressure (Choo, 1986). This study defined the four 
types of personalities as follow: Type A personality (tense and anxious person), control, 
commitment and challenge personality. All these independent variables were measured 
through Likert scale-type questionnaires when distributed to the sampled population. 
The dependent variable of this study is the job-related stress which was also measured 
by a job-related tension scale, a 15-items scale. A correlation test was performed to 
ensure that variables were not significantly related and a multiple regression test was 
used to analyse the relationship between dependent and independent variables. The 
population of this study comprised auditors working in small and big offices; 172 
questionnaires were received which constituted the material to be analysed. 
The results showed a positive relationship between job-related stress and type A 
personality, while there was a negative relationship between job-related stress and 
control, commitment and challenge personalities. As type A personality characteristics 
increase in an auditor’s personality, his perceived job related stress increases also; while 
as the other three personality characteristics increase in an auditor’s personality, their 
level of job related stress decreases (Choo, 1986). 
Choo performed another study in the same article ꞌJob stress, Job Performance, and 
Auditor Personality Characteristicsꞌ, where he related performance rating to job-related 
stress from a theoretical point of view. He concluded, through using the same 
population of the first study, that performance generally increases under pressure, but it 
reaches a maximum level and then declines. He noted that knowing every personality’s 
optimum level is the critical point in this analysis, since different personalities have 
different optimum levels of stress.  
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It was mentioned that type A personality, due to the fact that it perceives pressure more 
than other personalities, maybe have an increase in performance as stress increases but 
when it reaches the optimum point, performance declines. The same analysis was 
applied to the other three personalities. Whereas auditors who possess more challenge, 
control and commitment dispositions, the less they suffer. As a result of the minimised 
stress, a reduction of the personalitiesꞌ characteristics may lead to better performance. 
When those kinds of auditors face pressure more than the optimum level, then acquiring 
more challenge, control and commitment dispositions will reduce stress and lead also to 
better performance (Choo, 1986). 
A different approach article stating review sessions would lead to better performance 
was conducted relating audit reviews to auditorsꞌ motivation and performance (Miller et 
al., 2006). They hypothesised that auditors’ motivation to improve, and auditors’ 
performance improvement, is greater when there is a discussion during a review session 
between preparer and review. The other hypothesis was about performance and 
performance improvement, where they suggested that level of improvement is greater 
for inexperienced auditors than for experienced auditors. 
For the purpose of the study, the researchers prepared a survey in a form of a 
questionnaire to be sent to pairs of auditors, reviewer and preparer. For example, a 
senior and a staff auditor who worked on one assignment would be considered a ꞌꞌpairꞌꞌ. 
They received 154 pairs of questionnaires from a sample of auditors from big six 
accounting firms. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was used to analyse results 
to support or reject the hypothesis. The results showed that discussion during a review 
session is positively related to preparer’s motivation but it is negatively related to 
reviewer’s motivation. For the performance improvement variable, the results also 
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showed that it is highly related to the level of experience of auditors. Preparers obtain an 
increase in performance improvement compared to reviewers. The researchers 
commented on the negative relationship between level of experience and motivation and 
performance improvement, by stating that experienced auditors might be trained to such 
a processes of evaluation that could have led to this negative relationship (Miller et al., 
2006). 
Similar to Choo (1986) but not reaching exactly the same results, different stress factors 
combined with personality dispositions were studied (Fisher, 2001). Fisher defined job 
stress factors to be role ambiguity and role conflict. He hypothesises that there is a 
negative relationship between role ambiguity and conflict (independent variable) against 
auditor job performance and job satisfaction (dependent variable). 
The other hypothesis stated in this study was about Type A personality. It was assumed 
that Type A personality significantly intensifies the negative relationship between role 
ambiguity and conflict from one side and job performance from other side. This 
assumption was also used when relating role conflict and ambiguity to job satisfaction. 
Fisher (2001) used the ꞌꞌKolmogorov-Smirnovꞌꞌ normality test to test the correlation 
between variables and the distribution of variables where normal results were 
concluded. 
The research’s population was made up of 123 questionnaires completed by auditors 
employed at two of the big five public accounting firms located in New Zealand. 
Questionnaires were only sent to partners and to auditors who had a minimum of twelve 
months' experience. 
Analysis of the results supported the hypothesis of the negative relationship between 
elements of stress (role ambiguity and role conflict) when linked to job performance and 
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job satisfaction. The survey revealed a lower level of stress perceived by audit partners 
and this conclusion reflects the partners’ control over sources of stress, ambiguity and 
conflict. The results showed little evidence about extreme levels of stress faced by 
auditors in their work environment which contradicts many previous studies that 
covered stress levels and related consequences of inappropriate behaviour (Fisher, 
2001). 
Peytcheva and Gillet (2012) defined quality-threatening behaviour (QTB) as an 
international dysfunctional behaviour exercised by external auditors during an audit 
assignment. QTB is caused by perceived reputation threats. The results show that 
experienced auditors, rather than audit trainees, have more tendency to ignore audit 
evidence that is inconsistent with earlier audit decisions. This is due to the perceived 
reputation threat by prior involvement of auditors. The prior involvement factor may 
push auditors to ignore some audit evidence that is inconsistent with previous audit 
decisions (Peytcheva and Gillet, 2012). Other researchers covered two areas of auditor 
behaviour which are: 1) Under-Reporting of Time (URT) and 2) Quality Threatening 
Behaviour (QTB) (Pierce and Sweeny, 2004). URT was linked to the following 
independent variables: Budget attainability, Budget participation, Leadership 
consideration, Leadership structure, Budget style of evaluation, Non-accounting style of 
evaluation, and frequency of evaluation. 
QTB was correlated with the following independent variables: Time deadline pressure, 
Budget attainability, Budgetary participation, Leadership consideration, Leadership 
structure, Budget style of evaluation, Non-accounting style of evaluation, and frequency 
of written evaluation (Pierce and Sweeny, 2004). 
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Pierce and Sweeney (2004) hypothesised a negative relationship between budget 
attainability, auditor participation in setting budgets, leadership structure, and reliance 
on budgets for performance evaluation with dysfunctional behaviour. The other 
hypothesis was about positive relationship between time deadline pressure and QTB. 
They conducted their research based on a pre-testing scenario using small groups of 
accounting academics and ex-auditors as a pilot survey to assess changes in the audit 
field. One hundred and thirty questionnaires (316 sent, 130 received) were used to asses 
responses from audit juniors and seniors in four of the big five audit firms in Ireland. 
Parametric regression was used to test the hypothesised relationship, and multiple 
regression analysis was used to construct models of the dependent variables (Pierce and 
Sweeny, 2004). 
It was concluded that budgets are seen as less important than reported in previous 
studies because tight budgets can be implemented when firms are overstaffed but not in 
employees under shortage conditions. They also concluded that budgets are more 
important in smaller audit firms where fees are tighter. Time deadline pressure was 
directly related to Premature Sign Off (PSO) where audit firms have been imposing 
pressure to complete and to start another assignment. Leadership consideration and level 
of participation in setting budget variables were not significantly related to URT and 
QTB. 
Contrary to Pierce and Sweeney (2004), Kelly and Margheim (2002) conducted a study  
related to staff auditor time budget pressure and how their behaviour is affected by the 
senior auditors' level of participation in preparing budgets, seniors level of intervention 
in structuring audit assignment and if senior auditors take into consideration staff 
auditor perception to pressure. They used the questionnaire method to receive responses 
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from eighty-five matched pairs of senior and staff auditors who worked on the same 
audit assignment. Three US offices from a CPA international firm participated in this 
study where a regression analysis, a two person model, was used to relate audit seniors' 
and staff responses. 
The results revealed a lack of correlation between senior and junior auditors. For 
example, staff auditors perceive more Time Budget Pressure (TBP) when seniors are 
involved in budget setting, while senior auditors believe that there is less TBP on staff 
auditors when they are involved in budget planning. For audit structuring, there was a 
negative relation between staff auditor perception of TBP and senior job structuring. It 
was assumed in this finding that if there is less senior job structuring, there is a high 
staff auditors’ perception of TBP. 
Kelly and Margheim (2002) mentioned that these findings show a big gap between 
senior and staff auditors. While seniors believe that if they participated in budget 
preparation, pressure will be less on staff auditors, but the results showed exactly the 
opposite. 
Another study analysing budget tightness was conducted on a population sample from 
Mauritius (Soobaroyen and Chengabroyan, 2006). What makes this research different 
from previous studies is that it covered developing countries rather than developed 
countries. The researchers linked budget tightness to Premature Sign-Off (PSO), Under-
Reporting of Time (URT), level of participation in the time budget and level of 
influence of the audit programme. Over 52 questionnaires were used, completed by 
auditors working from the top 20 audit firms in Mauritius. The researchers used one 
way ANOVA to analyse the relationship between the variables. To avoid biased replies 
or improper questionnaires content, a pilot test was conducted and performed by an 
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audit partner and accounting lecturers at the University of Mauritius. Also, an ANOVA 
test was performed to study the extent of the relationship between budget tightness and 
different independent variables. 
Survey results showed that as budget tightness increases, PSO would increase also but 
only to a certain threshold, then it decreases at higher levels of budget tightness. What is 
different from other studies is that no significant relationship took place between URT 
and budget tightness in addition to smaller evidence of the perceived levels of role 
stress auditors face in their work environment. This was due to the fact of companies’ 
nature and size in Mauritius, and it was noted that companies have closer business and 
family relationships, which might have played a major role in smoothing the budget 
tightness levels and its consequences (Soobaroyen and Chengabroyan, 2006).  
McNamara and Liyanarachchi (2008) anaylsed the behaviour of auditors against time 
budget only. The study includes auditors from the Big-Four and non B-g-Four audit 
firms . It is concluded that time budget have an impact on dysfunctional behaviour on 
auditors. The purpose of the current research is to relate dysfunctional behaviour to 
audit quality. It is perceived that audit quality is accomplished more by Big-Four 
auditors rather than other auditors in the UK.  
Another study on components of pressure was conducted in relation to time budget 
pressure (Otley and Pierce, 1996). Otley and Pierce conducted their research on audit 
seniors working in three of the big six audit firms in Ireland using the questionnaire 
method. 
They hypothesised that as budget tightness increases; reduction in audit behaviour and 
under-reporting of time will increase, but not in an increasing rate but it will reach a 
maximum level and then decrease. Otley and Pierce (1996) also hypothesised that 
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budget attainability is positively related to senior auditorsꞌ level of participation in 
setting budgets and the ꞌꞌperceived influence of audit programmeꞌꞌ, while budget 
attainability is negatively related to the “perceived influence of clients over audit time 
budgets”. 
The study was conducted over a population of audit seniors working at three of the big 
six audit firms in Ireland. Otley and Pierce (1996) found that time budgets were 
generally perceived as demanding targets.  It was also surprising that meeting a budget 
deadline has been used as a significant factor by audit seniors in their performance 
evaluation and their progress in the audit firm, rather than using budgetsꞌ attainability as 
a main goal to accomplish audit assignments with limited time and having the same 
level of audit effectiveness. This supports another conclusion stating that if seniors were 
not involved in audit reduction behaviour and under-reporting of time, budgets would 
never be attained or less attained. They concluded that budgets are a very demanding 
target, and are correlated with the evaluation ratings rather than maintaining a better 
quality of audit. 
Also, Ponemon (1992) conducted a study to determine the determinants of auditorsꞌ 
under-reporting of time as the only dependent variable. He related this variable to two 
independent variables: budget attainability and peer pressure, where those variables 
relied basically on the auditor's moral reasoning and his different levels (high moral and 
low moral). In other words, Ponemon tried to analyse the factors of under-reporting of 
time and the impact of auditors’ level of moral reasoning to commit an under-reporting 
of time or not when faced with peer pressure and budget attainability pressure. 
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The sample of the study was made up of 88 staff auditors from a national public office 
in the US. All subjects of the experiment were assigned into two groups: 1) Time 
budget pressure group, and 2) Peer pressure group. 
There was also a control group that did not have any kind of pressure. They were given 
an audit task to complete (bank reconciliation and completion of cash work paper) and a 
questionnaire to answer. Ponemon (1992) defined psychology of moral reasoning as 
follows: ꞌꞌthe psychology of moral reasoning provides a theory that explains the human 
decision-making process prior to ethical behaviourꞌꞌ. It was concluded that audit firms 
may reduce under-reporting of time by increasing moral reasoning levels, since auditors 
with low moral reasoning tend to have dysfunctional behaviour more than those with 
high levels. 
False sign-off is defined as when auditors clear an audit procedure stating it has been 
accomplished but in fact it has not (Hyatt and Taylor, 2012). Hyatt and Taylor (2012) 
concluded that audit supervisors tend to report false sign-off of staff auditors when it 
was made intentionally and when the staff auditors are not facing time budget pressure. 
The study is related to the theory of ꞌꞌretributive justiceꞌꞌ and to what extent observers 
(senior auditors) assign responsibility to a wrongdoer (staff auditors). 
An audit case study was prepared in a form of an experiment and 55 responses were 
usable. The sample subjects comprised of auditors employed at large national CPA 
firms in Midwestern states, Cleveland, USA. It was hypothesised that a positive 
relationship between intentional false sign-off and existence of time budget pressure to 
senior auditor reporting on false sign-offs. The results show that senior auditors are 
more tolerant with false sign-offs when the act is unintentional and took place under 
high time budget pressure. As a result of this survey, Hyatt and Taylor (2012) 
58 
 
highlighted the training aspect. They reinforced the importance of staff auditors training 
programmes for less-false sign-off activities. Also, senior auditors should be trained 
more about their perception on when and what to report and to be vigilant when 
reviewing staff auditors' work. 
2.8 Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance 
The role of external auditors has always been an issue of debate regarding the nature, 
responsibility, and scope of tasks performed by auditors. Abdel-Khalik (2002) focused 
on the role of auditors as being an agent to the management. Instructors teach students 
that auditors are a ꞌꞌwatchdogsꞌꞌ for shareholders. Abdel-Khalik (2002) referred to these 
terms because in fieldwork, auditors are in relationship with management on a daily 
basis during the audit assignment, while they are only compensated and selected by a 
board of directors. Subsequently, the existence of agency conflict in management-board 
of directors' relationship affects the external middle layer of governance, the external 
auditor.  Habib and Bhuiyan (2011) support indirectly Abdel-Khalik's (2002) result by 
mentioning that the role of external auditors is considered an important factor in the 
classic agency problem between shareholders and management.  
Investors rely on audited financial statements in their investment decision-making 
process. It is argued in this study that auditor specialisation is inversely related to audit 
report lag. Audit report lag is defined to be the period between the company's fiscal year 
and audit report date. The results show that, as auditors are more specialised in the 
industry they audit, the less is the audit report lag. It is due to the fact that specialised 
auditors can spend less time to finalise an audit assignment and subsequently minimise 
the time period between the fiscal year and the audit report lag (Habib and Bhuiyan, 
2011). Audited financial statements are prepared by external auditors for the sake of 
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helping different stakeholders in investment decisions (Ussahawanitchakit, 2012). As 
part of maintaining a quality audit, auditors have to comply with set auditing standards 
(Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) that include different standards and 
statements that help in improving audit quality.   
Ussahawanitchakit (2012) argues that there is a significant positive relationship between 
audit planning and audit quality. Audit planning is defined to be the preliminary process 
auditors perform in the planning stage of an audit assignment. In particular, it involves 
understanding a client's business, setting materiality thresholds, assessing different 
risks, preliminary analytical review and understanding the internal control environment. 
It was concluded that the five dimensions of audit planning have a positive significant 
relationship with audit quality due to the fact that proper audit planning helps auditors 
in better audit strategy to accomplish a good quality audit (Ussahawanitchakit, 2012).  
Six factors are identified as contributing a better audit quality as follows: technical 
competence, ethical value, appropriate audit-client relationship, experienced and 
sceptical judgements, compliance with good working practices, good leadership and 
good quality control, and monitoring review process (ICAEW, 2002). Zaman and Holm 
(2012) conclude that investors, professional bodies and audit firms support the 
definition and factors of audit quality as defined by the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) at the ꞌꞌAudit Quality Forumꞌꞌ (ICAEW, 2002). Regardless of their support, the 
three groups consider that the FRC response to improve audit quality is insufficient. 
Audit firms consider that audit committees should play a role in promoting and 
contributing to better audit quality (Zaman and Holm, 2012). 
Financial figures, and not only the six factors of audit quality (ICAEW, 2002), affect 
audit quality. Sattar et al. (2004) concluded that audit quality is inversely related to the 
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cost of debt financing. This is due because the duality role external auditors perform in 
reducing information asymmetry and insurance role are ꞌꞌeconomically significant to the 
cost of debtꞌꞌ.  Imhoff-Jr (2003) conducted a historical review of the history of 
accounting quality, audit profession and its related challenges and changes in 
regulations, and the development of corporate governance role in a corporation.  
From an audit perspective Imhoff-Jr (2003) presented recommendations to the CPA 
firms to areas of auditor auditing former auditor, conflict with management, and the 
possibility of losing part of a portfolio of clients and the adequacy of training. Such 
recommendations affect audit quality if implemented as stated. He emphasised on 
auditors' rotation and subsequent problems as a result of such rotation, such as losses in 
first year of rotation, excessive chargeable hours recorded by auditor that may lead to an 
increase in audit fees. This study was presented based on previous literature and 
academic literature and recommendations were raised based on personal perception and 
opinion. There were no empirical models prepared to validate proposed 
recommendations.  As part of external auditor role, Holm and Birkholm (2007) 
concluded that communication should be improved between external auditor and audit 
committees. They focused on areas related to non-audit assignments and if any pressure 
is exercised on auditors to issue an audit report preferred by company's management if 
they will be signing or performing non-audit assignment.  
Cohen et al. (2007) conducted an academic research and concluded that companies with 
a weak corporate governance role have a tendency of not showing negative results in 
earnings.  Such companies have the tendency to use poor accrual accounting that may 
lead to a conflict with external auditors. As a result of potential conflict, the tolerance 
level for potential misstatements of auditors varies according to different conditions and 
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to what extent clients are willing to use poor accrual accounting. Abbot et al. (2000) 
concluded that companies with more independent directors and effective audit 
committees assign more quality auditors, since more independent directors care more 
for monetary and reputational losses. Healthier companies, compared with companies 
having poor financial conditions, are able to have their preferred resolution when facing 
a conflict with external auditors (Knapp, 1985). This conclusion is due to the fact that 
when an issue is dealt with no direct reference to technical standards, a company is able 
to avoid modified or qualified audit opinion.  
Along with Abbot et al. (2002), audit committees play an important role in controlling 
management with the help of external auditors (Rustam et al., 2013). Although audit 
fees are considered an economic cost to the firm, it is directly related to audit 
committees' activities and expertise. Effective and expert audit committees contribute to 
good corporate governance and quality financial reporting. External auditors, 
accordingly generate better audit quality in relation to the increased demand of audit 
committee members. Better audit quality is directly related to an increase in audit hours 
auditors spend on audit-related tasks (Rustam et al., 2013). 
A study was conducted to cover the going-concern factor in retaining or dismissing 
auditors. It relates the auditor's reputation and corporate governance from one side and 
impact of corporate governance from another side (Uang et al., 2006). It was concluded 
that the more shareholders play a monitoring role in a company, the less the gap 
between management and auditors' disclosure, as companies with effective governance 
mechanisms face less reporting and disclosure conflicts with their external auditors.  
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2.9 Corporate Governance and Audit Quality: Gaps and Potential 
Contribution 
The Board of Directors, considered as one of governance mechanisms, is 
responsible for assigning external auditors, approving audit fees, re-assigning external 
auditors, engaging with external auditors for non-audit assignments, and establishing 
audit committees to cooperate with external auditors (UK corporate Governance code, 
2010). External auditors' reports are addressed to the board of directors (ISA700 UK & 
Ireland, 2009). Audit committees are made up of a minimum of three members or two 
members in smaller companies (below FTSE 350). Their main role is to monitor the 
integrity of the financial reporting process, review and validate control environment 
design and effectiveness, review external auditors' work, and set up policies when 
engaging with external auditors to perform non-audit services (UK corporate 
Governance code, 2010). 
The auditor-auditee relationship has been considered crucial in performing audit 
assignments in areas of risk assessment, audit risk, and business risk (Sahnoun and 
Zarai, 2009). Besides this technical type of relationship that Sahnoun and Zarai (2009) 
discussed in their study, this section describes how auditors' behaviour may vary 
positively or negatively specifically in relation to the main corporate governance 
principles directly related to external auditors as mentioned above. As part of the 
auditor-auditee relationship (Sahnoun and Zarai, 2009) auditing is said to be an external 
corporate governance monitoring mechanism (Jinet et al., 2011). It has been said that 
auditing banks is more complex that auditing industrial firms. Accordingly, there is an 
inverse relationship between the type of auditor (Big Four or non-Big Four) and banks 
facing problems leading to failure and bankruptcy.  
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Jinet et al. (2011) conclude that banks have lower chances to fail when they are audited 
by a Big Four auditing firm. It is argued that Big Four audit firms care more for their 
reputation. They do not become involved in hiding bad and negative disclosures when 
the results are not to the benefit of their clients. This professional behaviour helps the 
Big Four auditors to perform better audit assignments with better quality which will 
lower the chance of banks to go into failure.  The risk of making a wrong decision 
leading to bankruptcy or failure can be mitigated by referring to audited financial 
statements.  Audited financial statements are prepared by external auditors for the sake 
of helping different stakeholders in investment decisions (Ussahawanitchakit, 2012).  
As part of maintaining a quality audit, auditors have to comply with set auditing 
standards (Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) that include different standards and 
statements that help in improving audit quality. Ussahawanitchakit (2012) argues that 
there is a significant positive relationship between audit planning and audit quality. 
Audit planning is defined to be the preliminary process auditors perform in the planning 
stage of an audit assignment. In particular, it involves understanding the clients' 
business, setting materiality thresholds, assessing different risks, preliminary analytical 
review and understanding the internal control environment. It was concluded that the 
five dimensions of audit planning have a positive significant relationship with audit 
quality due to the fact that proper audit planning helps auditors with a better audit 
strategy to accomplish a good quality audit (Ussahawanitchakit, 2012).  
A study was conducted by Lin and Liu (2009) who suggested that all other things being 
equal, Chinese firms with a higher percentage of shareholder positions held by 
controlling shareholders, smaller supervisory boards, chairman of the board and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) position being held by the same person, are all factors 
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affecting the change to a smaller number of auditors and the consequence of this on 
audit partners' behaviour. A logit regression method was used to analyse the results.  
They concluded that the poor Corporate Governance (CG) in China plays a significant 
role in giving shareholders more power to exercise on external auditors where poor 
levels of CG are associated with lower quality auditors. 
The second hypothesis that relates the number of supervisory board members to the 
choice of smaller auditors was not supported in this study, where no statistical relation 
was noted. This may be the result of the poor role of Board of Directors as well. Other 
factors other than the formation of companies that may lead to a change to a lower 
quality auditor was not discussed. Unlike Lin and Liu (2009), a study was conducted 
highlighting the financial performance and growth factors to be considered as possible 
reasons to change external auditors (Abdul Nasser et al., 2006). 
The auditor–client relationship in Malaysia has been researched by Abdul Nasser et al. 
(2006) to discover possible reasons for companies in Malaysia changing from Big Four 
to non-Big Four audit firms. They posit the nature and size of companies which can be 
two of many factors to change auditors. They hypothesised that changing from Big Four 
to non-Big Four audit firms is related to the size, growth, and financial distress of 
companies. The population of this study consists of listed companies in Malaysia and a 
logistic regression was used. It was concluded that client size, financial risk and changes 
in total assets play a significant role in switching to Big Four audit firms. On the other 
hand, these factors do not play the same role in the tenure of an audit firm. As we can 
see in the above conclusion, recorded and stated performance evidenced in the financial 
statements is essential for companies to assign Big Four audit firms. In other words, if a 
Big Four firm is in the process of renewing its engagement letter for another period of 
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time, possibly the audited financial statements may (or may not) play a significant role 
in the negotiation process. 
Another study covered companies' choice of auditors before and after the privatisation 
process. The nature of ownership of privatised companies plays a significant role in 
assigning an external auditor (Guedhami et al., 2009). This study dealt with the role of 
state and foreign ownership structures of different companies in assigning high quality 
auditors. The researchers hypothesise that as state ownership increases and foreign 
ownership decreases, the likelihood of choosing high quality auditors decreases. The 
dependent variable is auditor choice, where it was studied before one year and after 
three years of privatisation to identify the effect of the privatisation factor. Independent 
variables were ownership structure, different financial information generated from 
annual reports, and control privatisation. The sample of this research was made up of 
176 privatised companies selected from 21 emerging markets. To analyse the 
relationship between dependant and independent variables, the researchers used 
univariate and multivariate logistic regression to theoretically link between auditor 
choice and type of company's structure. 
Along with the results of Abdul Naser et al. (2006) who concluded that client size, 
financial risk and changes in total assets play a significant role in switching to Big Four 
audit firms, the results of this study are divided mainly into two sections: evidence 
before and after privatisation. It was concluded from evidence before privatisation that 
there is a negative relation between state ownership and Big Four auditor choice and a 
positive relation between foreign ownership and choosing Big Four auditors. For the 
evidence after privatisation, it was concluded that foreign ownership plays a significant 
role in pushing to assign Big Four audit firms. Also there is a high tendency to assign 
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Big Four auditors when government relinquishes part of its ownership, mainly above 50 
per cent. In general, the results supported the pre-set hypothesis that related ownership 
structure, government and foreign ownership to the choice of auditors with a tendency 
to assign a high quality auditor when government ownership is minimal and foreign 
ownership is dominant (Guedhami et al., 2009). It can be noted from the conclusion that 
state owned companies tend to assign non-Big Four auditors. In other words, the 
researchers tried to mention indirectly that state owned companies tend to present poor, 
biased and misleading financial statements; and for this reason, they hire low-quality 
auditors. It can be noted in the second hypothesis that governments may sell more than 
50 per cent of their ownership which may not go along with their intention to present 
poor financial statements and dominate companies. 
Besides the privatisation factor studied by Guedhami et al. (2009), type and nature of 
ownership were also studied to relate between auditor's choice and structure of 
companies. This study covered areas related to audit committee characteristics and their 
impact in auditor's selection (Abbot et al., 2000). Unlike Chinese companies that tend to 
hire low-quality auditors when having weak corporate governance (Lin and Liu, 2009), 
the researchers hypothesised that there is a significant positive relationship between 
effectiveness of audit committees and choosing a specialised, high-quality auditor.  
The Dependant variable was defined to be auditor selection process that was measured 
by auditor market share. The independent variable was defined to be audit committee 
characteristics. Monitoring, frequent meetings, outsiders members and presence of 
managers in the audit committee were set to be explanatory variables to be able to proxy 
audit committee characteristics. Companies comprising the sample of this study were 
selected from listed companies on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
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Stock Exchange (AMEX) or National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation (NASDAQ) during 1994. The researchers used univariate analysis and 
logistic regression to define industry specialist and auditor choice by companies; and 
they used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to measure specialisation by auditors. The 
result of this study supported the pre-set hypothesis. There is a positive relationship 
between audit committee effectiveness and independence and choosing an industry-
specialist auditor. Hence, the results are sensitive to the definition of effective and 
independent members of an audit committee. The study lacks a proper measurement to 
define an industry-specialist auditor since it relied only on auditor’s share in a certain 
segment of industry to be defined as a specialist. It also contradicts the conclusion 
reached by Piot and Janin (2007) who considered the existence rather than the 
independence of an audit committee plays a significant role in company’s performance 
and consequently the proposed conclusion by Abbot el al. (2000) regarding the choice 
of external auditors. 
Delivering many services other than audit assignments by audit firms is also 
considered another factor affecting auditor behaviour (Knapp, 1985). Knapp 
hypothesised that financial statement users will perceive that a company’s management 
will obtain their preferred resolution when there is a conflict with external auditors. The 
conditions when management have more power than external auditors is when an issue 
is not dealt with precisely by technical standards, the financial position of the audited 
company, the existence of Management Advisory Services (MAS), an audit assignment, 
or finally the level of competition where the company operates. 
Seventy senior commercial loan officers in the US were randomly selected to participate 
in the study and responses were measured on a seven-point Likert scale. The results 
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supported the first and second hypotheses that healthier companies, compared with 
companies being in a poor financial condition, are able to have their preferred resolution 
when facing a conflict with external auditors. This result applies also to the hypothesis 
related to conflict resolution, when it is not stated clearly in technical standards. The 
researchers concluded that the level of awareness of financial statement users is 
continuously increasing and consequently the audit firm’s credibility is being damaged 
(Knapp, 1985). 
The numbers of years where auditors were assigned was researched as another factor 
auditors face when resisting management pressure. The aspect of the relationship 
between external auditor and shareholders was studied relating auditor tenure to the 
voting of shareholders (Dao et al., 2008). Only one hypothesis was covered in this study 
that assumed there is no relationship between auditor tenure and the votes of 
shareholders against auditor re-appointment.  The dependent variable for this article was 
the log of total assets, proportion of shares held by officers directors, proportion of 
shares held by a block-holder (i.e. a shareholder owning more than 5% of the shares), 
duality role of CEO and chairman, return on assets, common stock return, ration of non-
audit fees to audit fees, the auditor is Big Four or not, and number of years auditor was 
assigned. 
The population of this study was made up of 2,084 US companies for the year ended  
31 December 2005, and it was only restricted to companies having a fiscal year ending 
31 December. The researchers used multiple regression models to analyse the sample 
tested. The results showed that larger companies’ shareholders tended to vote against 
auditor ratification when the auditor had been assigned for a long period. This result 
about audit tenure seems to be applicable in the US market, where Piot and Janin (2007) 
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concluded that auditor tenure is not considered a significant factor in the auditor-auditee 
relationship. 
The corporate governance role, and specifically internal auditor role, is gaining 
more advantage against the role of the external auditor (Holm and Birkholm, 2007). No 
empirical methods were conducted in this study but rather an interpretive framework 
and data collected by referring to many articles and journals. The researchers 
highlighted the difference in roles between external auditors who are considered agents 
for shareholders and stakeholders, and internal auditors who are considered agents of 
the day-to-day management team. They concluded that internal control mechanisms, as 
a result of promulgations, have extended the role of the control system and gained a 
supervisory role.in addition to this the audit committee should be independent from 
management besides the evolving role of internal auditors who are now involved in risk 
assessment and evaluating internal control systems. Hence, we should mention a critical 
point regarding this conclusion that International Standards of Auditing (ISA 610) and 
Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS 500) have allowed external auditors to rely on 
internal audit work where applicable and under certain defined conditions. 
Besides the role of corporate governance and its different principles and bodies that are 
gaining power against the role of external auditors (Holm and Birkholm, 2007), a 
research was conducted to relate between audit fees also to the level of financial and 
accounting expertise of audit committee members and different factors that may play a 
significant role in assessing auditorsꞌ behaviour (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). The 
two hypotheses for this study were defined as the association of audit fees to the level of 
financial expertise, and relating the above to the ratio of receivables and inventories in a 
balance sheet. To analyse the relation between the dependent variable, 'Audit fees' and 
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the independent variable 'Audit committee expertise', accounting financial experts were 
defined as directors with experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, principal 
or chief financial officer, controller, or principal or chief accounting officer, the 
proportion of audit committee directors who qualify as accounting financial experts to 
the total number of directors in the audit committee. Non-accounting financial experts 
are directors with experience as the chief executive officer or president of a for-profit 
corporation. 
Audit committee expertise is measured by the portion of accounting/financial members 
to total audit committee members and also through the portion of members who qualify 
at either accounting or financial expertise level. The researchers selected a sample of 
companies listed in Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 500) that were audited by big five 
(four) audit firms only and linear regression was used to analyse the results. Krishnan 
and Visavanathan (2009) concluded, consistent with their expectations, that audit fees 
for big clients are higher than small and middle enterprise clients, but firms having 
losses also have high audit fees due to the high audit risk tolerated by the auditor. Also, 
one may assume that an active audit committee may lead to lower audit fees, but 
findings showed the opposite since active committee members require more effort from 
auditors and subsequently higher audit fees. One major finding revealed that not having 
a duality role between the CEO and chairman position may lead to less poor 
performance of a companyꞌs activities, and consequently to lower audit fees. 
Nevertheless, it was clearly supported that audit committee members with 
financial/accounting expertise lead to lower audit fees (Krishnan and Visavanathan, 
2009). 
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For the second hypothesis, the results showed that lower audit fees are associated with 
accounting expertise of audit committee members as a single factor, but when this is 
related to a big portion of inventory and accounts receivable, the risk of earnings 
management would overcome the expertise factor leading to higher audit fees. The level 
of independence of board and committee members had no effect on pricing and audit 
assignment. In conclusion, the researchers managed to highlight that audit fees are not 
only linked to the expertise factor, but this should be accompanied by an effective 
company’s structure and corporate governance. The level of independence variable that 
was found to have no effect in pricing an audit assignment has been proven, along with 
audit committee effectiveness, to play a significant role in assigning an industry 
specialist auditor (Abbot et al., 2000)  
Cohen et al., (2007) also analysed the effect of board role in the planning stage 
of an audit assignment when defining risks. Different hypotheses were set out for this 
study relating between performance of companies’ boards in areas of dependence role 
and agency role to auditors’ nature of testing. The independent variables were the level 
of agency role and the dependency role of boards; whereas the dependent variable was 
the change in auditor’s risk assessment and nature of testing. The population of this 
study consisted of auditors employed at Big Four audit firms in the US. Auditors were 
given a case study about a high-tech company and information was provided on the 
inventory cycle. They were asked to assess inherent and control risks. A regression 
analysis was used to analyse the results after designing a two-by-two fully-crossed 
factorial experimental design. 
The results support the hypothesis that auditors tend to lower the level of testing when 
there is an effective role of corporate governance and this was also applied to the 
72 
 
control and inherent risk level. This finding is not surprising since as per International 
Standards of Auditing (ISA 610), auditors are highly recommended to adjust initial 
assessment of risks when there is evidence of a healthy control environment. Auditors 
in such an environment decrease control risk and subsequently their substantive testing. 
Contrary to ISA, reliance on internal audit work may lead to a better position for the 
internal audit function and gain advantage over the external auditors’ role (Holm and 
Birkolm, 2007). 
Some studies have been published calling for a change in the Corporate 
Governance formation and role following the Enron crisis. One of these studies dealt 
with the relationship between external auditors and the board of directors (Abdel-
Khalik, 2002). This study was conducted based on personal perception of the different 
role of corporate governance. The main purpose of this study was to suggest possible 
solutions for auditor independence. The role of auditors as agent to the management 
was highlighted, while in fact academic personnel teach students that auditors are a 
“watchdogs” for shareholders. The study referred to these terms because in fieldwork, 
auditors are in a relationship with management on a daily basis during the audit 
assignment, while they are only compensated and selected by the board of directors. 
The author also indicated that auditor independence may be impaired if any auditor is 
chosen to perform any additional consultancy services. To mitigate such potential 
impaired independence, Abdel-Khalik(2002) suggested the establishment of a 
Shareholder Board of Trustees (SBT).  
The role of this board is to decide, select, and compensate the chosen auditors. Its 
members will be selected by shareholders but with no proxy vote, and no overlapping 
members between Board of Directors (BoD) and SBT. Again the researcher in this 
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study, tried to create more committees assuming that more committees and more gap 
between external auditors and shareholder/BoD would minimise the level of impairment 
in independence but without considering other factors affecting auditors’ independence. 
Since members of the SBT will be assigned by shareholders who assign or elect the 
board of directors, it is believed this suggestion needs to be more thoroughly studied. 
Along with Abdel-Khalik’s  (2002) article of changing the role of corporate governance, 
an article relying on academic literature was issued to study the relationship and impact 
of auditor communication with corporate governance principles, board of directors and 
audit committees (Cohen et al., 2007). The researchers focused on the impact of such 
communication between auditor on one side and the board of directors and audit 
committees on the other, and its collision over the financial reporting process, internal 
controls and control environment. 
A list of Discussion Questions (DQ) was raised to analyse the timeliness of required 
auditor communication and the style of compliance with accounting standards 
(aggressive/conservative). The study hypothesised that clientsꞌ management may use 
accrual accounting to distort financial performance. As a result of this academic 
research and its related literature review, the researchers concluded that companies with 
a weak corporate governance role have a tendency not to show negative results in 
earnings and have a tendency to use poor accrual accounting. In such scenarios conflict 
with external auditors takes place and the tolerance level for potential misstatements of 
auditors varies according to different cases and to what extent clients are willing to use 
poor accrual accounting. They also highlighted the area of external auditors' reliance on 
internal auditors' work. This reliance should be supported by a proper communication 
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with the audit committee regarding the performance and quality of internal audit work 
and tasks.  
Auditors should mention to audit committee members the reason of their reliance or not 
on internal auditors' work and in which areas they relied on their work, if any. This 
shows the combined efforts between external and internal auditors, unlike Holm and 
Birkholm’s (2007) conclusion about role conflict between internal and external auditors. 
The study also concluded that communication should be improved between external 
auditor and audit committees in areas related to non-audit assignments and if any 
pressure is exercised on auditors to issue an audit report preferred by companyꞌs 
management, if they will be signing or performing a non-audit assignment. This 
conclusion aligns with Knappꞌs (1985) conclusion regarding conflict resolution between 
auditors and management. 
Whereas previous articles relied on previous literature and academic data to study the 
impact of the corporate governance role and its impact on the auditor’s role (Cohen et 
al., 2007; Abdel Khalik, 2002), another review of previous research and literature was 
conducted to propose personal points of view of how things should be done to improve 
the financial reporting process (Imhoff-Jr, 2003). Imhoff-Jr (2003) reviewed the history 
of accounting quality, audit profession and its related challenges and changes in 
regulations, and the development of corporate governance role in a corporation. The 
author started the study by a review of past literature of the role of the corporate board 
and the establishment of the audit committee during the twentieth century. It was 
indicated that one of its main tasks was to separate and at the same time relate between 
independent auditors and management.  
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From an audit perspective, the researcher presented recommendations to the CPA firms 
to areas of the auditor auditing the former auditor, conflict with management and the 
possibility of losing part of a portfolio of clients, and the adequacy of training. He also 
emphasised auditorsꞌ rotation and subsequent problems as a result of such rotation, such 
as losses in the first year of rotation, excessive chargeable hours recorded by an auditor 
that may lead to an increase in audit fees. He suggested that given the state of 
technology in auditing and assurance services, training the proper personnel assigned to 
difference assignments, in addition to the guidance provided by Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards ꞌꞌGAASꞌꞌ, may help in reducing auditor rotation costs. This study 
was presented based on previous literature and academic literature and 
recommendations were raised based on personal perception and opinion. There were no 
empirical models prepared to validate proposed recommendations (Imhoff-Jr, 2003). 
In contrary to the above research that mainly focused on previous literature and a 
personal point of view regarding the mechanism of corporate governance, a review of 
the corporate governance role when planning an audit assignment has been conducted to 
assess this role based on research questions and not on previous research (Cohen et al., 
2002). This study was based on a set of research questions addressed to partners, 
managers, and seniors in the form of interviews. The sample was selected from Big five 
(four) audit firms and one local firm in the US.  
The research questions, which have been asked of the audit personnel, cover areas 
related to the perception of corporate governance by auditors, and if an auditor takes 
into consideration the role of corporate governance when planning an audit assignment, 
and if this role varies between clients. The second set of research questions were related 
to the importance of an audit committee in a corporate governance mechanism and 
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auditor’s point of view about the expected change in the corporate governance role in 
the future. 
One initial disclosure of the conducted interviews shows a contradiction with the 
agency theory. Where agency theory focuses on the role of the board of directors and 
audit committee serving at an independent supervisory level between management and 
shareholders, the responses show that the auditors believe that management sets the tone 
of corporate governance. It was also revealed that managers' and partners’ levels were 
more involved in assessing the corporate governance factor when planning an audit 
assignment, since seniors were considered as a 'gatherers' (Cohen et al., 2002). 
It was viewed that corporate governance is more important in multinational rather 
domestic companies due to the fact of more regulations and credibility against the 
public.  Going back to the contradiction with agency theory concept, interviews also 
showed that one principle of corporate governance code, which is the audit committee, 
was considered less important compared to the importance of top management. It was 
clearly concluded that the majority of respondents indicated a growing role for 
corporate governance, in addition to their recommendation for the corporate 
governance, to play a major role in companies to avoid any potential weaknesses.  
The relation between auditor dismissals when issuing a going-concern report 
was discussed to link between auditors’ behaviour and companies’ structure (Carcello 
and Neal, 2003). The researchers studied the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and dismissal of an external auditor after issuing a going-concern audit 
report. They hypothesised a positive relationship between the existence of affiliated 
directors on the audit committee, and the ownership of stock options by audit committee 
members, and the likelihood of dismissing an auditor after a going-concern report. 
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On the other hand, they hypothesised a negative relationship between the directorship 
positions held by audit committee members and the level of financial expertise held by 
the same members to the dismissal of external auditors after issuing going-concern 
reports. The study was conducted on 174 companies, who received a going-concern 
report. 
The relation between audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals was 
analysed by using logit analysis. The result of this study revealed a strong relationship 
between the percentage of affiliated directors in audit committees, and auditors being 
dismissed subsequent to issuing a going-concern report. As audit committees comprise 
more affiliated directors, there is a higher likelihood of auditors being dismissed, and 
this has been demonstrated more in recent years of the study as the population was 
made of a sample of companies between 1988 and 1999. Audit committee members 
who have more governance expertise are less likely to dismiss an auditor subsequent to 
issuing a going-concern report. It was noted that the financial expertise variable was 
found to have no effect on auditors’ dismissals. 
A study was conducted to cover the going-concern factor in retaining or dismissing 
auditors. It relates the auditor’s reputation and corporate governance from one side and 
impact of corporate governance from another side (Uang et al., 2006). The hypothesis of 
this study was about the effect of going-concern disclosures between auditor-
recommended disclosures and management’s actual disclosure, taking into 
consideration the financial performance of a company. To analyse the relationship of 
management, going-concern disclosures and the impact of auditors and management, 
researchers defined many independent variables to assess the dependent variable: 
management going-concern disclosure. The first independent variable is auditor 
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characteristics. It is measured by: auditor rank, ratio of audit fee to total auditor revenue, 
ratio of auditor fees to client’s total income, ratio of non-audit fees, and if the auditor 
has changed from previous years. 
For the second independent variable, corporate governance structure, this was measured 
by: the duality role of a CEO, board size, ratio of non-executive board members, 
presence of an audit committee, percentage of equity held by directors at balance sheet 
date, percentage of equity held by institutional shareholders, CEO tenure, and 
companyꞌs leverage by calculating total debt to total assets 
Measuring going-concern disclosure was performed in two ways. First, content analysis 
through assessing the content of management going-concern disclosed and second, if a 
directorꞌs statement had included a Cadbury explanatory paragraph.  
The sample of this study was made up of one hundred and seventy-nine non-financial 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and regression models were used to 
analyse results. 
It was also concluded that there is a serious agency problem when management is 
pushed to report bad information related to going-concern disclosures. The more 
stakeholder and shareholder play a monitoring role in a company, the less the gap 
between management and auditorsꞌ disclosure. Also, the more reputation an audit has, 
the less going-concern reporting conflicts with management. But we can refer here to 
the audit expectancy gap and the different debates between clients and external auditors 
to specify properly the role of external auditors. They are not considered as ꞌꞌwatchdogsꞌꞌ 
as Abdel-Khalik (2002) mentioned in criticising previous literature, and another 
possible suggestion to avoid conflicts between management is to minimise the 
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expectancy gap and the managementꞌs perception of the external auditors’ role 
(Iskander, 2008). 
Auditors’ role in addition to their potential corporate governance role was studied to 
relate between the levels of corporate governance mechanismsꞌ performance and the 
choice of companies to hire and assign Big Four audit firms (Fan and Wong, 2005). 
They hypothesised that companiesꞌ decision to assign Big Four audit firms is directly 
related to the agency theory problems embedded in their ownership structure and the 
companiesꞌ demands for equity capital. In addition, they related audit fees to weak 
corporate governance structure. Mechanisms of corporate governance in East Asia, such 
as a board of directors, is mainly concentrated on a limited number of directors leading 
to weak corporate governance performance and subsequently to higher audit fees. It was 
concluded that companies with greater agency problems with high control concentration 
tend to hire Big Four auditors. It was also evident that Big Four firms charge higher 
audit fees where there is a controlling-owners and minority-shareholder conflict. The 
above conclusion justifies why auditors charge high audit fees for certain assignments. 
Auditors might be enforced to perform another role besides their main assignment to 
cover up serious weaknesses in corporate governance mechanisms. This conclusion 
leads to another factor of the continuous debate in auditor-auditee relationship. But it 
has also been shown in other studies that having effective audit committee members 
may lead to an increase in audit fees due to the fact that active members also require 
more time to be incurred by auditors (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). 
Another set of research questions was defined to enquire into directors’ and 
auditorsꞌ perception about the role of external auditors (Goodwin and Seow, 2002). 
Their survey covered auditors and companies’ directors in Singapore to relate between 
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corporate governance mechanisms and the ability of external auditors to perform an 
effective audit and to resist management pressure against the expertise of an audit 
committee, internal audit function and the existence of a code of conduct in sampled 
companies. They defined two research questions that covered the area related to the 
ability of external auditors to detect fraud and dispute existence in a management 
resistance scenario if there is an audit partner rotation and if the same auditor is auditing 
other entities with the group. The internal audit function rather than the audit committee 
was revealed to be the most significant variable in auditorsꞌ ability to resist management 
pressure. Detecting errors, control weakness, and fraud is directly related to whether the 
auditor is auditing other entities of the group. Respondentsꞌ results showed that partner 
rotation is not considered a significant factor in fraud and the control-weakness-
detection process. More detailed information was mentioned about different perceptions 
between directors and auditors. For example, directors considered an audit committee to 
be more important than an internal audit function (Goodwin and Seow, 2002). 
It can be noted that there is a wide is the gap between auditors' and directors' 
perceptions.  Auditors perceive that they should audit the whole group of companies to 
increase the probability of fraud and control weakness-detection; while directors 
perceive that a code of conduct is a significant factor in auditors resisting pressure and 
detecting fraud. This may also lead to higher audit fees if a company is willing to 
increase the probability of detecting fraud and controlling weaknesses, which is related 
to the fact that external auditor should be auditing all entities of the group, as per 
auditorsꞌ replies. 
The relationship between audit fees, corporate governance and accrual choices (Larcker 
and Richardson, 2004) was studied to analyse the amount of audit fees and non-audit 
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fees to the accrual measurement. The dependent variable is auditors’ independence 
while independent variables are the ratio of audit and non-audit fees to total fees and the 
ratio of clientꞌs fees to total revenue of the audit firm. The sample study comprises 355 
observations from clients audited by big five (four), Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman 
audit firms only. It was concluded that there is a positive relationship between 
unexpected accruals and audit fees but only when fees are measured based on the ratio 
of non-audit fees to total revenue of the audit firm. The second hypothesis relates 
earnings quality to auditor independence and clientsꞌ characteristics. It was concluded 
that there is a negative relationship between auditor independence and earnings quality 
for companies having weak corporate governance performance. This result reflects that 
companies with high insider holders and low institutional holders has a relatively weak 
corporate  governance performance, allowing companies to exercise some pressure on 
auditors, through non-audit assignment fees, to avoid huge accruals. 
Zaman et al. (2011) state that the wider audit scope, the higher audit quality. It is argued 
in this study that complex organisations and bigger ones, with the existence of expert 
audit committee members, tend to hire auditors more for non-audit services. The sample 
tested covers a period between 2001 to 2004. A composite measure of audit committee 
variables is used and board of directorsꞌ characteristics are included as control variables. 
It is concluded that there is a positive significant relationship between audit committee 
independence, audit committee meetings, and audit committee size while audit 
committee expertise is found to have no impact on audit fees. But when the composite 
measure of audit committees is used, it is found that active audit committees have a 
positive significant impact on audit fees. What is meant by active audit committees is 
audit committees meeting minimum three times a year, all members are independent , at 
least one audit committee member possess financial expertise, and minimum three 
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directors should be comprising the audit committee.   The main objective of this study is 
to analyse auditorsꞌ remuneration rather than focusing on audit quality. 
O’sullivan (2000) states that non-executive board of directors is positively significant 
with audit fees. Role duality and block holders are said to have no impact on audit fees. 
The main objective of this study is to analyse factors that may affect audit fees. The 
sample tested relates to data collected from annual reports between 1992-1994. Audit 
committeesꞌ characteristics are excluded from this study plus the Big Four audit firms 
during that period were named as Big-Six as follows: Arthur Andersen, Coopers and 
Lybrand, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG and Price Waterhouse. A 
change in audit quality might exist after the merge of Coopers and Lybrand and Price 
Waterhouse, the collapse of Arthur Andersen, and the issuance of many regulations 
since that period. 
Another research related to the concept of audit quality is conducted by Basiruddin 
(2011). This study links the levels of audit quality to the level of earnings management. 
Three proxies are used to measure audit quality as follows: audit fees, non-audit fees, 
and industry specialist auditors. Non-audit fee is used in other studies as a proxy of 
auditorsꞌ independence (Wines, 1994; Knapp, 1985) rather than a proxy for audit 
quality. Industry specialist can be a biased proxy of audit quality (Cahan et al., 2007; 
Kwon et al., 2007). The sample of this study is comprised of non-financial companies 
listed at the FTSE 350 for a period between 2005-2008. It is concluded that that 
independent boards require more services from auditors other than regular recurring 
audit assignments. Also, specialised auditors are found to reduce manipulated earnings 
management. 
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Audit fee is not only used as a proxy for audit quality but also to measure the 
monitoring function of boards of directors (Desender et al., 2013). The sample of this 
study comprises of listed companies at Madrid Stock Exchange and Paris Stock 
Exchange with the exclusion of financial companies. The results show that board of 
directorsꞌ independence and audit fees move in the same direction but only when 
ownership is dispersed but not when concentrated. This is additional evidence that the 
role of external auditors is used as a tool as a monitoring tool by shareholders to control 
management (IASSB, 2013) to manage the relationship between principals and agents 
within the agency theory framework (Bromwich, 1992). 
2.10 Conclusion 
The first group of studies analyses auditorsꞌ behaviour against factors embedded at audit 
firms and different scenarios auditors may face during their employment at audit firms. 
This group of studies covers mainly senior and audit staff levelsꞌ behaviour only; who 
are employed at Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms. 
Corporate governance studies are classified into many groups. One group of studies 
explains corporate governance mechanisms and their effect on corporationsꞌ 
performance and the relationship between agency cost to be non-compliant with 
corporate governance code. Another group defines the role of external auditors. The last 
group of studies covers the area of corporate governance characteristics and its 
relationship with audit quality and type of auditors to be assigned. 
The methods used in the previous studies varied depending on the nature of each study. 
Some studies used the questionnaire technique to analyse auditorsꞌ feedback against a 
set of questions. Other researchers conducted interviews with different audit levels and 
analysed their replies. Reviewing previous literature through an interpretative 
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framework was also used in studies that avoided the questionnaire and interview 
methods. As for studies related to corporate governance, most of these studies used the 
data-collection method, secondary data, by using different applications and data hubs 
for sampled companies. 
Previous studies analysed audit-related issues, other than audit quality, with respect to 
corporate governance principles and mechanisms selected in the study. Audit fees have 
been used in different studies with relation to non-audit fees and audit committeesꞌ 
structure (Zaman et al., 2011), to earnings management (Basiruddin, 2011), to the level 
of auditorsꞌ independence in comparison to total auditorsꞌ remineration (Wines, 1994), 
to accrual accounting treatments (Larcker and Richardson, 2004), and a measure for 
board of directors monitoring level (Desender et al., 2013). 
This research specifically analyses the dynamics of audit quality from behavioural 
approach and companiesꞌ corporate governance characteristics, mainly those 
characteristics which interact with external auditors’ tasks and nature of work. Clients’ 
corporate governance characteristics are obtained from non-financial companies listed 
in the FTSE 350. 
The principal-agent relationship (agency theory) mentioned in the theoretical foundation 
section will be explained in detail in the next chapter. Also, stakeholdersꞌ theory, 
legitimacy theory and coping behaviour theory are explained in detail in the next 
chapter, with a justification for including/not including each theory and their 
relationship to the core of this research.   
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Chapter Three - Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
 The theoretical foundation of this research focuses on the impact of audit firm 
embedded factors on auditorsꞌ behaviour and how such possible dysfunctional 
behaviour may affect audit quality. It also focuses on the determinants of audit quality 
in relation to defined corporate governance mechanisms. Those mechanisms are 
considered to be related to the nature of external audit scope.  
The theory concept helps researchers and individuals to understand the relationship 
between objects and related mechanisms and how the world moves around. The 
existence of a theory requires us also to use our reasonable expectations about objects. 
A theory will not guide us on what to do, when and where to do things or to act, but it 
will help us to eliminate countless options from consideration when we are in a situation 
to choose or to decide between different alternatives (Chambers, 1996). 
Different studies have focused on the determinants of audit fees in relation to corporate 
governance. It is said that external auditors are assigned by Boards of Directors (BoD) 
to solve the information asymmetry problem between shareholders (principal) and 
management (agent). Limited studies have used audit fees, among other proxies, as a 
signalling tool to measure audit quality. Audit quality plays a significant role in the 
decision-making process. This decision could be made by investors, creditors, bankers 
and many other stakeholders. The level of audit quality is also found to play a 
significant role in reducing the agency conflict from one side and to improve clients’ 
and audit firmsꞌ credibility and reputation from another side by issuing a good quality 
audited financial statements. It is worth mentioning here that not all audited financial 
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statements have the same quality audit. When it is referred to quality in auditing, it is 
not necessarily that the audit is improper or incorrect when financial statements are 
audited with less quality. 
It is argued in this research that corporate governance mechanisms, mainly board of 
directors, audit committees, and ownership concentration play a significant role in the 
quality of audited financial statements that are prepared by management. Preparation of 
financial statements is the sole responsibility of management where the role of external 
auditors is to give their opinion on the financial statements. Auditors perform audit 
procedures according to International Standards of Auditing (ISA), Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS) or any other defined auditing principles. Financial 
statements are normally prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
(Ussahawanitchakit, 2012).  
What determines audit quality is corporate governance mechanisms as argued in this 
research. Internal factors could be the qualifications and competences of auditors 
performing the audit assignment. The research argues that the less dysfunctional 
behaviour is committed when facing time budget pressure, time deadline pressure and 
performance evaluation the better audit quality will be.  
3.2 Theory and Accounting – An overview 
Hendriksen (1970) defines theory as a ꞌꞌcoherent set of theoretical, conceptual and 
pragmatic principles forming the general framework of reference for a field of inquiryꞌꞌ 
p.23. This definition is very close to the US definition of theory where the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1976) states that theory is a ꞌꞌcoherent system of 
interrelated objectives and fundamentals that can lead to consistent standardsꞌꞌ. The use 
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of the word ꞌꞌcoherentꞌꞌ can be noted in both definitions. It is implied that the concept of 
theory should be coherent with human behaviour to provide guidance and explanation 
about a certain phenomenon (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
Theory is not considered just a simple 'hunch' and it is a not ready concept to be used on 
demand or when exceptional scenarios exist. Therefore the coherent term is associated 
with the concept of theory that is based on logical reasoning (Hendriksen, 1970). 
As for accounting theories, some are considered inductive and others are labelled as 
prescriptive ones. The inductive theory can be based on empirical evidence, where 
predictions are made about likely occurrences. In other words, a theory is generated and 
supported later by a number of observations. The other types of accounting theories 
have a prescriptive concept. They help to predict about what should be done in certain 
events (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
Due to the fact that accounting can only be performed with the existence of an 
'accountant', accounting is considered to be a human activity. As a result of this human 
nature of accounting, individuals’ behaviour is needed to be part of the financial 
accounting theories (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
The descriptive or positive theory will be used mainly in this research rather than the 
perspective or normative theories. Normative theories are about prescribing events and 
what shall be done, while the positive theory is based on empirical evidence and 
observations (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) are considered two pioneers who excelled on positive 
accounting theory. The theory focuses on the relationship between different personnel in 
an organisation, in particular, how accounting is being used to develop the relationship 
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between different individuals. This relationship can be between top management and 
staff, shareholders and management, and many other potential “principals” and ꞌꞌagentsꞌꞌ. 
The kind of relationship between individuals and shareholders is referred to as agency 
relationship and will be covered in the next section. Accounting information is used as a 
tool for decision-making leading to different consequences. Loss consequences may 
lead to hiding some information by agents that will create information asymmetry and 
agency cost. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) developed the positive accounting theory but certain 
human matters are not included in the development of positive accounting theory. Such 
human matters are loyalty and morality. Loyalty and morality are ignored due to the fact 
that individuals are driven by self-interest and they will act by default towards more 
wealth. This self-interest factor will align with the interest of shareholders (principals) 
to lead to an organisationꞌs better performance. On the assumption that individuals are 
driven by self-interest, it is expected that organisations will establish 'alignment 
mechanisms' to achieve principal and agent objectives at the same time. 
3.2.1  Agency Theory 
Agency theory may be used as a supplement to cover the gap in having a 
comprehensive accounting theory. Agency theory is said to be a frame for the 
relationship between a principle and an agent via a contract (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Shareholders (principals) delegate tasks to be performed by management 
(agents). Tasks cover mainly operating the organisation on behalf of shareholders to 
meet their objectives. Agency theory is also considered to be a contract between 
shareholders (principals) and external auditors to control the work of other agents 
(management). 
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Auditors play a role in the agency relationship between shareholders and management. 
From one side they are considered agents assigned by the board of directors and also 
exercise an intermediary role between shareholders and management to validate 
financial statements prepared by management (Bromwich, 1992). 
Some researchers have argued that agency theory is structured to minimise the cost of 
hiring more agents. Normally, principals hire agents to work on their behalf for their 
benefit. But due to the fact that organisations are structured to reduce agency cost, 
principals prefer to work with each other within the organisation rather in the market 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Managerial integrity and managerial competency are two types of failures that may 
restrict agents to behave in alignment with principals' objectives/interests. Managerial 
integrity is related to managersꞌ behaviour that has a negative consequence on the 
appropriation of organisationsꞌ assets. Managerial competencies are related to hiding 
some information as a result of control deficiencies (Moldoveanu and Martin, 2001). 
3.2.1.1  Agency Cost 
Different costs arise as a result of separating ownership and management between 
principals and agents. Different agency costs can be summarised by monitoring costs, 
bonding costs, and residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
3.2.1.1.1 Monitoring Cost 
Monitoring costs are said to be the costs paid by principals to monitor the performance 
and stewardship skills of agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This process involves certain 
level of competencies and expertise to monitor management performance. Moreover, it 
91 
 
involves incentives by principals to pay this cost and to provide credible response on 
management control style (Denis et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, it is argued that excessive monitoring costs would limit managerial 
initiatives (Burka et al., 1997). Some researchers have criticised parts of the Cadbury 
report (1992) about the heavy monitoring cost. Heavy monitoring cost may prevent 
managerial entrepreneurship. Donaldson (1988) argues that organisations’ structure 
would facilitate effective action by management. The selected corporate governance 
characteristics play a significant role in the agency-monitoring cost and stewardship of 
management. It is argued that there is a positive impact on organisations with a small 
board of directors’ size when role duality exists.  
Role duality is when the chief executive officer and chairman roles are performed by 
one individual. As a result of a small BoD size and role duality, the decision-making 
process is facilitated easily towards a good stewardship role. But on the other hand, this 
ease of decision making, due to certain corporate governance characteristics, may harm 
shareholdersꞌ interest as is considered to be working to the benefit of agents rather than 
principals. A balance between monitoring costs and the stewardship role should be in 
place to achieve and maintain organisation performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
3.2.1.1.2 Bonding Cost 
Bonding cost is highly interrelated with monitoring cost. Bonding cost reduces the 
monitoring cost and for this reason managers tend to accept bonding cost more 
(McColgan, 2001). Agents might not satisfy shareholdersꞌ interest, so a maximum 
bonding cost is incurred to meet shareholders’ interest. Hence, no optimal bonding 
contract is available to meet highest levels of shareholdersꞌ interest (Denis, 2001). 
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The bonding cost is said to be agentsꞌ rewards and compensation in return for meeting 
principalsꞌ interest. The full set of financial statement inclusive of detailed disclosures is 
prepared by management. It is the sole responsibility of management to prepare a full 
set of financial statements in addition to a disclosures section to confirm that their 
stewardship is meeting shareholdersꞌ interest. In other words, managers are bonding 
themselves to prepare the financial statements. The cost of management binding 
themselves is referred to as binding cost in positive accounting theory (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2011). 
3.2.1.1.3 Residual Loss 
Residual loss or agency loss is the result of having monitoring cost and bonding cost. It 
is the failure of an agent to meet shareholdersꞌ interest in respect to monitoring agentsꞌ 
performance. As a result of the imbalance between bonding cost and monitoring cost, 
residual loss exists and the agentꞌs contract is not perfectly accomplished (McColgan, 
2001).  
3.2.1.2  Agency Conflict 
Different problematic factors arise as a result of the conflict between principals and 
agents. Such conflict can be summarised by moral hazard agency conflict, earning 
retention agency conflict, time horizon agency conflict and managerial risk agency 
conflict (McColgan, 2001). 
3.2.1.2.1 Moral Hazard Agency Conflict 
Higher monitoring cost is associated with corporate size. The bigger companies are the 
more complex their transactions, which may lead to difficulties in monitoring and 
subsequently higher monitoring cost (Jensen, 1993). As a result of the high monitoring 
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costs, moral hazard problems and conflicts take place between managers and 
stakeholdersꞌ interest. Managers may spend more time on compliance and private 
perquisites rather than spending time on investment plans and strategies to increase an 
organisationsꞌ value. Such behaviour is perceived by managers as protecting their stake 
in the organisation, since if organisations expand, their stake decreases (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
3.2.1.2.2 Earnings Retention Agency Conflict  
In a shareholder-agent relationship, two different types of compensations exist. While 
managers receive better compensation if they perform well and contribute more to 
organisations’ growth, shareholders on the other hand receive dividends (Jensen, 1993). 
As a result of the different type of compensations, earning retention conflict takes place. 
Corporation size is considered to be a major factor in managersꞌ compensation that may 
lead to more focus on size growth from managersꞌ side. Shareholders prefer to have 
better results in the return to shareholders' growth rather than size growth (Brennan, 
1995). It is said that shareholders prefer cash dividends while managers prefer to have 
growth in an organisationꞌs size to receive better remuneration (Jensen, 1993). 
3.2.1.2.3 Time Horizon Agency Conflict 
McColgan (2001) argues between the status of a shareholder and an agent within an 
organisation. Shareholders normally have a long-term relationship in organisations 
while managers have a relatively short-term one. Due to this fact, cash flow timing 
conflicts exists. Managers are more concerned about short-term cash flow activities to 
have cash available for their compensation packages and rewards. Shareholders, on the 
other hand, are more concerned with long-term cash flow activities that will 
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consequently provide more dividend figures. This time-horizon conflict affects the 
strategic plans of a company in general, and research and development expenditure in 
particular. 
It is concluded that there is a negative relationship between research and development 
expenditures and top managers approaching retirement age. Shareholders show more 
interest in research and development expenditure, as it will potentially generate more 
dividends, while managers are more concerned in short-term cash flow activities 
(Dechow and Sloan, 1991). 
3.2.1.2.4 Managerial Risk Aversion Agency Conflict 
Managersꞌ status is highly dependent on organisationsꞌ performance. Shareholders do 
not have the same level of dependency on organisationsꞌ performance as they can be 
doing business and owning shares in a certain organisation in the same time. Risks 
affecting organisations are avoided by managers who tend to minimise organisationsꞌ 
stock risk and avoid decisions that can have an impact on the organisation’s going 
concern (Denis, 2001). 
Since the role of external auditors is considered an important factor in the classic agency 
problem between shareholders and management (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011), the agency 
theory is used to theoretically link between corporate governance mechanisms and audit 
quality and its related determinant(s). 
3.2.2  Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory explains the relationship between organisations and their external 
environment (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders represent the big umbrella for all 
individuals and parties that may have interest in an organisation. Stakeholders can be 
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bankers, suppliers, creditors, government bodies, and political groups as mentioned in 
Figure 3.1 
 
A stakeholder is defined as a human agency that can have an impact or affect 
organisations (Gray et al., 1996). Due to this role of stockholders, organisations are not 
only accountable to shareholders only but also to stakeholders. As a result of this 
accountable relationship, many factors and conditions exist to maintain and manage the 
stakeholder-organisations relationship. Stakeholders concept is involved in the 
development of strategic planning performance measures (Atkinson et al., 1997). 
The going concern and lifetime of organisations is highly related to the support of 
stakeholders and their approval of organisationsꞌ activities (Gray et al., 1995). Ansoff 
(1965) argues that the stakeholder-organisation relationship is not limited to 
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organisationsꞌ activities and strategic plans but also to the organisationsꞌ behaviour and 
the potential impact of such behaviour on stakeholders. 
Although organisations may have a huge number of potential stakeholders as mentioned 
in Table 3.1, no priority should be given to any stakeholder at the expense of another 
stakeholder (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
The stakeholder theory has been used in massive previous literature and research 
studies. The use of the stakeholder theory is not limited to a single type of research. It 
has been used in different methodologies, various types of evidence and various 
techniques for appraisal. The main three approaches for the stakeholder theory concept 
are the normative approach, the instrumental approach, and the descriptive approach 
(Freeman, 1984). 
The normative approach is said to be the core of the stakeholder theory. It focuses on 
the individual or group of individualsꞌ rights, social contract and social responsibility 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995). The second core is said to be instrumental approach that 
involves prediction about certain practices and obtaining results at a later stage. This 
approach focuses on relating corporate performance to stakeholders. The third core is 
about the descriptive approach which explains and analyses observations and 
observations’ relationships with the external world. In other words, the descriptive 
approach focuses on relating the observed reality with theory concepts. 
The existence of three different approaches for the stakeholders theory: normative, 
instrumental, and descriptive approach, have played a significant role in the 
development and the advancement of the stakeholder theory. The three approaches are 
embedded with different evidence and implications (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
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In addition to the three different approaches, the stakeholder theory involves moral and 
philosophical guidance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Wijnberg (2000) states that 
companies should serve the interest of stakeholders solely. Management is responsible 
to disclose all kind of information. Mainly, this kind of information is related to the 
moral and normative (ethical) part of the stakeholder theory and the kind of information 
for the interest of powerful stakeholders. The ethical part of the stakeholder theory 
states that all stakeholders have the right to receive full disclosures and information 
regardless if such information meets their interest or not. Management should be 
treating all levels of stakeholders the same and to have a balanced relationship and work 
for an optimal balance among different stakeholders (Hasnas, 1998). It is implied that 
businesses sometimes sacrifice the interest of certain stakeholders to benefit others. It is 
worth mentioning that the normative form of a stakeholder theory does not assume a 
social responsibility by businesses. 
The other kind of information is the one that is revealed only to powerful stakeholders, 
governmental or political ones. Gray el al. (1996) and Deegan (2000) argue that some 
information might be critical to have the approval for it by powerful stakeholders or 
disapproval of others. As a result, managers would have an interest in disclosing partial 
information to all stakeholders and critical information to powerful stakeholders to meet 
their expectations (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
Clarkson (1995) classifies stakeholders into two groups: primary and secondary 
shareholders. The existence of primary shareholders is essential for corporationsꞌ 
survival. The secondary stakeholders are less essential but their actions can severely 
damage or benefit organisations. 
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The stakeholder theory concept is achieved by establishing non-financial measures 
(Logsdon and Lewelly, 1997). The stakeholder theory plays a guidance role for 
corporations and organisations. The main assumption in this theory is that all kinds of 
stakeholders should receive moral consideration (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). On the 
other hand, Atkinson et al. (1997) argue that stakeholder theory is a model for 
measuring corporate performance. The measurement of corporate performance will help 
in assessing stakeholdersꞌ expectations and contributions. Atkinson et al. (1997) also 
mention that contractual relationships with stakeholders are achieved by taking into 
consideration different processes used to achieve organisations’ objectives. 
It was concluded that the way organisations deal with multiple stakeholders is affected 
by the stakeholders' relationship network structure (Rowley, 1997). One of the main 
advantages of the stakeholder theory is its use as a tool to manage various stakeholders 
relationships and conflicts, since there is no concentration to meet the interest of 
individual stakeholders only (Freeman, 1984). 
Rowley (1997) mentions two structural factors that frame the interaction between 
organisations and related stakeholders. The first kind of interaction is the one that is 
associated with the density of ꞌꞌstockholders’ networkꞌꞌ. This type of interaction 
determines the degree of interrelationship between an organisation and its stakeholders. 
The second type of interaction is the one that measures the organisation's status between 
its stakeholders and their network. 
If an organisation is located in the centre of different stakeholders' network, information 
exchange is achieved with more ease and formation of shared behavioural expectations 
are affected (Rowley, 1997). Also, Mintzberg (1983) states that the higher the density 
network, the more information is shared among stakeholders within the network and 
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communication will be more effective. On the other hand, the less dense the network, 
shared behavioural networks exist but with constraints. Oliver (1991) supports the 
previous arguments by stating that the higher density network, the better stakeholders 
can interact with each other. 
The stakeholder theory does not only address the relationship between organisations and 
stakeholders but also with organisationsꞌ external environment. Stakeholders are 
considered factors that may affect the resources of the organisations. But in the same 
time, stakeholders themselves are affected by organisationsꞌ resources such as 
economical, technological, social, managerial, and political factors (Freeman, 1984). 
The above social and ethical factors are disclosed mainly to maintain the relationship 
between an organisation and its related stakeholders to gain their approval and to retain 
their stake (Gray et al., 1996). 
Organisational environment is established by stakeholders. The managerial factor plays 
an essential role in the stakeholder-organisation relationship. Wolfe and Putler (2002) 
conclude that an organisation might not have a homogeneous group of stakeholders. 
Different stakeholders may exist with different objectives. Some stakeholders might be 
looking for a voting power to affect certain actions; others might contribute to the 
organisationsꞌ performance. No only non-homogenous groups of stakeholders may exist 
but also the stakeholder theory addresses the possibility of a heterogeneous group of 
stakeholdersꞌ existence and the high chance of conflict taking place (Wolfe and Putler, 
2002). 
The resolution of such conflict highlights the level of power group stakeholder 
possessed in an organisation environment (Miles, 2002). Robert (1992) states that the 
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main objective of an organisation, from a stakeholder theory approach, is to balance 
between stakeholdersꞌ demands and conflicts. 
Although the stakeholder theory explains the relationship between the organisations and 
different stakeholders, it is not being used neither when assessing the relationship 
between auditorsꞌ behaviour and audit firm factors nor between audit quality and 
companiesꞌ governance mechanisms. Audit firms may have different stakeholders but 
the study will be analysing only one stakeholder who is the 'auditors' and how they 
behave against different types of pressure they face. In other words, the study assesses 
the principal (audit firm) agent (auditors) relationship rather than applying the 
stakeholders theory. 
3.2.3  Legitimacy Theory 
The term 'legitimacy' is defined as a general perception that actions of entities are 
considered appropriate and desirable if they fall within a frame of values and beliefs 
(Suchmankj, 1995). Society provides corporations with legal standing to hire 
individuals as a use of natural resources. In other words, there is a contract between 
members of the society and corporations. The society would allow organisations to 
benefit from resources if the benefits exceed the cost (Mathews, 1993). 
Accounting theory identified different users of accounting information such as 
shareholders, creditors and other possible stakeholders (Gray, 1995). Different groups 
of an organisation represent its source of power and subsequently a company cannot 
survive without the ability to distribute benefits to its groups (Shocker and Sethi, 1973). 
Some researchers argue that a company cannot survive unless it matches with the 
society it operates (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). There is a kind of social agreement 
between companies and the society where they operate. Explicit clauses take the form of 
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legal requirements and implicit clauses take the form of legislated social expectation 
(Gray et al., 1996). 
Audit firms, through issuing audit financial statements, are considered a primary source 
of information for investors and decision makers (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011). The level 
of audit quality and the consequences of auditors’ behaviour have potential implications 
on a society. Due to the fact that the two aspects of accountancy (audit quality and 
auditors’ behaviour) are not studied from a legislative perspective, but rather from a 
principal-agent concept, the legitimacy theory is not heavily studied in the theoretical 
framework of this study. 
3.2.4  Signalling Theory 
Two theories have characterised the accounting literature recently: the agency 
theory and the signalling theory. While agency theory is about the principal-agent 
relationship, it has been used to explain the theoretical accounting choices and 
appointment of external auditors. Signalling theory covers the information asymmetry 
area and voluntary selection of auditors (Morris, 1987). 
The signalling theory helps in reducing information asymmetry. This reduction happens 
by a party disclosing information and signalling it to others. Historically, the signalling 
theory has been established and related to the labour market, but it can be applied to any 
market having information asymmetry problems. A simple example about the signalling 
theory would be as follows: a seller is perceived to have a good quality product, and 
buyers have no specific information but only a general perception that the seller’s 
product has good quality. Buyers in this case are ready to pay more for a product that 
they perceive to have a better quality. It is the role of the seller to communicate and 
send signals to buyers about their good quality products. When sellers manage to create 
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quality signals, buyers will consider all other sellers to have poor quality products 
(Morris, 1987). 
The above explanation of the signalling theory is tailored to fit the use of such theory in 
the concept of audit quality. As mentioned, the core of signalling theory is about 
information asymmetry that includes appointment of external auditors as a tool to 
manage the information asymmetry problem. Big Four accountancy firms are known to 
provide better audit quality compared with other audit firms. The higher the perception 
of audit quality the more clients and corporations are ready to pay more for Big Four 
audit firms to audit their financial statements. Due to this fact that companies and 
organisations (buyers) are willing to pay more to Big Four audit firms (sellers); audit 
fees are said to be a signalling factor for a better audit quality.  
3.2.5  Institutional Theory 
The concept of institulisation is related to organisationsꞌ actions over time. Such actions 
are said to be legitimated within an organisation and environment (Pfeffer, 1982). 
Different factors play role in deriving organisationsꞌ behaviour from a legitimate 
behavioural point of view. Some factors are industry common practices, organisationsꞌ 
history, cultural values, management philosophy and folklore (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
Majority of institutional literature focuses on organisationsꞌ processes and structures 
within accepted norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
The choice made by individuals is constrained by the role of habit and history. In other 
words, it is constrained by the ꞌꞌforce of moral pressures and the cake of customꞌꞌ in 
strengthening the social order. Institutional elements comprise the institutions and over 
time the institutional elements are given priority. The key point is to identify what 
institutional elements reinforce or undercut other elements (Scott, 2008). 
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Individuals and organisationsꞌ actions are explained by the institutional theory concept. 
Although institutions push for a change and to shape potential changes within their 
environment context; but organisationsꞌ character change over time. Functional 
pressure, political pressure and social sources are three possible factors that cause 
pressure on institutional common practices (Oliver, 1991). Institutional change can take 
place on a very micro level to the most macro and global level. In other words, this 
change can be very brief or a prolonged one over decades and centuries.    
Scott (1987) states that the structure of organisations is considered to be an adaptive 
vehicle. The purpose of this vehicle is to shape the coherence between participantsꞌ 
characteristics and commitments from one side and external environment constraints 
and influences from the other side. The main question asked in this context is ꞌꞌwhat is 
the nature and origin of social order? ꞌꞌ. The answer is related to the interaction between 
human constructions that are embedded in social interaction. Some agents, found in 
institutional sector, are powerful enough to impose structural forms and practices. 
Organisational structure sometimes is affected by institutional environment. ꞌꞌCultural 
controls can substitute for structural controlsꞌꞌ. When cultural beliefs are effectively 
spread within an organisation, it is not necessary to have those practices coded officially 
and formally within organisationsꞌ structure (Scott, 1987).    
As mentioned above, the choice made by individuals is limited to moral pressure faced 
(Scott, 2008). Also there are different kinds of pressures (functional, political, social 
sources) that affect institutional common practices (Oliver, 1991). The institutional 
theory deals with factors affecting organisations within a social environment. Auditorsꞌ 
behaviour is assessed in relation to audit firm professional practices rather than social 
and political factors. The relationship between auditors and their management is framed 
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by the principal-agent (agency theory) relationship. Their behaviour is analysed against 
different kind of pressures that are embedded within an audit firm rather than factors 
and sources found within an institutional context. Auditors (agents) are expected to 
serve principalsꞌ interest by complying with set deadlines and budgets. Agency conflict 
and agency cost may arise as a result of potential dysfunctional behaviour exercised by 
auditors.  
3.2.6  Coping Behaviour Theory 
In a work environment, internal and external demands exist. It depends on the behaviour 
of every individual on how to cope with different demands based on a person’s 
resources. This is referred to as “Coping Behaviour Theory” (Folkman, 1984). There are 
two categories of coping behaviour: problem solving oriented and emotion oriented. 
The problem-solving category is related to those who use additional resources and 
reorganising time schedules. The emotion-oriented category relates to individuals who 
involve positive thinking and determination when facing stress. The application of the 
two types of core behaviour helps in alleviating stress that will consequently improve 
job performance and lead to a better performance evaluation. 
At a moderate level of stress, problem-solving oriented category dominates the 
problem-solving category. At a higher stress level, emotion-oriented category dominates 
the problem-solving one (Folkman, 1984). The main purpose of the study is to highlight 
audit firmsꞌ embedded factors that may push auditors to commit dysfunctional 
behaviour which will affect audit quality. The survey includes technical questions 
related to an audit assignment scope. There will be no assessment of behavioural 
perspectives of auditors but indicators of a dysfunctional behaviour in relation to 
technical audit matters. 
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3.3 Corporate Governance, Auditing and Theoretical Approach 
Corporate governance is said to be a set of mechanisms that control and monitor 
top management activities and decisions on behalf of companies’ stakeholders 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Corporate governance is defined as a system that 
controls and directs companies to give an accountable image to shareholders and 
stakeholders (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). The term “corporate governance” existed 
before the 1990s. It is used along with the ꞌꞌfair tradeꞌꞌ and ꞌꞌfree competitionꞌꞌ to achieve 
universal respect (Keasey et al., 2005). As a result of creative accounting drivers, 
different financial failures, agency cost and problems between management and 
shareholders, the role of auditors, all these factors led to the formation of the first UK 
corporate governance committee known by the Cadbury committee in 1991. The 
committee published the Cadbury report in 1992. The main recommendations of the 
Cadbury report were directions towards areas of control and accountability and 
disclosures related to boards of directors and other committees. Before the Cadbury 
report was introduced, companies were free to disclose their board of directors and 
directorsꞌ independence status. 
The main objective of corporate governance mechanisms is to separate ownership from 
control using agency theory (John and Senbet, 1998). There is a direct relationship 
between firms' value, external financial needs, investment opportunities and product 
market competition with governance mechanisms (Chen et al., 2010). The results 
showed that besides the importance of corporate governance on a firm's value, external 
forces such as the financial needs and market opportunities are also related to corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
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Dey (2008) conducted a study on the relationship between corporate governance 
and agency conflicts. It was hypothesised that the level of agency conflict is higher in 
larger, more complex and management control companies. The results supported the 
hypothesis indicating a positive relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and agency conflict. It was concluded that companies facing high agency problems have 
good corporate governance mechanisms, mainly independence and effectiveness of the 
Board of Directors (BoD) and audit committee, measured by the percentage of outside 
directors and frequency of meetings. Dey (2008) mentioned that due to competitive 
pressure on capital, goods, and labour markets, companies facing high agency problems 
have good corporate governance mechanisms. Through empirical research, he 
mentioned that this result supports the theory on corporate governance that describes 
governance mechanisms to be a mirror or endogenous output of every companyꞌs 
business and economic environment. This conclusion indicates that ꞌꞌno size fits allꞌꞌ 
when it comes to apply different mechanisms of corporate governance best practices. 
Dey (2008) mentioned that this result supports the theory on corporate governance that 
describes governance mechanisms to be a mirror or endogenous output of every 
companyꞌs business and economic environment. 
Bentham (1907) stated, cited in Harrison (1983), that as accounting is the soul of 
justice, audit can be presented as a substitute for democracy (Power, 1994). Audit 
serves as an intermediary between a principal and an agent. The rising problems of 
accountability are widely solved by presentation of social arrangement reinforced by the 
audit process. Audit is mainly presenting different administrative problems along with 
their solution. The auditees having such problems are not required to implement the 
auditors’ solution since the auditor plays the role of ꞌꞌadding-valueꞌꞌ to auditee parties. It 
can be noted here the similarity between the concept of UK corporate governance code 
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and the conceptual framework of auditing. Both have the tone of recommendations 
rather than of requirement and obligatory mode (Power, 1994).  
Audit is not limited to issuing audited financial statements. There is a growing 
frequency of using the word “audit” in the UK as environmental audits, value for money 
audits, management audits, quality audits, forensic audits, data audits, intellectual 
property audits, medical audits and many others besides. The audit practice evolution in 
the UK is due to different problematic controls, mainly regulatory failures, invisibility 
of the audit, and the construction of auditees (McColgan, 2001). 
 Saam (2007) stated that in agency theory, the principal exercises more power 
than agents when facing agency problems. But in a hidden information situation, where 
management is exposed more to operations, the agent has more privilege than the 
principal. In such a hidden information situation, audit quality may be affected due to 
the flow of accurate information and data they may receive to support their work before 
submitting their reports to boards of directors and consequently to shareholders.  In an 
agency relationship, a principal is expected to increase the agent’s efforts by more 
monitoring, but heavy monitoring can have some hidden costs affecting interpersonal 
relationship and reducing social distance (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Due to the 
nature of the auditing profession which is based on interaction with companies’ 
management and personnel, reducing social distance affects the scope and quality of 
audit. 
Since shareholders elect the board of directors who are responsible to assign external 
auditors (UK corporate governance code, 2010), dividends paid to shareholders are 
considered a tool to satisfy agency problems and conflicts (Adjaoud and Ben-amar, 
2010).There is an agency conflict between management and audit committee chairs 
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(Haka and Chalos, 1990). This agency conflict is evidenced where internal and external 
auditors align themselves with management, highlighting the issue of auditorsꞌ 
independence. Moreover, more agency cost through heavy monitoring (Dickinson and 
Villeval, 2008) may lead to a variance in audit quality. 
The theoretical framework between governance mechanisms and audit quality is 
labelled by the agency theory.  Shareholders, through the election of a board of 
directors, establish an external layer of control over management by assigning external 
auditors. Management has incentives for a better quality audit that reflects transparency 
and more reliable financial statements and explanatory disclosures which reduce 
information asymmetry problems. This reflects that management practices align and 
serve shareholders’ interest which minimise agency conflict cost. 
There is a focus on behaviour, moral and values in managing corporations from 
a stakeholders theoretical point of view. Stakeholders are affected by corporations’ 
goals achievements (Freeman, 1984). Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that 
stakeholder theory requires attributes, structure and practices to establish a 
philosophical management framework. Stakeholder theory establishes a framework to 
explain the relationship between audit firm practices (time deadline, time budget, 
performance evaluations) and auditors' behaviour, considered as a major group of 
stakeholders. The more these measures are accepted by auditors and align with their 
interest, the more an audit firm can meet its objectives and goals by proper compliance 
of said measures and practices. Consequently, less dysfunctional behaviour may exist. 
3.4 Conclusion 
As explained in different sections of the theory chapter, different theories frame 
the auditing practice in general and auditors’ behaviour and audit quality in particular. 
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The agency theory is used to manage the relationship between a principal (shareholder) 
and an agent (management). It is said that an improper balance in this relationship may 
lead to an increase in agency cost. Audit fees are considered one type of agency cost 
(Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011) and external auditors are also said to be an external 
corporate governance mechanism that is used to minimise the agency conflict between 
management and shareholders. Agency costs are summarised by monitoring cost, 
bonding cost, and residual loss. Moreover, misbalanced relationship between a principal 
and an agent leads to different conflicts, from agency theory perspective, as managerial 
hazard agency conflict, earnings-retention agency conflict, time-horizon agency conflict 
and managerial-risk-aversion conflict. As a result of the above agency cost, agency 
conflicts and potential information asymmetry, external auditors are considered a tool to 
solve these issues. 
Companies assign external auditors, especially Big Four audit firms, to have credible 
financial statements that are audited by a credible accountancy firm (Ussahawanitchakit, 
2012). Although external auditors are assigned by the board of directors, their daily 
communication is with organisationsꞌ management (Abdel-Khalik, 2002). 
Conflict between shareholders and management is expected to be solved through 
auditors. The better the audit quality, the more conflicts are expected to be solved. The 
signalling theory, in addition to the agency theory and the stakeholder-agency theory, is 
introduced into this study to label the theoretical approach of audit quality and auditors’ 
behaviour. Companies (buyers) are willing to pay more for an audit service which is 
perceived to be performed by a credible high-quality audit firm (seller). The more audit 
fees are paid, the more signals are perceived showing that financial statements are 
audited with better quality. 
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 Although the stakeholder theory governs the relationship between an 
organisation and its external environment, but due to the fact that only one stakeholder 
(employees ꞌꞌauditorsꞌꞌ) is studied against management (audit firm) factors; the concept 
of principal-agent arises again and subsequently framing this research by the agency 
theory. 
It is also said the going concern of an organisation is highly related with the support of 
stakeholders. The life of an audit firm is also highly related by the behaviour of its 
auditors. It was evidenced through the famous Enron scandal where we witnessed 
severe dysfunctional behaviour by auditors that led to the collapse of the giant Arthur 
Andersen. 
Auditors’ behaviour and audit quality are the main variables that are studied in this 
research. Auditors’ behaviour is analysed to highlight internal factors affecting it in 
addition to companies’ characteristics that may affect audit quality. Exploring the 
determinants of auditors’ behaviour, the second model analyses audit quality. The 
second model is included to complement the first model. Previous studies have used 
different proxies for audit quality, but rare ones have used the audit fees proxy 
supported by the theoretical and technical argument. 
The theoretical framework supported mainly by the agency relationship complements 
with the Hypothetico–Deductive applied in this research. The use of external auditors, 
considered to be an external corporate governance mechanism, will be analysed against 
other different components of organisations. Participants of the second study are sent a 
survey with the expectation of objective answers to be received. 
Ontological objectivism and epistemological positivist approaches are selected to align 
with the theoretical framework used and to link between different components. The 
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methodology plays a linkage role between the two empirical studies and harmonises the 
relationship between them. Components of the studies and detailed selected 
methodological approaches are explained in the next chapter (research design). 
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Research Design  
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Chapter Four - Research Design 
4.1 Introduction 
The basis of the current research is to analyse the determinants of auditors’ 
behaviour and audit quality. This research is conducted on the UK market. The first 
empirical model covers auditors’ behaviour employed in UK audit firms. A survey has 
been conducted in collaboration with the Big Four audit firms in the UK: Deloitte, EY, 
KPMG, and PwC. The second model sampled a population made up of non-financial 
listed companies in the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE 350) for a longitudinal 
time frame between  2007 to 2010.  
The main objective of this chapter is to highlight the methodology used. Many types of 
methodologies are discussed but the selected methodology is justified and supported 
based on the two empirical models’ analysis and findings in addition to the theoretical 
framework of this research.  
Ontological and epistemological approaches are explained and justified for the selected 
approach to align with the theoretical framework used and to link between different 
components. The methodology plays a linkage role between the two empirical studies 
and harmonises the relationship between them. 
The first model is trying to identify factors leading to dysfunctional behaviour. 
Time budget, time deadline and performance evaluation factors are selected to be 
independent variables against the dependent variable: auditors’ behaviour. The research 
is trying to link between accountancy firms’ embedded factors that may play a role in 
committing dysfunctional behaviour and consequently may harm audit quality. 
Moreover, the first study also highlights the perception differences between audit 
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trainees and experienced auditors. A questionnaire technique is used for this model to 
assess auditors’ behaviour. 
The second empirical study complements with the first study. Selected corporate 
governance variables are defined and used as determinants and signalling indicators of 
audit quality. The concept of audit quality has been a controversial issue in recent years. 
As a result of many scandals, the major question has been always asked “where were 
the auditors?” Relevant data from 908 annual reports was manually collected. The data 
includes financial and non-financial information of the 908 non-financial listed 
companies on the FTSE 350. To control for this empirical model, companies’ size, 
profitability, leverage, and companies’ line of service are included as control variables. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
Crotty (1998) mentions the following statement “justification of our choice and 
particular use of methodology and methods are something that reach into the 
assumption about reality that we bring to our work”. Different theoretical concepts and 
methodological tools can be used in a research, but the key point is to justify and tailor 
selected techniques and methods to related research. 
Different research layers and ranges are used to examine the theoretical perspectives. 
Ontological and epistemological layers are broad lines for philosophical approach with 
different methodological techniques. 
Saunders (2003) identifies five layers referred to “onion” layers. Research philosophy is 
the first layer, research approach is the second layer, research strategy is the third layer, 
research time horizon is the fourth layer and data collection method is the fifth layer. 
Different alternatives are available in each layer. It is the researcher's role to choose 
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among different options within each layer and to tailor the “onion” approach to the 
designated research. 
Ruddock (2001) states that to be able to conduct a research; researchers should be aware 
of the theory knowledge and the theoretical concepts that are embedded in a research. 
The knowledge about the theoretical suppositions is referred to as epistemology, while 
the theory of knowledge is referred to as ontology. In more detail, ontology helps 
researchers to understand the nature of reality. Analysing data collected, observation 
reached and surveys conducted depends on the level of understanding of the ontological 
and epistemological nature of our work. It is critical to decide on the research 
philosophy approach that may fit with a research. Blaikie (2002) describes ontology as 
“claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about 
what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how the units interact with 
each other. In short, ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe 
constitutes a social reality” (p.27). 
Marsh and Stoker (2002) argue that the ontological position of a research helps in 
identifying the nature of the investigated social and political reality; the theory of being. 
Objectivism (realism) and subjectivism (constructionism) are said to be two parts of the 
ontological position (Burrel and Morgan, 1994). Bryman (2001) defines objectivism as 
“ontological position implies that social phenomena confront us as external facts that 
are beyond our reach of influence” (p.16). Subjectivism is defined as “social phenomena 
and their meanings are continually being accomplished by their social acts. It implies 
that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction 
but that they are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman 2001, p.18). 
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An objectivism approach argues that organisations are considered to be a group of 
social entities. These social entities comprise an organisation which has a tangible 
reality and in specific, objective reality. On the other hand, a subjectivism approach 
argues that reality is not objective and due to this fact, research objectives constructions 
should take place taking into consideration the ontological position (Bryman, 2001, 
p.16). 
The main difference between subjectivism and objectivism is that objectivists believe 
that a firm is embedded from inception by an objectivism approach. Subjectivists, on 
the other hand, believe that subjectivism is a continuous process by organisations as a 
result of social enactment (Smircich, 1983).  
Along with the objectivism and subjectivism approaches of ontology, positivism and 
interpretivism are said to be the two main positions of epistemology (Marsh and Stoker, 
2002). Epistemology assumes that everything that can exist can be known. In particular 
epistemology is defined as “the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, 
whatever it is understood to be. In short, claims about what is assumed to exist can be 
known” (Blaikie, 2000). The OED (2004) states that epistemology is “a theory or 
science of the methods or ground of knowledge”. As a result of the above definitions, 
epistemological position is considered to be the theory of knowledge. Through this 
theory or using this theory, a world can be seen. 
Generating hypotheses is an objective of the positivism position of epistemology. 
Research and researchers are responsible to test and develop those theories (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). Swartz et al. (1998) define positivism as “working with observable social 
reality and that the end product of such research can be law-like generalisation similar 
to those produced by the physical and natural scientists” (p.32). Generating hypotheses 
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is accomplished by employing structured methodology (Gill and Johnson, 2002). One of 
the critical assumptions of the positivism approach is that a researcher plays no role in 
affecting a collected data and research subject (Swartz, 1998). A hypothesis is 
developed, data is collected, measured and analysed. As a result of the previous steps, a 
hypothesis is either accepted or rejected. Hypotheses examination helps in developing 
the examined theory (Saunders et al., 2009). 
The second epistemological position is interpretivism. Swartz et al. (1998) defines 
interpretivism as “the details of the situation to understand the reality or perhaps a 
reality working behind them”. Generalisation is not considered as a crucial factor by an 
interpretivist. Researchers applying the interpretivism approach tend to understand the 
research subject from the subjects’ point of view. Researchers use the sympathetic 
position using the epistemological interpretivism (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Moving to the second layer of the “onion”, a research approach is introduced 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The research approach is classified in two main categories: 
deductive (testing) and inductive (building theory). Generally, the deductive approach is 
widely used in research. Researchers normally tend to test subjects in a population. The 
population is usually framed by a law that allows researchers to interpret and elaborate, 
to develop the phenomena as mentioned previously and allow prediction (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997). 
There are five consecutive stages for a research with a deductive approach. The 
first stage is to develop a hypothesis. A hypothesis is a theoretical argument to test the 
relationship between subjects. The second stage is presenting the hypothesis in technical 
terms. In other words, explanation on how variables are measured and a decision about 
the coefficient/direction of each variable takes place. The third stage covers testing the 
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selected hypotheses. Testing a hypothesis can be done via empirical research, inquiry or 
any other kind of testing techniques. The fourth stage is about examining the output in 
stage three. The results of testing the hypotheses are analysed and assessed to confirm 
or identify any need for theory modification. The last and fifth stage of the deductive 
research is modifying the theory as a result of tests conducted in stage four. 
Gill and Robson (2002) support the above explanation of deductive research. A 
deductive research is initiated to identify a relationship between variables which is then 
followed by hypotheses development. Subsequently qualitative and/or quantitative 
research and data collection are performed. Testing hypotheses is conducted with the 
support of a structured methodology. 
The inductive approach is considered to be the other type of research along with 
deductive approach. This approach works almost the opposite of how the deductive 
approach works. Inductive approach is initiated by data collection, then analysis of the 
collected data which leads to formulating a theory. Researchers may end up with the 
same theory or can induct a theory from the results. In inductive approach, the theory is 
the output of hypotheses testing (Saunders et al., 2009). 
This research is based mainly on the agency theory. The agency theory is said to 
be one of the important segments of the positive accounting research. The normative 
theory has been replaced by the positive accounting theory since the 1970s (Gaffikin, 
2007). The positive accounting theory is also referred to as a “neo-empirical” research. 
It is mainly about the use of empirical evidence based on an established theory (Peirson 
and Brown, 1992). 
The positive accounting theory applies to an objective (realist) position. Consequently, 
ontological neo-empirical adopts the objective position. The human agency and human 
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involvement are the fundamentals of an objective assumption embedded in the positive 
accounting theory. Human beings normally do not create reality; rather human beings 
live around reality. In this concept, human beings behave passively not actively. Human 
behaviours are tested objectively and results are used to predict and to respond to the 
real world (Gaffikin, 2005). 
Gill and Johnson (1991) mention that a researcher has no role in any subject-object 
relationship and consequently in the results observed. The dualism between a subject 
and an object should be separated to reach a proper observation (Keat and Urry, 2011). 
The positivist epistemology is based on this dualism concept. The methodological 
approach is directly affected by the ontological and epistemological positions. If results 
are accepted, then the results can be used as a law-like generalisation (Gill and Johnson, 
1991).  
The hypothetico-deductive methodology is considered to be a suitable approach as a 
result of the explained objectivist ontological position and positive epistemology. This 
kind of approach starts with developing the hypotheses after critically reviewing 
previous literature, and then testing the hypotheses for results and conclusions to 
support or to reject the set hypotheses (Saunders et al., 2009). 
The process of accepting or rejecting a theory is accomplished through a set of stages. 
The positivist epistemology is concerned with the observed phenomena and the 
hypothetico-deductive theory testing. The data collection process is considered to be a 
blind process without the existence of a developed hypothesis. If the output and the 
results from testing the data collected match with the defined theory, then a theory is 
accepted, or otherwise rejected (Keat and Urry, 2011). 
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Choosing between quantitative and qualitative testing techniques is based on 
certain factors. Quantitative research is based on objectivity which is essential for this 
kind of research. On the other hand, qualitative research is considered to be subjective 
rather than objective. Subjectivity is inclusive within the qualitative research. As a 
result, the quantitative research approach is applied in this research based on the 
objective ontological position (Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Ruddock, 2001)in addition to 
the use of agency theory. 
Since the objective ontology is applied, selected variables are used as complementary 
for the quantitative research approach. The variables are considered the main core of the 
quantitative research technique. Hypotheses are developed on the potential relationship 
and coefficients among variables. Variables are considered as real world objects that 
will objectively establish a causal relationship. The results will help to support or to 
reject the theory and a potential outcome can be generalised. It is very critical here in 
this approach that researcher has no impact on all data collected to maintain objectivity 
(Gaffikin, 2005). 
Among different techniques that can be used in the quantitative research, the 
survey technique is appropriate for these types of studies. Surveys are said to give a 
general view of what individuals think or report using the descriptive explanatory 
research (Newman and Sansing, 1997). Yin (2003) states that the survey technique 
helps to answer the “what, how many, how much” questions. The deductive approach is 
usually associated with the survey technique of quantitative research (Saunders et al., 
2009). The benefit of using a survey technique is the assumption that it is strictly 
positivistic with answering the “how many, how much” questions (Swartz et al., 1998). 
Another advantage of using the survey technique is that it allows the data collected from 
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an economical context to be controlled during the research process (Saunders et al., 
2009). Explanatory surveys are said to test a theory using the experiment logic (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002).  
Along explaining different methodological approaches and research positions, objective 
ontology and positive epistemology are used in this research. The positive accounting 
theory is adopted for this neo-empirical research. Along with the positive accounting 
theory, the stakeholder/agency theories are framing the theoretical approach of the 
research. Hypotheses are developed and tested that justify compliance with the 
hypothetico-deductive methodological approach (Saunders et al., 2009). 
As a result of the selected approach, quantitative rather than qualitative research 
is considered to be appropriate for an objectivist ontological position that will help in 
examining the developed hypotheses. Technically, the survey method is followed to 
gather and collect data for the two empirical models. The data is collected through a 
primary source by circulating questionnaires to objects, and a secondary source through 
manual collection of financial and non-financial information from companies’ annual 
reports. 
4.3 Research Paradigm 
The process of understanding and explanations can be gained from examining a 
social phenomena is called “Paradigm” (Saunders et al., 2003). Ontological and 
epistemological positions are the basis of a research paradigm. There are four paradigms 
illustrated by Burrell and Morgan (1994) as follows: 
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 Figure 4.1 - Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Science 
                                                Radical Change 
 
 
Subjectivist            Objectivist 
 
 
 
             Regulation 
 
Developed from Burrell and Morgan (1994, p.23) 
The above figure shows the four paradigms illustrated by Burrell and Morgan (1994): 
functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. They are arranged 
in a way related to four dimensions: radical change, regulation, subjectivist, and 
objectivist. The subjectivism and objectivism have been explained thoroughly in the 
research philosophy section. In particular, they related to the ontological research 
position. While radical change is critical, regulatory perspective is less judgemental. 
Radical change elaborates and explains organisational problems from the point of view 
of an existing state of affairs. Regulations explain the concept of why we have 
regulations and how such regulations can be improved and developed over time. 
The four paradigms assist researchers to clarify research assumptions related to the 
nature and the society. Also, they offer a useful tool to help researchers how to approach 
and manager their work. Moreover, the four paradigms help researchers to scheme the 
research route and to where their research may lead. 
Radical Humanist 
Interpretive Functionalist 
 
Radical 
Structuralist 
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Radical humanist paradigm is classified within the radical change and subjectivist 
dimensions. The ontological position fits with the state of subjectivist. Burrell and 
Morgan (1994) mention that radical humanist dimension is a state “to articulate ways in 
which humans can transcend the spiritual bonds and fetters which tie them into existing 
social patterns and thus realise their full potential” (p.23). 
The radical structuralist paradigm is the status when researchers are interested to 
approach the research with a fundamental change view based on analysing 
organisational phenomena (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Burrell and Morgan (1994) mention that the interpretive paradigm refers to “everyday 
life is accorded the status of miraculous achievement”. This dimension is more into 
explaining and understanding what is going on rather than achieving changes. 
The fourth and last paradigm is the functionalist paradigm. Burrell and Morgan (1994) 
refer to this dimension as “often a problem-oriented in approach, concerned to provide 
practical solutions to practical problem”. The concept of rationalism characterises this 
dimension. It refers to rational organisations in which rational solutions are achieved by 
rational solutions. This dimensions fits with the ontological position. 
As explained in the research philosophy sections, objectivism is the selected ontological 
position. Functionalist, as a result of the above illustration, is considered to be the most 
appropriate paradigm which fits with the research nature and philosophy. 
The two empirical models are categorised by a survey time horizon. The first model is a 
cross-sectional survey over a selected group of respondents. The second model is a 
longitudinal survey over a four-year period.  
Figure 4.2 graphically explains the research philosophy and research position as 
explained in the above sections. 
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Figure 4.2 – Research Philosophy and Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Adapted from Iskander (2008)
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4.4 Hypotheses Development - Empirical One 
Monitoring costs, considered one type of agency costs, are the costs paid by principals 
(audit firm) to monitor the performance and stewardship skills of agents (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). This process involves certain level of competencies and expertise to 
monitor management performance. It is argued that in a highly competitive market, 
managers increase their monitoring to be able to compete better. Auditors, accordingly, 
rely on the increased monitoring by managers to compensate the decrease in audit hours 
and consequently lower audit fees (Leventis et al., 2011). This will lead to setting tight 
budgets and tight deadlines that may push auditors to commit dysfunctional behaviour 
and in increase agency cost.  
4.4.1 Auditors' Behaviour and Auditing Profession   
4.4.1.1 Time Budget 
Time budget is defined as budgeted time of an audit assignment or any other task to be 
accomplished, taking into consideration assignment fees and level of experienced staff 
allocated to an assignment (Margheim et al., 2005). In Big Four audit firms, the 
recoverable rate of assignments plays a significant role in auditors’ behaviour, besides 
time-budget issues. Previous research has been conducted to analyse the effect of time-
budget pressure on auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour where results varied among 
different research and studies. 
When auditors face time-budget pressure, the employer expects auditors themselves to 
solve it (McNair, 1991). This shows the absence of a proper system on how to deal with 
different pressure scenarios. Other researchers conclude that budgets are seen as less 
important due to the lack of experienced qualified staff (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004). 
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Time-budget pressure is not directly related to audit effectiveness when the risk of 
misstatement is high (Coram et al., 2004). The level of auditors plays a significant role 
in their behaviour when time-budget pressure exists (Kelly and Margheim, 2002). When 
senior auditors are involved in budget preparation, staff auditors’ level of perception 
against time-budget pressure increases. It was also included in this study that time-
budget pressure has more effect on senior than staff auditors when dealing with 
cognitive problems. 
The reason for audit reduction behaviour is related to budget tightness (Otley and 
Pierce, 1996). It was concluded that budgets have become very demanding and tight; to 
an extent auditors are pushed to under-report actual hours worked to be in compliance 
with pre-set budgets. Ponemon (1992) concluded that budget pressure has minimal 
effect on auditors when there is high level of moral reasoning. The nature of business 
was also considered as another factor in dealing with time-budget pressure (Soobaroyen 
and C. Chengabroyan, 2006). Their results showed that time-budget pressure is much 
lower compared to previous research and studies due to the fact of the nature of sample 
tested in the Mauritius. It was concluded that a market with closely-related and a family 
business relationship tends to minimise time-budget pressure. Accountants and 
corporate managers believed that “increased budget pressure would be beneficial” 
(Lyne, 1992). 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H1a: There is a positive significant relationship between time-budget pressure and 
auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour 
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4.4.1.2 Time Deadline 
Time deadline is set normally for auditors to abide by a time frame allocated to a certain 
assignment. Time deadline is not always related to budgetary issues or monetary 
constraints. Listed companies, for example, need to finalise their accounts and issue 
their audited financial statements before a very tight date after fiscal  
year-end; in this case audit fees are not considered an issue or a pressure factor rather 
than finalising the accounts before a set deadline. In the audit profession, time deadline 
is a continuous pressure factor imposed on auditors to finalise audit assignments in 
compliance with professional standards within a very tight time allocated on different 
tasks of an assignment (McDaniel, 1990). It was concluded in the study that as time 
pressure increases, audit effectiveness directly decreases. Conversely, there is a positive 
relationship between time deadline pressure and audit efficiency. In other studies, it was 
revealed that time deadline is considered to be a significant factor leading to quality-
threatening behaviour (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004). This study differentiated between 
time deadline pressure imposed by audit firms and the one imposed by clients. On the 
other hand, Margheim et al., (2005) concluded that time deadline pressure has more of 
an effect on junior auditors rather than senior auditors. 
Glover’s (1997) study revealed that time deadline pressure would cause an increase in 
audit effectiveness through reducing judgmental bias. It was also concluded that people 
in general, not only auditors, tend to predict negative perception about time deadlines; 
where in practice time deadline may lead to beneficiary output (Maule et al., 2000). 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H1b: There is a positive significant relationship between time deadline pressure and 
auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour. 
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4.4.1.3 Performance Evaluation 
Performance evaluation is not limited to chargeable hours recorded by personnel for 
accomplishing assignments within a time frame. Performance evaluations, mainly at 
Big Four audit firms, are prepared based on a set of detailed categories and sections. 
The “performance review” at KPMG is prepared based on technical knowledge, 
operational responsibilities, and behaviour skills (KPMG performance review, 2011). 
At Ernst and Young (EY), the assessment process is classified into four sections as 
follows: 1) people 2) quality 3) operational excellence, and 5) market leadership and 
growth (EY Check list for your annual plan, 2011). 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) classifies their performance coaching and development 
process (PC&D) into more detailed sections covering areas related to relationship and 
sustainability of clients, leading and contribution to team success, demonstration of 
courage and integrity learning sharing and innovation, application of commercial and 
technical expertise, having a spirit of agility, and finally managing projects and 
economics (PwC PC&D, 2011). 
We can conclude that audit firms use such assessment tools as part of their human 
capital strategy either to retain their staff or to create areas for improvement for low 
performance staff. 
Style and frequency of evaluation have been hypothetically tested in the study “Cost-
Quality Conflict in Audit Firms: An Empirical Investigation” by Pierce and Sweeney 
(2004). They concluded that evaluations have been seen as less important in recent 
years due to staff shortage. Otley and Pierce (1996) stated that evaluation tools are used 
primarily for budget-related matters rather than their main goal as defined by firms. 
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Other researchers concluded that the performance evaluation process is affected by 
geographical factors (Soobaroyen and Chengabroyan, 2006). One of their findings 
showed that working in a family business environment minimises the effects of 
evaluation factors on auditor behaviour. Netmeyer and Maxham III (2007) concluded 
that supervisors’ approval on employees’ performance rating is positively related to 
customer satisfaction rather than the actual rating of employees and the subjective 
assessment of the rater. An appraisal system is considered to be playing a positive role 
in employees’ morale (Di Pboye, 1981). 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H1c: There is a significant positive relationship between performance evaluation 
process and auditors' dysfunctional behaviour  
4.4.2 Dependent Variable Definition and Measurement 
In the second empirical, auditor’s behaviour is measured using two proxies: under-
reporting of actual time and premature sign-off of audit steps. The dependent variable is 
measured in relation to time budget, time deadline, and performance evaluation. These 
three independent variables are all internal factors endogenous in the audit profession, 
mainly Big Four audit firms. 
4.4.3 Level and Determinants of Auditors’ Behaviour 
There are two perspectives available when assessing the relationship between auditors 
and audit firms (Herrbach, 2001): the economic or legal perspective which is related to 
a work contract and the social perspective which is related to a psychological contract. 
The work contract is the traditional tangible contract that is signed between an 
employee and an employer to protect each party’s rights and state the obligations. The 
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psychological contract is when an auditor is expected to accomplish a certain level of 
performance in exchange for various forms of compensation (Rousseau and Parks, 
1993). 
The main difference between the work contract and the psychological contract is that 
the elements of the psychological are not necessarily explicit but rather implied and 
implicit (Herrbach, 2001). In other words, it will not be mentioned in the psychological 
contract that dysfunctional behaviour, unethical behaviour and non-professional 
behaviour are prohibited. Such conditions and clauses are embedded in the social 
perspective of auditor-firm relationship. 
The questionnaire constructed for this study consists of forty-eight questions to measure 
auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour against time-budget pressure, time deadline pressure 
and performance evaluation variables. Dysfunctional behaviour is measured by two 
proxies: premature sign-off and under-reporting of chargeable time. Those two proxies 
are the outcome of different behaviours as follows: 1) audit quality reduction behaviour, 
2) team mismanagement, 3) non-professional behaviour (Herrbach, 2001) and 4) 
unethical behaviour. 
The appendix includes the list of questions used in this survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
4.4.4 Research design – Empirical One 
The dependent variable is measured using the questionnaire method among many 
different techniques in the second empirical related to Big Four audit factors. Due to the 
fact that the population tested in this empirical is auditors employed at Big Four audit 
firms in the UK from selected offices at different levels, this leads to a large number of 
auditors. The use of a questionnaire helps in collecting data in a standardised way and it 
is considered an objective tool more than conducting interviews (Milne, 1999), 
especially in measuring behaviour that requires an objective tool which enables 
respondents to reply as objectively as possible. 
Different styles of questionnaire may be prepared as follows: 
(Oppenheim, 1966, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd) 
Group-administered questionnaires are used in this model to gather data from auditors 
employed at Big Four audit firms. This method involved attending training seminars 
and contacting executives at Big Four audit firms to arrange for an on-site survey that 
mitigates follow-up procedures if questionnaires are mailed or sent electronically. A 
Likert scale is used to measure different responses in the questionnaires. This scale 
makes sure that all items measure the same thing – auditors’ behaviour. To eliminate the 
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need for judges, a five-point Likert scale is used starting from strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. These five positions are given weights from one 
to five after more complex methods and expanded weights were showed not to be 
effective (Oppenheim, 1966). 
The method of using questionnaires has been used in many previous studies McDaniel, 
1990; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Herrbach, 2001; Coram et al, 2004; Kelly and 
Margheim, 2002; Otley and Pierce, 1996; Lord and DeZoort, 2001; Choo, 1986; Fisher, 
2001; Soobaroyen and Chengabroyan, 2006). 
4.4.5 Independent Variables Definition and Measurement 
The first model of this research covers the relationship between auditors’ behaviour and 
different Big Four audit factors which may determine auditor behaviour. Mainly time 
budget, time deadline, and performance evaluation factors are said to be major factors in 
determining auditors’ behaviour (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; McDaniel, 1990; Otley 
and Pierce, 1996). 
4.4.6 Population and Sample Criteria 
The population of this research is comprised of external auditors. Many scandals took 
place and the recent financial crisis hit the global economy causing the unanswered 
famous question “where were the auditors?”(MacDonald, 2006). This research answers 
part of this question that is related to the behaviour of external auditors. It analyses 
employer (audit firm) factors exercised on auditors that may lead to possible 
dysfunctional behaviour by external auditors. The sample is made up of respondents 
(auditors) employed at KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, and EY operating in the UK. In addition 
to sending electronic questionnaires, field visits are arranged to Big Four offices to 
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secure high response rate. Questionnaires are distributed and collected during the field 
visits. This technique prevented delays in responses. The survey is made up of external 
auditors at all levels starting from staff auditor to partner level. Auditors from the 
mentioned audit firms are selected to be the population of this research as they represent 
the most exposed auditors to market and corporate challenges. The sample of this 
empirical study is made up of 145 usable questionnaires collected during 2012. Initially 
167 questionnaires were sent to auditors. Auditors employed at the Big Four are 
estimated to have more clients and time-issues matters in addition to the firms’ structure 
that imposes certain challenges on auditors being employed at Big Four firms. The 
survey was conducted during 2012. Previous studies that used the questionnaire method 
have a sample that varied between 100 and 501 as mentioned in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 
*Researchers attending training seminars venues where they made sure to receive all questionnaires from respondents.  
Article Author Population Number of surveys 
Sent  recvd.     % 
The Effects of Time Pressure 
and Audit Programme 
Structure on Audit 
Performance  
McDaniel, 1990 Staff auditors 179 179 1 * 
 
     
Cost-Quality Conflict in Audit 
Firms: An Empirical 
Investigation 
Pierce and Sweeney, 
2004 
Senior auditors 316 130 41% 
      
Audit Quality, auditor 
behaviour and the 
psychological contract 
Herrbach, 2001 Senior auditors 395 170 43% 
      
The Effect of Risk of 
Misstatement on the 
Propensity to Commit 
Reduced Audit Quality Acts 
under time-budget Pressure  
Coram et al., 2004 Senior auditors 501 103 21% 
      
The relationships between 
senior auditor budget 
preparation, job structuring, 
job consideration and staff 
auditor time-budget pressure  
Kelly and Margheim, 
2002 
Staff and senior 
auditors 
155 85 55% 
      
Auditor time-budget pressure: 
Consequences and antecedents 
Otley and  Pierce, 1996 Senior auditors 356 260 73% 
      
The impact of commitment 
and moral reasoning on 
auditors’ responses to social 
influence pressure  
Lord and DeZoort, 
2001 
Staff auditors 171 171 1 * 
      
Job Stress, Job Performance, 
and Auditor Personality 
Characteristics  
Choo, 1986 All levels of 
auditors 
315 97 31% 
      
Role Stress, The Type A 
Behaviour Pattern, and 
External Auditor Job 
Satisfaction and Performance 
Fisher, 2001 Staff auditors 165 123 75% 
      
Auditors’ Perceptions of 
Time-budget Pressure, 
Premature Sign Offs and 
Under-Reporting of 
Chargeable Time: Evidence 
from a Developing Country 
Soobaroyenand 
Chengabroyan, 2006 
All levels of 
auditors 
100 52 52% 
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4.5 Hypotheses Development – Empirical Two 
Agency theory is used to explain the theoretical framework between governance 
mechanisms and audit quality.  Shareholders, through the election of board of directors, 
establish an external layer of control over management by assigning external auditors. 
Management has incentives for a better quality audit that reflects transparency and more 
reliable financial statements and explanatory disclosures which reduce information 
asymmetry problems. This reflects that management practices align and serve 
shareholders’ interest that minimise agency conflict cost. 
4.5.1 Determinants of Audit Quality 
4.5.1.1 Role Duality 
Role duality is when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chairman of the 
Board of Directors (BoD) positions are being held by the same individual (Lin and Liu, 
2009). A CEO should not be holding a chairman of the board title at the same time (UK 
corporate governance code). The code mentioned that if under exceptional conditions 
role duality exists, the board of directors should consult major shareholders to explain 
and disclose the reasons in the next annual report. 
Bliss et al. (2011) argue that external auditors do no not rely in internal control systems 
when there is a role duality. This leads to an increase in substantive testing to obtain 
reasonable assurance that control procedures have not been overlapped as a result of 
role duality. An increase in audit fees takes place as a result of role duality. 
Lin and Liu (2009) concluded that there is a downward switch to lower auditor quality 
when a CEO is operating as a chairman of the BoD at the same time. It is due to the fact 
that a firm with weak corporate governance mechanisms prefers to protect the 
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vagueness advantage for having weak corporate governance and consequently assigning 
lower auditor quality. This shows different difficulties faced by external auditors to 
retain their clients when there is a duality role.  
Although role duality may help in the ease of decisions, but due to other governance 
mechanisms; role duality and the ease of decision making process may harm 
shareholders' interest. This situation might be considered working out to the benefit of 
agents rather than principals in an agency relationship (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  In 
agency theory, non-duality of CEO and chairman of the board titles should reduce the 
gap between auditors and directors' disclosures quality. It also reduces agency costs as 
more effective monitoring takes place (Uang et al., 2006). But it was concluded that a 
role duality factor is found to have no evidence to reduce the quality of management 
reporting which may cause a conflict with external auditors. A review of historical 
development in accounting, auditing, and corporate governance have been conducted 
and proposed different recommendations (Imhoff-Jr, 2003). Imhoff-Jr. (2003) 
recommends that a CEO or any top manager is prohibited not only to act as a chairman 
of the board but also not to be involved in the directors’ nomination process to mitigate 
any conflict of interest. Segregation of duties between CEO and chairman of the board 
affects corporate governance performance since it minimises corporate failure which 
lead to lower audit fees (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009).  
Role duality is not considered a factor for auditor resignation (Lee et al., 2004). It was 
concluded that there is no statistical relationship between auditors’ resignation and 
duality role.  
Brickley et al. (1997) argued that role duality is like an individual grading their own 
homework. But we notice that a fundamental requirement related to role duality is not 
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mentioned in the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (Green, 2004). This justifies why certain 
corporations assign one individual for both CEO and chairman of the board positions 
due to the “recommended” rather than “required” tone as per SOX and UK corporate 
governance code. Dalton et al. (2007) theoretically indicate that internal and external 
policies should not be led by one individual which may lead to bigger losses when there 
is a failure scenario. The consequences of such failures affect external parties where 
external auditors are one of these external parties, and subsequently audit quality. 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2a: There is a negative significant relationship between role duality and audit quality. 
4.5.1.2 Non-Executive Directors 
Non-executive directors (NED) are defined to be directors taking part on the 
board of directors with more independence than executives ones. They are not involved 
in companies’ operations but rather they give assistance in the strategic processes and 
participate in monitoring in the presence of concentrated/dominant shareholders (Long 
et al., 2005). As part of the close relationship between board of directors and external 
auditors (UK corporate governance code, 2010), Uang et al.(2006) argue that more non-
executive board members minimise agency cost and lead to better reporting quality and 
less gap with external auditors. But it was concluded that NED factor is shown to play a 
minor role in reducing dissonance between external auditors and management (Uang et 
al., 2006).  
NED have more incentives than inside directors to better monitor management as they 
care for their reputational capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983), which will lead to mitigation 
of agency cost. Abott and Parker (2000) conclude that the percentage of outside 
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directors’ variable is not significant in external auditors’ selection process. A review of 
previous literature and studies have emphasised that a board member should be an 
outside member from a corporation and should not have any significant relationship 
with the corporation itself or its top executives and management due to the influence of 
those directors on different financial and non-financial processes (Imhoff-Jr, 2003). 
Board or audit committeesꞌ membersꞌ independence are shown not to have a significant 
effect on audit fees (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). Chen and Sun (2007) argue that 
a more independent board of directors demands better auditor reputation. It was 
concluded that more independent boards were likely to dismiss Andersen earlier and to 
assign a Big Four audit firm as a successor auditor. Lee et al.(2004) concluded that an 
independent board of directors plays a significant role in mitigating external auditors to 
resign. Such boards of directors tend to work closely with external auditors to avoid and 
to reduce the level of hidden audit risks. 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2b: There is a positive significant relationship between the percentage of non-
executive directors to total board of directors’ members and audit quality. 
4.5.1.3 Board Size 
Board of directors’ size, as one of other factors and corporate governance 
mechanisms, has been researched in many previous studies where different conclusions 
revealed different roles of board size in corporations. There is a weak evidence that 
board size plays an important role in reducing inconsistencies between management and 
auditors regarding going-concern disclosures (Uang et al., 2006). Chen and Zhou (2007) 
hypothesised that clients with larger boards were more likely to dismiss Andersen at an 
earlier stage before the Enron scandal. The results support the above hypothesis that 
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companies with larger board size may mitigate auditor failure (Andersen) by dismissing 
the audit firm ahead of time of any scandal caused by the audit firm itself. Anderson et 
al.(2004) argued that larger boards provide better monitoring over the financial 
reporting process. They concluded that additional board members reduce the cost of 
debt.  
Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that larger boards have an advantage of being more 
diversified in directors’ backgrounds. Such board members are heterogeneous in 
technical and educational backgrounds. As a result a larger and diversified BoD may not 
be subject to management domination and is are able to promote for shareholders’ 
interest. This shareholder interest will be evidenced at the end of every financial year 
through a financial statements audited by an external auditor. Monks and Minow (1995) 
argue that larger boards can be involved in more monitoring and overseeing 
management. It is due that having larger boards with several committees established by 
the BoD (audit, nomination, remuneration...) allow fewer committees’ responsibilities 
for every board member. 
Board size is inversely related to corporate performance, since larger ones are 
associated with more agency cost (Canyon and Peck, 1998). Small boards of directors 
may facilitate the decision making process, but when other governance mechanisms 
exist, this would harm shareholders' interest. A balance between monitoring costs and 
the stewardship role should be in place to achieve and maintain organisation 
performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). It is concluded from a sample of five 
European countries (UK, France, Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy) that as board size 
increases, corporate performance decreases. 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
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H2c: There is a positive significant relationship between boards of directors’ size and 
audit quality. 
4.5.1.4 Audit Committee Size 
The size of audit committee is another independent variable selected to measure 
audit quality. The size itself gives an indicator of an effective discharge of audit 
committee duties (Chartered Institute of management Accountants, 2000). It is argued 
that larger audit committees are associated with more authority (Kalbers and Fogarty, 
1993). Audit committees are established to mitigate high agency costs and to be used as 
a monitoring tool (Menon and Williams, 1994). Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) argue 
that larger audit committees possess wider knowledge. Kent and Stewart (2008) 
conclude that there is a negative relationship between disclosure levels and audit 
committee size. This negative coefficient is due to the fact that smaller audit committees 
rely on external auditors for disclosure level (Kent and Stewart, 2008). This conclusion 
leads to a substitution effect between external auditor and characteristics of audit 
committee as corporate governance mechanism. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) state 
that the bigger the audit committees, companies issue less information about forecasts 
and subsequently less guidance is provided to the market only when shareholders are 
exposed to risk or wealth problems,; as a way to protect shareholders.  
H2d: There is a positive significant relationship between audit committee size and audit 
quality. 
4.5.1.5 Audit Committee Independence 
The audit committee independence explanatory variable is measured by the 
number of independent directors serving on the audit committee board. It is found that 
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audit committee independence is negatively related to dismissing external auditors after 
issuing a going-concern or unfavourable audit opinion (Carcello and Neal, 2003). 
Another study for Carcello and Neal (2000) reveal that companies have lower chances 
in receiving going-concern reports when their audit committees exhibit more affiliated 
directors. Audit committee independence plays a significant role in dismissing 
Anderson a little time before the scandal (Chen and Suny, 2007). Kent and Stewart 
(2008) conclude that audit committees’ independence is not related to disclosure level.  
From a theoretical framework, audit committees with no existence of independent 
directors are not perceived to be an objective monitoring tool between principles and 
agents and have negative impact on audit committees (Menon and Williams, 1994; 
Collier and Gregory, 2000). Audit committees’ independence plays no role in earnings 
management (Piot and Janin, 2007). It was concluded in this study that the 
independence factor of audit committees is not related to earnings management, since 
affiliated directors are more involved, rather than independent ones, in earnings related 
matters. Piot (2004) conclude that independence of audit committees is negatively 
related to inside ownership. 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2e: There is a negative significant relationship between audit committees’ 
independence and audit quality. 
4.5.1.6 Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit committee effectiveness is measured by the number of meetings held by 
audit committees during a financial year. Chen and Suny (2007) argue that the 
frequencies of audit committee meetings are associated with audit committee 
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effectiveness. It is found that audit committee meetings are significantly and positively 
related to the choice of a Big Four audit firm to be assigned after Anderson as active 
audit committees demand better auditor reputation. 
Kent and Stewart (2008) concluded that the frequency of audit committee meetings is 
positively related to the quantity of disclosures and it also reduces potential problems in 
financial reporting (Farber, 2005) as they are able to meet more to mitigate such 
problems. 
Along with the theoretical perspective of agency theory regarding the monitoring role of 
shareholders; Collier and Gregory (2000) state that there is a positive relationship 
between audit committeesꞌ activities and higher quality auditors. Active audit 
committees are expected to lower audit fees, but being an active audit committee 
requires more time from external auditors leading to an increase in audit fees (Krishnan 
and Visvanathan, 2009). There is no statistical relationship between auditors’ 
resignation and the number of meetings held by an audit committee and the selection of 
a successor auditor (Lee et al., 2004). 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2f: There is a positive significant relationship between audit committees’ frequency of 
meetings and audit quality. 
4.5.1.7 Financial Literacy of Audit Committee Directors 
Among different audit committee directors, an audit committee should comprise 
of at least one member who possesses financial experience (UK corporate governance 
code, 2010). The competency of audit committees is perceived more when financial and 
accounting experts exist (Cohen et al., 2002). It is concluded that there is a negative 
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relationship between audit committees financial expertise and disclosure levels (Kent 
and Stewart, 2008). This result is due to the fact that audit committees with less 
financial experts members tend to rely more on external auditors when it comes to the 
level of disclosure. But Mangena and Pike (2005) conclude that the financial expertise 
of audit committee members has a significant positive influence on interim disclosures. 
The contradicting results between Mangena and Pike (2005) and Kent and Stewart 
(2008) studies might relate to the type of disclosures (interim/annual). 
Based on the suggestions of the agency theory regarding the monitoring role of 
principals, financial experts within audit committees are said to have positive impact on 
audit quality. They demand better audit quality that will lead to increase in audit fees 
(Basiruddin, 2011). This increase in demand for better audit quality is due to financial 
expertsꞌ monitoring role and their intent to comply implicitly with the principal-agent 
conceptual framework. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) state that managementsꞌ forecasts 
are positively related to audit committees that constitute financial experts. It is argued 
that in this study better governance led to more forecasts and forecast update disclosures 
flowing from management to shareholders. Krishnan and Visavanathan (2009) conclude 
that there is an insignificant positive relationship between existence of financial experts 
in audit committees and audit fees. It is due to the fact that accounting experience and 
not general financial expertise gives a significant relationship against audit fees. 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2g: There is a positive significant relationship between audit committee directors’ 
financial expertise and audit quality. 
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4.5.1.8 Ownership 
Ownership concentration is when block shareholders enjoy an extra power to 
enforce corporate contracts with different parties (Fan and Wong, 2005). This variable 
is selected to be included in analysing a potential relationship between audit quality and 
clientsꞌ corporate governance characteristics. It is argued that companies with weak 
governance mechanisms are characterised to have block holders (Lin and Liu, 2009). 
They concluded a positive relationship between ownership concentration and switching 
to smaller auditors, as such companies prefer to benefit from “opaqueness gains”.  
The shareholdersꞌ voting is affected by the extent of block holders among other regular 
shareholders (Dao et al., 2008). It is hypothesised that there is a significant negative 
relationship between block ownership holders owning a minimum of five per cent or 
more of total shares and shareholders’ approval on auditors (Dao et al., 2008). 
Shareholders can either sell their shares or vote against auditors’ tenure, but it is less 
costly to vote against auditors’ tenure to send dissatisfaction signals over audit quality 
and management reports. It was concluded that as auditor tenure increases, block 
holders tend to change external auditors. 
Companies characterised by agency problems lead to high control concentration (Fan 
and Wong, 2005). They argue that such agency problems cannot be resolved by an 
internal control mechanism but through a reputable external auditor.  It is concluded that 
companies with more agency problems (controlled shareholders) tend to hire Big Five 
(Four) external audit firms than companies with less problems. The study also reveals 
that Big Five (Four) auditors increase their fees when they are auditing companies with 
concentrated shareholders due to more entrenchment problems.  
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Noe (2002) argues that block holders can be used as a tool to reduce agency cost. They 
are involved in monitoring activities over problems causing high agency cost. Huafang 
and Jianguo (2007) state that block holders are positively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosures. It is due to the fact that managers disclose more information in 
annual reports in order to minimise agency cost. Disclosing more information is 
expected to have a positive effect on audit quality. 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) also define block ownership variable to be holders owning a 
minimum of five per cent of equity. It was concluded that block ownership is positively 
significant to firm value, since block holders can control managers more than minor 
shareholders. Boone et al. (2007) argue that block holders increase board size to achieve 
more representation rather than displacing other board members. It was concluded that 
there is a positive relationship between block holder ownership and board of directors’ 
size. 
Since the Securities Exchange Committee (SEC) requires companies to disclose 
substantial shareholders holding a minimum of five per cent (Dao et al., 2008), in 
addition the Transparency Directive (TD) issued by the Financial Service Authority 
(FSA) requires a disclosure of substantial shareholders holding more than five per cent 
of UK and non-UK shares; a threshold of five per cent is set for the ownership structure 
variable. 
The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2h: There is a negative significant relationship between ownership 
concentration/block holders and audit quality. 
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Many variables have been used in different studies to analyse audit related areas. 
Variables used in one study are not necessarily to be found at another study, depending 
on every research scope, objective, data and sample selected.  The above selected and 
supported independent variables are selected to analyse their impact on audit quality and 
to assess companiesꞌ corporate governance mechanisms.  
To understand the relationship between non-audit fees and corporate governance 
quality, Zaman et al. (2013) include the acquisition variable in addition the selected 
independent variables. The acquisition variable is included since non-audit services 
cover assignments related to mergers and acquisitions that are not part of a regular 
recurring audit assignment which is different from the current research scope. Others 
included different ownership variables along with board of directorsꞌ characteristics 
only to assess audit quality (Oꞌsullivan, 2000). The objective of this study is to highlight 
on different ownership structures for listed companies between 1992-1994. Also non-
audit services is included which is against the scope of this research since non-audit fees 
can be an indicator for auditorsꞌ impaired independence rather than audit quality proxy. 
Binary variable for auditors is also included in Oꞌsullivanꞌs study which is not applicable 
in the current research. Majority of the tested sample are audited by Big Four auditors 
where such proxy is not valid and did not give any statistical relationship with audit 
quality. Another proxy is collected to measure audit quality which is not commonly 
used in previous literature: existence of going concern disclosure. Only one per cent of 
the tested sample has modified unqualified audit opinions, existence of going concern 
disclosure, which gives no statistical relationship with audit quality. 
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4.5.2 Dependent Variable Definition and Measurement 
The dependent variable of the second model is audit quality. Agency cost arises 
from separating ownership and control. It is mitigated by credible financial reporting 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Auditing is perceived to be a tool of increasing the 
credibility of financial statements (Abott and Parker, 2000). These financial statements 
are used as a monitoring tool by shareholders against management performance and 
stewardship. Abott and Parker (2000) indicate that the selection process of external 
auditors is considered a signalling of a companyꞌs performance.  
In theory, credible financial reporting audited by reputable audit firms decreases agency 
cost. It reduces information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, increases 
investors’ confidence, and reduces the cost of raising new capital (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Big Four audit firms are differentiated from other audit firms for their better 
reputation and credibility. This reputation is gained from investing in their ꞌꞌreputation 
capitalꞌꞌ (Beatty, 1989).  Big Four audit firms are perceived to provide better audit 
quality than non-Big Four audit firms due to their competence and independence 
(Khurana and Roman, 2004). Competence is achieved from huge investments in 
training related to international accounting standards, codes of ethics, international 
standards on auditing and fraud. Independence is achieved from their large portfolio of 
clients that enable them to withdraw from audit assignments when necessary. 
As companies have more complex and larger transactions, the probability of auditor 
failure increases (Pratt and Stice, 1994). Pratt and Stice (1994) argue that to maintain 
reasonable audit quality in such companies, auditors incur more hours to obtain enough 
and acceptable audit evidence. Additional audit hours lead to an increase in audit fees to 
maintain audit quality.  
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Previous studies and researchers have used different proxies to measure audit quality. 
Non audit fees, auditorsꞌ specialisation and auditorsꞌ market share are examples of audit 
quality proxies (Hussainey, 2009; Roheida, 2011). Non-audit fee is a signalling proxy 
for auditor independence rather than for audit quality. Delivering many services other 
than audit assignments by audit firms is considered another factor affecting auditor 
behaviour (Knapp, 1985). Knapp states that financial statement users will perceive that 
a company’s management will obtain their preferred resolution when there is a conflict 
with external auditors. Wines (1994) states that auditorsꞌ independence is ꞌꞌin doubtꞌꞌ 
when remuneration from non-audit fees exist. The result of this study shows that 
companies with a higher proportion of non-audit fees receive more unqualified audit 
opinion in comparison with companies incurring lower non-audit fees and receiving 
different types of qualified audit opinion.  
Audit firms auditing same line of industry clients and obtaining large market share; this 
might be an indicator of a lower audit quality. There is evidence that specialised 
auditors assign junior staff and spend minimal time on reviewing the control framework 
that could lead to a lower quality audit (Cahan et al., 2011). Kwon et al. (2007) indicate 
that auditor specialisation can have an effective role in improving accounting quality in 
a weak legislative environment. Auditorsꞌ specialisation is a substitute of a weak 
corporate governance mechanism in a weak legislative environment rather than strong 
legal environment. 
The research scope is mainly about the compulsory provisions of audit and the 
mandatory audit assignments rather than other services performed by audit firms. Audit 
fee is used as an audit quality proxy to maintain the coherence between the two 
empirical studies. The first study comprises a survey about auditorsꞌ dysfunctional 
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behaviour. The dysfunctional behaviour is measured by pre-mature sign-off and under 
reporting of chargeable time related to audit assignments only. The detailed 
questionnaire in the appendix highlights the different areas auditors are questioned 
about which are related to tasks and scenarios of audit assignments rather than voluntary 
assignments and services. The potential dysfunctional behaviour, measured by under 
reporting of chargeable time, will lead to tight budgets and lower audit fees leading to a 
lower audit quality. Companies subject to Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAER) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) incur audit fees 
premium (Barua and Smith, 2013). It is implied that auditors assess risk at a higher level 
for companies cited by the AAER. To maintain a good quality audit, auditors charge 
higher audit fees to cover all potential risks. Audit quality is measured by total audit 
fees (Holm and Birkholm, 2007; Krishnan and Visavanathan, 2009). 
4.5.3 Research Design – Empirical Two 
Audit quality against corporate governance characteristics is modelled by using 
a secondary data method. This method involves data collection for UK listed companies 
on the Financial Times Stock Exchange 350 (FTSE 350) excluding financial institutions 
and utilities from 2007 to 2010. To identify which regression test to choose, Hausman 
test is used to give guidance on whether to use random or fixed regression tests. Also, 
the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression test has been run and used to mitigate for 
reverse causality problems (Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013). To compare two sets of 
instruments, the Hausman specification test is used. A null hypothesis is stated where 
the larger set of variables is relatively efficient (Castella, 1989). The main objective to 
run 2SLS regression test is when there is a doubt that one or many explanatory variables 
are endogenous. It is better to test for exogeneity; if the hypothesis (variables are 
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exogenous and uncorrelated) is accepted, then it is better to rely on Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) rather than 2SLS regression (Soderbom, 2009). Along with the 2SLS, the 
Durbin-WU-Hausman is used for endogeneity (Essen et al., 2013). The 2SLS regression 
test is used primarily for the model robustness purposes. 
4.5.4 Independent Variables Definition and Measurement 
The first model of this research covers the relationship between audit quality and 
clients’ corporate governance characteristics. The two main mechanisms that are closely 
related to external auditors are board of directors and audit committee. Also, ownership 
structure is added as part of corporate governance characteristics to empirically assess 
its impact on audit quality. 
Board of directors is measured by the following explanatory variables: role duality, 
percentage of non-executive directors to total number of board of directors, and board 
size. Audit committee is measured by level of independence and effectiveness. 
A set of different additional variables are included in the model to control for the 
statistical relationship between audit quality and clients’ corporate governance 
characteristics. Control variables are as follows: company’s size, leverage, profitability, 
and line of industry   
4.5.4.1 Role Duality 
Role duality variable is defined as chairman of the board of directors and chief 
executive officer positions being held by the same person (Jun and Ming, 2009). Role 
duality is a dummy variable measured by 1 or 0 if role duality exists or not. 
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4.5.4.2 Non-Executive Directors 
Non-executive directors are defined as directors serving at board of directors but 
who practise more independency than executive directors. They help in strategic matters 
and are not involved on operations (Long et al., 2005). A non-executive director 
variable is measured by the number of independent directors against total number of 
board of directors using the ratio technique over a period of five years for sampled 
companies. 
4.5.4.3 Board of Directors’ Size 
Board of directors’ size is selected to be an independent variable against 
auditors’ behaviour, since board of directors’ size plays an essential role in audit-related 
matters in addition to their executive and non-executive role in corporations (Uang et 
al., 2006; Chen and Zhou, 2007; Anderson et al., 2004). Board of directors’ size is 
measured by extracting related data from companies’ annual reports. 
4.5.4.4 Audit Committee Size 
The size itself gives an indicator of an effective discharge of audit committee 
duties (Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, 2000). It is argued that larger 
audit committees are associated with more authority (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) argued that larger audit committees possess wider 
knowledge. Kent and Stewart (2008) concluded that there is a negative relationship 
between disclosures’ levels and audit committee size. This negative coefficient is due to 
the fact that smaller audit committees rely on external auditors for disclosure level 
(Kent and Stewart, 2008). This conclusion leads to a substitution effect between 
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external auditor and characteristics of audit committee as corporate governance 
mechanism.  
4.5.4.5 Audit Committee Independence 
Audit committee, being one of other committees established by board of 
directors, has a close interaction with external auditors. It gives recommendation to the 
board of directors on assigning and reassigning external auditors (UK corporate 
governance code, 2010). The independence of audit committee members plays a 
significant role in the control and financial reporting process (Carcello and Neal, 2003). 
Also, the level of members’ independence affects the decision of dismissing external 
auditors (Chen and Suny, 2007). It is measured by the number of non-executive audit 
committee members to total members of the audit committee. Related information about 
audit committees are extracted from annual reports of sampled companies. 
4.5.4.6 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Audit committee effectiveness is defined to be the number of meetings audit a 
committee held during a financial year. Number of meetings gives us an indicator of 
how effective an audit committee is (Kent and Stewart, 2008) or whether it is 
established for compliance purposes. The effectiveness of audit committees is closely 
related to the work and behaviour of external auditors (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2009; Chen and Suny, 2007; Kent and Stewart, 2008). Number of meetings held by 
audit committee is extracted from annual reports of sampled companies. 
4.5.4.7 Financial Literacy of Audit Committee Directors 
The competency of audit committees is perceived more when financial and 
accounting experts exist (Cohen et al., 2002). It is concluded that there is a negative 
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relationship between audit committees' financial expertise and disclosure levels (Kent 
and Stewart, 2008). This result is due to the fact that audit committees with less 
financial expert members tend to rely more on external auditors when it comes to the 
level of disclosure. But Mangena and Pike (2005) conclude that the financial expertise 
of audit committee members has a significant positive influence on interim disclosures.  
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) state that management forecasts are positively related to 
audit committees with more financial experts. Krishnan and Visavanathan (2009) 
conclude that there is an insignificant positive relationship between existence of 
financial experts in audit committees and audit fees. Audit committee financial expertise 
variable is measured by the number of audit committee financial experts divided by the 
total number of audit committee members. The members are counted by referring to 
annual reports used in the data collection process. Companies disclose in the audit 
committee section, which is part of the governance compliance and mechanisms’ 
disclosures section in the annual report, members that have financial expertise by briefly 
stating their background, education and professional experience. 
4.5.4.8 Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration or block holders are defined to be shareholders holding 
a minimum of five per cent of a company’s equity (Dao et al., 2008). They are said to 
have a big influence on companies’ plans through their voting power. Companies 
characterised by agency problems face high control concentration (Fan and Wong, 
2005). It was concluded that companies with more agency problems tend to hire Big 
Five (Four) external audit firms than companies with less problems. It is measured by 1 
or 0 for the existence of ownership concentration or not. 
 
154 
 
4.5.5 Control variables 
4.5.5.1 Companiesꞌ Size 
Large clients tend not to dismiss external auditors (Francis and Wilson, 
1988),(Haskin and Williams, 1990) since large clients care for a better reputation to 
have good-quality auditors due to the level of expertise and better audit quality expected 
from Big Four audit firms. It was also revealed in previous literature that company’s 
size plays a significant role in minimising disagreements with external auditors that may 
lead to dismiss external auditors, since larger companies tend to retain their auditors to 
avoid being scrutinised by financial markets and analysts (Carcello and Neal, 2003). 
The majority of non-financial corporations comprising the sample of this model are 
assets-based companies where assets are the main driver for future economic growth 
and profit. Taking into consideration that net income is transferred to retained earnings 
in the equity section of the balance sheet, which will be indirectly reflected in total 
assets measurements; companies’ size is measured by total assets. 
4.5.5.2 Leverage 
Previous literature has shown that debt is considered to be a healthy factor to 
companies’ value. It provides managers with incentives for good performance to avoid 
creditors’ pressure and the possibility of losing their jobs in a financial crisis (Masulis et 
al., 2007; Chen et al.,2010). Including a leverage variable to control companies’ risk is 
essential to show if external auditors are performing a corporate governance role (Fan 
and Wong, 2005). Garvey and Hanka (1999) conclude that firms operating in anti-
takeover law regions tend to increase significantly their leverage to avoid a hostile 
takeover. 
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Monitoring creditors and lenders, measured by leverage,is insufficient in preventing 
directors from over-optimistic financial reporting regardless of their companies’ going-
concern problems (Uang et al., 2006). Broye and Weill (2008) state that the higher the 
disclosure requirements and the more creditors’ rights are protected, the higher the 
demand for audit quality by highly-leveraged companies. Leverage is measured by 
long-term debt divided by total assets. 
4.5.5.3 Profitability 
Profitability variable has been used to assess the impact on the auditor selection 
process, since more profitable companies are more likely to pay premium fees to have 
better audit quality (Abott and Parker, 2000). Dao et al. (2008) included return on assets 
ratio (ROA) to control the relation between auditor tenure and shareholder ratification, 
because it has been evidenced that the support for management proposals is weaker at 
low performance companies. Less financially distressed company directors tend to 
change and deviate from external auditors’ going-concern modification, regardless of 
the real concerns of a going-concern problem, rather than companies with poor financial 
performance (Uang et al., 2006). Due to the fact that ROA’s denominator includes total 
assets (both equity and debt), this can help in assessing how well a company is using its 
two financing options that can be reflected in corporate operational performance. 
Comparing ROA to other ratios, return on equity (ROE) for example, ROE’s 
profitability is reflected by income over equity only, excluding debt. Companies’ 
profitability is measured by return on assets ratio. It is calculated by dividing net income 
over total assets. 
 
 
156 
 
4.5.5.4 Liquidity 
There is a positive relationship between liquidity and the level of interim 
financial disclosures (Mangena and Pike, 2005). Mangena and Pike (2005) argue that 
companies with higher liquidity are more inclined to show their ability to sustain 
forecasts earnings, although the results showed to have no significant evidence. Lin and 
Liu (2009) considered that liquidity plays a significant role in switching to a lower-
quality auditor. Total assets balance is a mirror for total liabilities and ownersꞌ equity. 
Liquidity is measured by the ratio of current assets over total assets. This proxy is 
controlling not only for current liabilities and whether companies are able to pay their 
short term debts from their currents assets; but also for their liabilities that might have a 
short term characteristic but it has been re-scheduled to have a long-term balance (bank 
over drafts). The proxy also controls for any potential dividends payments to 
shareholder that are included in the equity balance. 
4.5.5.5 Industry 
Line or nature of industry is included as a control variable to measure audit risk  
(Sahnoun and Zarai, 2009). It was concluded that audit firms are restructuring their 
firms per line of industry to meet market challenges. Clients operating in inherently 
risky industries have difficulties in obtaining debt financing with reasonable interest 
rates (Johnstone, 2000). Industry variable is analysed to study the changes of audit 
quality when line of industry differs.  Industry sections are classified into six groups 
with a dummy measurement. Type/line of industry data is extracted from FTSE codes 
for listed companies.  Table 4.2summarising the independent and control variables is 
presented below, stating the description and proxy of each variable. 
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Table 4.2 Independent and Control Variables Summary 
 Variable Description Proxy/measurement References 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
 
RD Role duality 1 if the CEO is also 
chairman of the board, 0 
otherwise 
(Jun and Ming,2009);  
(Krishnan &Visvanathan, 
2009);  
(Uang et al., 2006) 
NED Non-Executive 
Directors 
The percentage of 
outside directors on the 
board 
(Long et al., 2005); 
(Lee et al., 2004); 
(Abott and Parker, 2000) 
BS Board of Directors 
size 
Number of members 
serving at board of 
directors 
(Canyon and Peck, 1998); 
(Uang et al., 2006);  
(Boone et al.,2007);  
(Anderson et al., 2004);  
(Chen and Zhou, 2007) 
ACS Audit committee size 
 
 
 
Number of members 
serving on an audit 
committee 
(Kent and Stewart, 2008). 
(Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005) 
ACI Audit Committee 
Independence 
The percentage of 
outside directors on an 
audit committee 
(Carcello and Neal, 2003); 
(Piot, 2004);  
(Kent and Stewart,2008);   
(Chen and Suny, 2007) 
ACM Audit Committee 
Effectiveness 
Frequency of audit 
committee meetings 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2009);  
(Kent and Stewart, 2008);  
(Chen and Zhou, 2007) 
FINEXP Audit committee 
financial expert 
directors 
 
 
 
 
The percentage of 
financial experts on an 
audit committee 
(Mangena and Pike, 2005); 
(Kent and Stewart, 2008); 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005) 
OC Ownership 
concentration/Block 
holders 
Ratio of shareholders 
owning five per cent of 
equity against 
companies’ equity 
(Fan and Wong, 2005);  
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2009);  
(Huafang and Jianguo, 2007);  
(Mak and Kusnadi, 2005);  
(Boone et al., 2007) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
SZ Companie’s size Total assets (Francis and Wilson, 1988); 
(Haskin and Williams, 1990); 
(Carcello and Neal, 2003) 
LEV Leverage Long-term liabilities 
divided by total assets 
(Masulis et al., 2007);  
(Chen el al., 2010);  
(Fan and Wong, 2005); 
(Garvey and Hanka, 1999); 
(Broye and Weill, 2008); 
(Uang et al., 2006) 
ROA Profitability Net income divided by 
total assets 
(Dao et al., 2008);  
(Abott and Parker, 2000);  
(Uang et al., 2006) 
LQD Liquidity 
 
 
 
Current assets divided 
by total assets 
Lin and Liu (2009) 
InD Industry Type of industry from 
FTSE 350 schedules 
(Johnstone, 2000);  
(Sahnoun and Zarai, 2009) 
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4.5.6 Population and Sample Criteria 
The dependent variable, audit quality, is measured against companies’ corporate 
governance characteristics and mainly those that are closely related to external auditors, 
board of directors and audit committee in addition to ownership concentration. 
Companies are selected from the FTSE 350 database that represents 350 companies in 
the UK, excluding financial institutions due to their own regulations and regulatory 
bodies (Financial Services Authority - FSA) to avoid any discrepancies in the sample 
and data collection. Utilities are excluded also from the sample due to the many 
regulations and regulatory bodies governing this market sector. In particular, the utilities 
sector is governed by Office for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas (OFREG), Office 
of Communications (Ofcom), Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), Office 
of Water Services (OFWAT), Water UK Water, and Industry Commissioner for 
Scotland. Excluding financial institutions and utilities align with previous literature as a 
result of their special regulatory bodies, financial structure and accounting standards 
(Chen et al., 2010). Government regulation, in financial institutions and utilities 
industries, lead to a limited role of board of directors (Yermack, 1996). 
FTSE 350 is characterised to be an index based on ꞌꞌmarket capitalisation 
weighted stock market incorporating the largest 350 companies by capitalisation which 
have their primary listing on the London Stock Exchangeꞌꞌ (FTSE, 2010). Such rated 
companies are assumed to be in compliance with most common international practices 
and help in giving a reasonable view about how their structure and boards’ mechanisms 
affect audit quality. Four years' data is collected from 2007-2010 companiesꞌ annual 
reports. The four yearsꞌ period helps in understanding how audit quality varies during 
that period; especially, many were asking about the role of external auditors as a result 
of different accounting scandals that took place. New updated codes were issued in 
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2010 and 2012. To mitigate for any differences in corporate governance compliance and 
to maintain a homogenous sample, the four yearsꞌ data relates mainly to one code (The 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance, 2006). Analysing data collected over four 
years help in highlighting whether companies are abiding by the corporate governance 
code as the code follows the ꞌꞌComply and Explainꞌꞌ approach rather than being 
legislated.  
4.5.7 Model Specification 
The econometric model of this empirical is as follows: 
LnAF=β1+β2BSt+β3NEDt+β4RDt+β5ACSt+β6ACIt+β7ACMt+β8FINEXPt+β9OCt+β10Ln
TAt+β11ROAt+β12LQDt+β13LeVt+β14InDt+e 
Where  β1- constant (Intercept) 
 β2-β14 - coefficient  
LnAF = Audit fees 
BS = Board Size 
NED = Non-Executive Directors 
RD = Role Duality 
ACS = Audit Committee Size 
ACI = Audit Committee Independence 
ACM = Audit Committee Effectiveness/Number of meetings 
FINEXP =Financial literacy of audit committee directors 
OC =Ownership concentration 
LnTA = Company Size/Total assets 
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ROA = Company Profitability/Return on equity 
LAQ =Company liquidity 
LEV = Company Leverage 
InD = Company type of industry 
and, 
e=error term 
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4.6 Conclusion 
As explained thoroughly in the previous sections, objectivist ontological 
positions and the positive epistemology are the selected justified philosophical and 
methodological approaches used in this research. The agency theory, the stakeholder 
theory and the stakeholder-agency theory are the selected justified theories associated 
with this research. They are considered part of the positive accounting theory embedded 
in the objective ontology. As a result of this theoretical philosophical framework, the 
hypothetico-deductive (testing) approach is the appropriate approach to be used in this 
study. 
There are two surveys included in this research. The first empirical model uses a valid 
and reliable questionnaire. The questionnaire has been reviewed, validated and a pilot 
study was conducted to assess its appropriateness to meet the model’s objective. It 
measures and analyses the perception of auditors’ behaviour in different scenarios. 
Mainly auditors’ behaviour is analysed against time budget, time deadline, and 
performance evaluation factors. 
In addition to the primary source of data collection for this model, observations are 
analysed using quantitative analysis and some qualitative analysis from respondents’ 
interpretations. 
The second survey is made up of a designed checklist for selected variables collected 
from a secondary data source. This model tests the set hypotheses and analyses the 
determinants of audit quality against corporate governance mechanisms. The 
methodology of the first empirical model tests the hypotheses against corporate 
governance characteristics; board of directors’ independence, board of directors’ size, 
role duality, audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee 
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effectiveness, audit committee with financial experts, and ownership concentration. It 
also tests audit quality against companies’ characteristics, companies’ size, profitability, 
leverage and line of industry as selected control variables. 
The sample of the first model is comprised of auditors employed at the UK Big Four 
firms. The sample of the second model is comprised of non-financial companies listed 
at the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE 350).  
The relationship between theoretical perspective and the empirical analysis is 
linked using research methodology. The deductive methodology explains that a 
researcher is testing a theory by conducting empirical work and analysing related 
results. Due to the previous explanation, the research is directed to the hypothetico-
deductive methodology. This type of methodology helps the main purpose of the 
research as it is based on a theory rather than establishing a theory (inductive approach). 
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Chapter Five 
Auditing and Auditorsꞌ Behaviour 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter represents the first empirical model of this research. It measures and 
assesses auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour. The role of external auditors exists as a 
result of management-shareholders unstable relationship leading to information 
asymmetry (DeAngelo, 1981). Due to this critical role of external auditors, previous 
studies have been conducted to analyse auditors’ behaviour and what factors may push 
auditors to behave in a dysfunctional manner (Margheim et al., 2005; Ponemon, 1992; 
and Kelley and Margheim, 2002). 
The main objective of this chapter is to highlight factors leading to dysfunctional 
behaviour. The survey conducted is comprised of 48 questions used to analyse auditors’ 
perceptions about dysfunctional behaviour. The dependent variable, dysfunctional 
behaviour (DB) is measured using two proxies as signals of dysfunctional behaviour; 
premature sign-off and under-reporting of chargeable time. The independent variables 
used in this model are time-budget pressure, time-deadline pressure, and performance 
evaluation. 
The results highlight factors auditors believe are embedded in the accountancy 
profession that push them to commit dysfunctional behaviour. The results also show 
how behaviour differs between experienced and inexperienced auditors employed the 
Big Four in the UK. 
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample of this empirical study is made up of 145 usable questionnaires. Initially 
167 questionnaires were sent to auditors. Different follow-up techniques were used to 
secure a high response rate. Mainly, mail questionnaires and group-administered 
questionnaires methods were used. The breakdown of the questionnaires’ response rate 
is presented below. 
Table 5.1 
Response rate and breakdown of questionnaires 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D Pooled 
Total questionnaires sent 39 48 35 45 167 
Total questionnaires received 36 44 32 43 155 
Usable responses 35 41 30 39 145 
Response rate 90% 85% 86% 87% 87% 
Respondent’s gender      
   Male 27 27 21 22 97 
   Female 8 14 9 17 48 
 
The results in Table 5.1 indicate that the overall response rate for the four audit firms is 
87 per cent. This is considered a good response rate as compared to other studies 
conducted about auditors’ behaviour (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004; Herrbach, 2001; 
Coram et al., 2004; Kelly and Margheim, 2002; Fisher, 2001; and Otley and Pierce, 
1996) as shown in Table 6.2. Field visits are arranged to Big Four offices to secure high 
response rate. Questionnaires are distributed and collected during the field visits. This 
technique prevented delays in responses. 
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Table 5.2 – Summary of previous studies’ response rate 
 
Table 5.1 also indicates that the questionnaire response rate is fairly collected from the 
four firms to help in generalisation and to avoid responses from a single firm that will 
dominate the whole sample. 
As part of answering the research question of how auditors’ behaviour may or may not 
change between experienced and inexperienced auditors, the survey was conducted with 
questionnaires sent to different levels of auditors.  
Article Author Population Number of surveys 
sentrecvd.     % 
Cost-Quality Conflict in 
Audit Firms: An Empirical 
Investigation 
Pierce and Sweeney, 
2004 
Senior auditors 316 130 41% 
      
Audit Quality, auditor 
behaviour and the 
psychological contract 
Herrbach, 2001 Senior auditors 395 170 43% 
      
The Effect of Risk of 
Misstatement on the 
Propensity to Commit 
Reduced Audit Quality Acts 
under Time-budget Pressure  
Coram et al., 2004 Senior auditors 501 103 21% 
      
The relationships between 
senior auditor budget 
preparation, job structuring, 
job consideration and staff 
auditor time-budget pressure  
Kelly and Margheim, 
2002 
Staff and 
senior auditors 
155 85 55% 
      
Auditor time-budget 
pressure: Consequences and 
antecedents 
Otley and  Pierce, 
1996 
Senior auditors 356 260 73% 
      
Role Stress, The Type A 
Behaviour Pattern, and 
External Auditor Job 
Satisfaction and Performance 
Fisher, 2001 Staff auditors 165 123 75% 
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The breakdown of ꞌꞌperiod of employment in accountancyꞌꞌ and “period of employment 
with the current employer” is presented in Table 5.3. It can be noted that the majority of 
auditors (61 per cent) are newly employed at their firms. Managers/Directors are the 
least group of auditors (6 per cent) that have stayed with the current employer. This can 
be due to the fact that auditors, by the time they reach such a level (Manager/Director), 
become more experienced and get exposed to different types of industries where they 
start receiving competitive job offers and packages. This is due to the nature of the 
audit/accountancy profession. Auditors work in different lines of service and are 
assigned at different kind of companies (manufacturing, trading, construction, financial 
services, etc.). This kind of diverse experience helps auditors to become knowledgeable 
in different market segments and to possess remarkable ꞌꞌknow howꞌꞌ.  
The above conclusion can be supported by referring also to the “period employed in 
accountancy” results. It can be noted that the Managers/Directors are the least group of 
auditors (18 per cent) to accumulate number of years of experience in accountancy. 
Again, this can be due to the high turnover of auditors at this level due to competitive 
offers outside the audit profession. 
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Table 5.3 – Employment Breakdown 
 Audit title Pooled 
Period employed in 
Accountancy (years) 
   
0-2 Audit trainee 53 37% 
3-5 Senior auditor 33 23% 
6-8 Manager/Director 26 18% 
>8 Partner 33 23% 
Period with current 
employer (years) 
   
0-2  89 61% 
3-5  33 23% 
6-8  8 6% 
>8  15 10% 
 
The same argument applies to audit trainees. They constitute the majority of auditors 
who have the least years of experience (37per cent), and they are the biggest group of 
auditors who are employed with the current employer (61 per cent). This is due to the 
fact that auditors start an accountancy career; they accumulate a certain number of years 
in the profession until they are promoted to manager/director level where they move out 
from accountancy for better competitive packages and job offers. 
Table 5.4 clearly highlights the gap between individuals progressing to graduate and 
post-graduate degrees and/or to accomplishing professional qualifications. Only 35 per 
cent of auditors finished a graduate degree while 56 per cent possessed a professional 
qualification (ACCA, CPA, etc.). This concern has been raised by Coughlan (2012) 
where it was mentioned that UK universities are failing to attract skilled staff needed by 
a modern economy. This gap between graduate degrees and professional qualifications 
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could be due to the nature of the accountancy profession. Accountancy firms, especially 
the Big Four, care more about hiring and retaining those who are professionally 
qualified rather than those who possess graduate degrees. 
Table 5.4 – Academic and Professional Background 
   Pooled 
Academic degree    
Bachelor degree  93 64% 
Masters degree  50 34% 
PhD  2 1% 
Professional 
qualification(s) 
   
   ACCA  40 28% 
   CPA (US)  28 19% 
   CFA  4 3% 
   CIMA  0 0% 
   CIA  8 6% 
   Other(s)  6 4% 
    
 
CVA (1): Certified Valuation Analyst; CISA (2): Certified Information System Audit; 
 CFSA (1): Certified Financial Services Auditor; CFE (1): Certified Fraud Examiner
 
The breakdown of auditors comprising the sample of this empirical study is presented 
below. 
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Table 5.5 – Respondents Level Breakdown 
  Pooled 
Job title    
Audit trainee  53 37% 
Senior auditor  26 18% 
Manager/Director  60 41% 
Partner  5 3% 
Other  1 1% 
 
The results in the below table indicate the need for a professional qualification to 
progress in the accountancy field. It is interesting to find that all managers/directors (60) 
possess a professional qualification. 
 ACCA CPA CFA CIMA CIA Other Total 
Manager/Director 30 18 3 6 - 3 60 
 
 As a result of the above finding, the gap between professional qualification and 
graduate degree can be justified, as having a professional qualification is becoming one 
of the fundamental factors in the promotion scheme within the Big Four. 
Finally, some respondents were keen to write down their personal opinions about 
certain sections of the questionnaire and 40 per cent stated their emails, asking to 
receive the analysis and the results of this empirical chapter. 
5.3 Test of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses tested in this study cover the relationship between auditors’ 
dysfunctional behaviour as a dependent variable and the impact of time budget, time 
deadline and performance evaluation as independent variables (H1a, H1b, H1c). The 
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stated independent variables are considered three of the most common factors that may 
push an auditor to commit a dysfunctional behaviour (Otley and Pierce, 1996; 
Soobaroyen and Chengabroyan, 2006; Fisher, 2001). 
In addition to assessing auditors’ perception on dysfunctional behaviour, the empirical 
study highlights the differences in behaviour and perception between audit trainees and 
experienced auditors (senior and above). The questionnaire is constructed using the 
five-point Likert scale technique where 1 stands for Strongly Agree, 2 stands for Agree, 
3 stands for No Opinion, 4 stands for Disagree, and 5 stands for Strongly Disagree. 
As a result of using the five-point Likert scale measurement, the analysis is based 
mainly on the mean and median scores. Normally, in data mining the mean score is used 
as it represents a set of objects and it is calculated by the average of the numbers 
divided by the set number. The mean value is also useful in the analysis as it represents 
a fundamental quantity in statistics and it is the middle number of a sorted list of 
numbers (Jianet al., 2012). Accordingly, a mean scored above three indicates that 
responses are directed toward disagreement and responses below three indicate 
responses are directed toward agreement. 
 
 
172 
 
Table 5.6 - Time-Budget Pressure 
Under-reporting of chargeable time Mean 
(Median) 
01. Auditors should not employ the practice of under-reporting 
chargeable time, even in the face of tight time-budget constraints. 
1.69 
(2) 
 
02. Senior and staff auditors knowingly under-report chargeable time. 2.40 
(2) 
 
03. When facing a tight budget, auditors shift chargeable time to non-
chargeable categories on their time report/time sheet. 
 
2.77 
(2) 
04. Sometimes auditors need to under-report chargeable time to meet 
budget constraints. 
 
2.72 
(2) 
05. Sometimes new auditors need to under-report time but with added 
experience, there is less of a need. 
 
3.12 
(3) 
06. When facing a tight budget, auditors charge time to other clients 
that should have charged to this client. 
 
3.33 
(4) 
07. Under a tight budget, auditors tend not to pursue an unexpected 
problem occurring during a mission. 
 
3.30 
(4) 
08. When facing a tight budget, auditors under-report chargeable time 
by performing chargeable work in their personal time. 
 
2.01 
(2) 
Premature sign-off 
 
 
09. Under time-budget pressure, auditors prematurely sign-off a 
required audit step, which is not covered at other stages of the audit, 
without completing the work or noting the omissions of procedures. 
 
3.17 
(3) 
10. Under time-budget pressure, auditors tend to reduce the amount of 
work on a step beyond the normal. 
 
3.03 
(3) 
11. Auditors tend to perform superficial reviews of clients’ documents 
to comply with budgeted time allocated to the audit assignment. 
 
3.35 
(4) 
12. Under a tight budget, auditors may accept insufficient or light 
explanations from the client. 
 
3.01 
(3) 
13. Under time budget pressure, auditors insufficiently document a 
technical point needed for the execution of a step. 
 
3.17 
(4) 
14. Under a tight budget, auditors declare in their working papers that 
they have performed a control that they did not actually perform. 
 
3.89 
(4) 
15. Under a tight budget, auditors tend to handle substantive tests 
faster. 
 
2.69 
(2) 
 
16. Under a tight budget, auditors tend to tick mark audit schedules 
after an essentially superficial review of supporting client documents. 
 
3.27 
(3) 
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5.3.1 Auditorsꞌ Behaviour and Time Budget 
Table 5.6 includes a set of questions that assess the perception of external auditors about 
dysfunctional behaviour and how they perceive dysfunctional behaviour if being caused 
by time-budget pressure. 
The results summarise the relationship between the dependent variable and the first 
independent variable. The dependent variable is measured using two proxies: under-
reporting of chargeable time and premature sign-off. Accordingly, eight questions are 
presented to cover under-reporting of chargeable time and eight questions cover the 
premature sign off behaviour. 
It can be noted that auditors believe, in abstract, that they should not employ any kind of 
dysfunctional behaviour including under-reporting of chargeable time (Q1). This 
question is stated to assess the fundamental understanding of external auditors about the 
chargeable time reporting concept. 
Although auditors believe that they should not behave in a dysfunctional manner, senior 
and staff auditors intentionally and knowingly commit under-reporting of chargeable 
time when they face time-budget constraints (Q2). The objective of this question is to 
highlight the fact that under-reporting of chargeable time is not an outcome of 
unintentional error where the results show exactly the opposite. This intentional 
behaviour of committing dysfunctional behaviour might be due to the absence of an 
improper system to deal with such issues. Some studies mentioned that when auditors 
face time-budget pressure, the employer expects auditors to solve things on their own 
(McNair, 1991).   
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It was interesting to notice that the act of under-reporting of chargeable time is 
committed in a way not to affect other audit engagements and assignments (Q3 and Q6). 
The manipulation of chargeable hours, when facing time-budget pressure, is committed 
by switching and recording chargeable time as non-chargeable hours on the auditors’ 
time sheet or assignment time record. In other words, if auditors are working on other 
clients where they do not have any time budget issues, they prefer to shift the 
chargeable hours to a non-chargeable category when facing a time budget rather than 
shifting them to another client's records. It can be concluded that, in general, auditors 
care more for assignments' profitability than their utilisation rate. This could be due to 
the auditors’ perception and unwillingness to be seen as incompetent. They put extra 
efforts to maintain a good percentage of assignment realisation. The feasibility for 
meeting a budget variable was also linked to personal normative beliefs and their 
willingness to disapprove or approve the under-reporting behaviour (Lightner et al.. 
1982). 
Another example of dysfunctional behaviour exercised by under-reporting of chargeable 
time can be found in the response to question 8. It can be noticed that auditors do not 
only shift hours among different clients and tend to record chargeable hours as un-
chargeable, but also the existence of time-budget pressure pushes auditors to work 
chargeable hours in their personal time. Working in their personal time may affect the 
progress of auditors in other areas in the accountancy profession and consequently may 
affect the audit quality. 
Budget tightness is also one of the factors leading to dysfunctional behaviour (Q4). The 
experience factor shows no major impact on under-reporting of chargeable time when 
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facing time-budget pressure (Q5). The mean and median of question number 5 gave 
almost similar scores. Hence, a senior auditor stated the following: 
“Logically with time and experience, yes they learn how to do things faster, however 
they are simultaneously assuming on new roles and responsibilities at a faster rate than 
they actually get time to master their previous roles. So in this case I don’t know exactly 
what to answer because even though it would take them less time, but there are other 
constraints especially in understaffed situations (which is almost always the case).” 
It can be noted from the above participant’s response that experience might not help 
significantly in reducing dysfunctional behaviour. Although more experience is 
obtained over the years and auditors may incur less chargeable hours as a result of the 
accumulated knowledge; the issue of understaffing at audit firms causes more tasks to 
be assigned to auditors leading to more pressure and dysfunctional behaviour. 
Auditors committing dysfunctional behaviour still care to solve any unexpected issues 
during an audit assignment although they are facing time-budget pressure (Q7). It can 
be noted that auditors are ready to work in their personal time (Q8), to avoid 
manipulating other assignments’ chargeable hours (Q6) and to solve unexpected issues 
regardless of time-budget pressure. But one interesting comment was stated by an audit 
trainee: 
“If the other client has a budget and the manager overseeing the projects is one and the 
same.” 
In other words, auditors are willing to commit dysfunctional behaviour but not at the 
expense of not covering all major problems they face during an audit assignment if two 
assignments are managed by one audit manager as mentioned in the above comment.  
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The second set of questions (9 to 16) assess auditors perception of dysfunctional 
behaviour but through questions and statements related to premature sign off rather than 
under-reporting of chargeable time. 
The results of these questions related to technical dysfunctional behaviour (premature 
sign off) and showed different opinions whether or not auditors commit a premature 
sign off when facing time budget pressure. There was no clear opinion as to whether 
auditors prematurely sign off an audit step which is not mentioned at another audit step 
without mentioning the omission and performing the procedures required (Q9). Also, 
the responses did not show any clear direction if auditors are willing to reduce the time 
required in certain audit procedures if they are facing time-budget pressure (Q11). A 
senior auditor stated the following: 
“I believe it depends on employee’s character. However usually when an auditor checks 
information/ specially clients’ documents and document their work they know they are 
held liable for it and generally do check them correctly unless (a) they don’t have the 
experience and have been assigned a risky or technical section which happens quite 
often and therefore they miss on important elements or (b) they don’t care about their 
career in audit and willing to take a risk on their reputation.” 
It can be noted from the above response that there are different types of auditors who 
may care less for audit reputation. This contradicts with the general perception that 
auditors are perceived to be professional expert individuals in their field. Possible 
dysfunctional behaviour could be the result of the existence of such employees.  
Coram et al. (2004) mentioned that accepting doubtful evidence is directly affected by 
the time-budget pressure variable but it is not the case for risking misstatement; but for 
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minimising a sample, the risk factor has a conditional effect. In other words, auditors 
tend to minimise a sample when there is a low risk of misstatement. 
The same result applies to the communication with the clients and auditees’ 
management (Q12). The results show no clear direction whether auditors may or may 
not accept light and insufficient explanation from clients for the sake of avoiding time-
budget constraints and to prematurely sign off an audit procedure to move forward and 
accomplish other audit procedures. Again, this can be due to the fact that auditors are 
not willing to show they are incompetent (Lightner et al. 1982). It is worth mentioning 
that auditors are required to communicate with the management and with those charged 
with governance regardless of the company’s size. Auditors are required to 
communicate mainly with those who are responsible for preparing financial statements 
(ISA 260 and AU 380), as auditors will issue their opinion on the financial statements 
which are prepared by management. 
It is interesting to notice that that the box-ticking exercise showed no clear opinion in 
this survey (Q16). The box-ticking exercise is historically known to be a common 
problem in the audit practice (McNair, 1991). 
Going back to the tone of replies about auditors’ behaviour who are willing to work in 
their personal time and not to harm another audit assignments when facing time-budget 
pressure, the results show that auditors are not willing to perform superficial reviews of 
clients’ documents although they might be facing tight budget constraints (Q11). It is 
noted that external auditors are willing neither to insufficiently document a technical 
misstatement nor to declare in their working papers that a certain audit step has been 
performed while in fact it has not, when facing time-budget pressure (Q14). 
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Despite the fact that auditors are not willing to perform superficial reviews (Q11) and to 
accept light evidence from clients (Q12), it can be noted that auditors are willing to 
work and to handle substantive tests faster to meet deadlines to avoid premature sign-off 
of audit steps. 
It can be concluded from the above results that when time-budget pressure exists, 
auditors are willing to commit dysfunctional behaviour but in different ways. The 
results showed that the majority of dysfunctional behaviour acts within the time-budget 
context are not significantly affecting the technical side of the audit cycle. On the other 
hand, abiding by the audit methodology does not mean other areas in the audit are not 
violated. The under-reporting of chargeable time act, although audit methodology and 
practices are not violated to a certain extent, plays a significant role in improper costing 
in the audit firm, which will consequently affect clientsꞌ portfolio and audit quality. The 
under-reporting of chargeable time may give a false indicator about budgeted fees, 
required number of hours for every auditor and the level of expertise required for every 
assignment. In other words, an audit assignment may show profitable figures at the 
clearance stage while in fact excessive hours have been spent on this assignment 
without being recorded properly; this consequently will harm future negotiations 
between the audit firm and its clients. It can be clearly implied that the first hypothesis 
(H1a) is satisfied where it is supported that there is a positive relationship between 
auditor dysfunctional behaviour and time-budget pressure. 
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Table 5.7 - Time deadline pressure 
Premature sign-off Mean 
(Median) 
01. It is a common practice to reduce the sample size specified in the 
audit programme without noting the reduction to meet tight deadlines. 
3.67 
(4) 
 
02. Auditors tend to declare in their papers that they have performed a 
control that they did not actually do to meet a tight deadline. 
3.97 
(4) 
 
03. Auditors tend to believe that the nature of the audit methodology 
and the length of documentation of audit work is a factor determining 
premature sign off to meet tight deadlines. 
 
3.01 
(3) 
04. Completing work to meet time deadline typically means the auditor 
does not have a break or have any personal life beyond work.  
2.28 
(2) 
 
05. Auditors tend to exercise premature sign off for some audit steps if 
everyone in the audit team is working too fast to meet the time deadline. 
3.17 
(3) 
 
06. Auditors are asked by their superiors to handle substantive tests and 
generally operate faster to meet time deadlines.  
2.32 
(2) 
 
07. The length of time booked for audit assignment is adequate. 3.35 
(4) 
 
08. Auditors are given a margin of insufficient documentation on a 
technical point needed for the execution of a step to meet a deadline. 
3.07 
(3) 
 
09. Time-deadline pressure is the result of increased competition in the 
audit market. 
2.57 
(2) 
 
10. Time-deadline pressure interferes with the proper conduct of an 
audit. 
2.57 
(2) 
 
11. Auditors tend to rely on internal auditors’ work to save time.  3.30 
(4) 
 
12. Auditors tend to focus on risky areas to save time. 2.40 
(2) 
 
13. Premature sign off usually occurs when auditing non-risky cycles 
rather than critical ones. 
2.58 
(2) 
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Table 5.7 - Time deadline pressure (Continued) 
 
5.3.2 Auditorsꞌ Behaviour and Time Deadline 
Table5.7 includes a set of questions related to time deadline pressure. The objective of 
the above questions is to assess auditorsꞌ behaviour and their perception about time 
deadline pressure factors and related behaviour (dysfunctional). 
It can be noted that auditors do not reduce the sample, without documenting the 
reduction, for time deadline purposes (Q1). This can be due either to the documentation 
reason or sample-reduction. In other words, auditors may or may not reduce the sample 
size if they document the reduction to meet a time deadline. When auditors are working 
for a low-risk environment client, they are encouraged to use their professional 
scepticism to manage the audit assignment. In a low-risk control framework, sample 
size and materiality thresholds can be adjusted to perform less work (Elder et al., 2010). 
Along with the same tone of replies in Q1, auditors tend not to declare fictitiously in 
their working papers about an accomplished task while in fact they did not perform just 
to meet tight deadlines (Q2). The result in Q2 supports the conclusion in Q1 where it 
14. Time deadlines have become tighter in recent years. 2.22 
(2) 
 
15. Time deadlines tend to be given without consultation. 2.41 
(2) 
16. Time deadlines are very tight, practically unattainable. 2.63 
(2) 
 
17. Normally, time deadlines are met ethically when the manager and 
the senior coordinate things together in setting up the budget. 
2.38 
(2) 
 
18. There is a tendency for auditors to sign off audit steps prematurely 
if auditors are working quickly to meet a time deadline. 
2.98 
(3) 
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can be noticed that auditors do not reduce the sample size and fictitiously document 
accomplished audit procedures. 
There is no clear opinion about the impact of audit methodology to meet time deadlines. 
Hence, an experienced audit manager mentioned the following: 
ꞌꞌA major section of an audit assignment budget is allocated on certain audit steps 
related to audit methodology. Sometimes the massive documentation in this section may 
push some staff members to prematurely sign off some steps to meet tight deadlines. I 
doubt we can find a solution for our massive documentation in the methodology section. 
We, as Big Four, are known for our methodology that helps us to understand the client 
and its business environment before we start auditing the accounts. ꞌꞌ 
Meeting time deadline requires a misbalanced life for auditors (Q4). The result of Q4 in 
table 5.7 is almost similar to the results in Q8 (Table 5.6) related to time budget. It is 
clearly noted that facing time-budget pressure and meeting time deadlines are 
accomplished only when auditors invest in chargeable hours from their personal time. A 
senior auditor stated the following: 
“During the high season of audit, not only we do invest from our personal time, but also 
we may have no life besides continuous work to meet very tight deadlines. It is not the 
case as time-budget pressure. We might be given a very relaxing/inflated budget but we 
need to clear the audit in a very short period.”  
The above comment aligns with the results of the mentioned questions. It is clear that 
majority of auditors work in their personal time to meet deadlines. This dysfunctional 
behaviour is mainly committed in time deadline rather than time-budget scenarios. 
Regardless whether other members of the audit team are committing dysfunctional 
behaviour or not, the results show no clear direction that auditors are affected by other 
team members who are prematurely signing-off audit steps (Q5).  
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When facing time deadline, auditors might be asked by their superiors to handle 
substantive tests faster (Q6). None of the respondents stated that superior instructions 
may or may not lead to dysfunctional behaviour. The results in Q6 can be linked to the 
result of Q1. It is implied that auditors may reduce sample size (in accordance with 
auditing standards) only if they are instructed to do so by their superiors. Again, 
reducing sample size, if exercised according to auditing standards and audit 
methodology, is not considered dysfunctional behaviour. 
The length of time booked for an audit assignment is not adequate (Q7). The time 
allocated, taking into consideration tight deadlines, is playing a role in pushing auditors 
to commit dysfunctional behaviour through premature sign-off of audit steps. A 
comment by a senior auditor is as follows: 
“Definitely No. Audit assignments are booked quite often without a full detailed plan 
taking into consideration the level of expertise of the employee and it only focuses 
usually on fieldwork time. It does not usually include review time, coaching, team and 
client meetings and discussions, documenting and wrapping up the file. It also assumes 
that employees will face no challenges and that they are 100 per cent effective and 
efficient.” 
The above comment highlights issues related to budget preparation that is affecting 
auditors’ behaviour. It shows that budgets are prepared without taking into 
consideration inherent and audit challenges faced by auditors at the field work. Such 
challenges may delay auditors to finalise assignments leading to time pressure and 
potential dysfunctional behaviour. 
Other studies concluded that tight deadlines and length of assignment play a significant 
role in audit efficiency. McDaniel (199) stated that listed companies, for example, need 
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to finalise their accounts and issue their audited financial statements before a very tight 
date after fiscal year-end. In the audit profession, time deadline turned to be a 
continuous pressure factor imposed on auditors to finalise audit assignments in 
compliance with professional standards within a very tight time allocated on different 
tasks of an assignment. It was also revealed that time deadline is considered to be a 
significant factor leading to quality-threatening behaviour (Pierce and Sweeney, 2004).  
There is no clear opinion about the existence of a margin for insufficient documentation 
(Q8). The result here is related only to technical documentation. Other studies 
concluded that time pressure plays a positive role in reducing useful data (Glover, 
1997). The results of the laboratory experiment show that only a time pressure factor, 
excluding other factors, may affect auditors’ judgments. This conclusion states that 
when auditors are dealing with non-diagnostic information, time pressure factor has 
positive consequences by pushing auditors to eliminate non-useful data leading to a 
reduction in judgmental bias. In the case of auditors dealing with diagnostic information 
only, the results supported previous studies that it significantly reduces but does not 
eliminate dilution. 
The increase in competition between audit firms is perceived to be a major factor in 
time deadline pressure (Q9). The result shows that external auditors perceive that tough 
competition among audit firms is playing a significant role in setting and accepting tight 
deadlines. It should be mentioned here that tight deadlines are imposed not only by the 
clients themselves due to certain reporting dates, but also from the audit firm itself 
(Pierce and Sweeney, 2004). Audit firms might be enrolled in tight deadlines to push 
their staff to finish assignments as early as possible, to allocate them to a maximum 
number of assignments to increase the firm’s market share which may lead to a better 
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reputation. A senior manager highlighted another type of pressure and stated the 
following: 
“I actually think that it is the fee pressure that is driving increasing competition.  The 
fee pressure is based on the state of the economy, which then results in some firms 
reassessing their strategy, considering whether to concentrate on increasing market 
share and ‘buy’ audits (performing them at a loss), or whether they seek to control their 
cost base, working on making the audits they do have more efficient and profitable (e.g. 
leveraging work to the lower grades when ‘rising stars’ have been identified that could 
do the work with appropriate supervision.” 
The above comment highlights the concept of pressure auditors face where they are not 
limited to time budget, time deadline, or performance evaluation. The respondent 
highlights the concept of market-free pressure that may play an important role in 
pushing audit firms to change their strategies. Such strategies change may cause more 
pressure depending on the strategy type and management philosophy.  
It can be noted clearly that time deadline violates the code of conduct (Q10). Auditors 
believe that clearing an audit assignment within the time allocated, with the presence of 
tight deadlines, is accomplished when a violation of code of conduct takes place.  
The relationship between internal and external auditors is still not helping in minimising 
the effect of time-deadline pressure. The score shows that external auditors are not 
relying on internal auditors’ work. This can be the result of the rising role of internal 
audit function on the expense of external audit work (Holm and Birkholm, 2007). They 
concluded that internal control mechanisms, and as a results of promulgations, have 
extended the role of control system and gained a supervisory role. In addition, the audit 
committee should be independent from management, besides the evolving role of 
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internal auditors. Internal auditors are involved more in risk assessment and evaluating 
internal control systems. Hence, it should be mentioned that International Standards of 
Auditing (ISA 610) and Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS 500) have allowed 
external auditors to rely on internal audit work where applicable and under certain 
conditions defined. 
External auditors tend to focus on risky areas to meet tight deadlines (Q12). The 
response shows a clear direction of “agreement” that premature sign off occurs mainly 
in non- risky areas (Q13). Nevertheless, a senior manager made the following comment: 
“A point to note here is that audits are meant to be planned to be risk-focused, so that 
more work is performed in an area that is likely to result in a misstatement as opposed 
to focusing effort in an area that is non-risky.  My answer is ‘no opinion’ since I think 
auditors tend to focus on risk areas as it’s what they are supposed to do, and not to save 
time.” 
It can be noted from the two questions that auditors try to use different techniques when 
facing time-deadline pressure. One of the techniques is applying the risk-based 
approach rather than auditing the full set of accounts with no consideration to risky/non-
risky areas. It is implied that dysfunctional behaviour is taking place on non-risky areas 
where auditors believe they have least responsibility and liability. This may be due to 
the effect of good corporate governance mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2007). It is 
concluded that auditors tend to lower the level of testing when there is an effective role 
of corporate governance and this was also applied on the control and inherent risk level. 
It can be due also to the moral reasoning of external auditors. Lord and DeZoort (2001) 
concluded that the level of tolerance of misstatement is higher with auditors having a 
lower level of professional and organisational commitment under social influence. 
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Coram et al. (2004) concluded that accepting doubtful evidence is directly affected by 
the time pressure variable but it is not the case for risk of misstatement, but for 
minimising samples, the risk factor has a conditional effect. In other words, auditors 
tend to minimise samples when there is a low risk of misstatement. Also Lee (2002) 
concluded that junior auditors, under risk-based auditing, are given a professional 
freedom to decide on the time allocated to them, based on budgets. Time would be used 
efficiently to obtain the possible evidence that might reduce material misstatement. This 
condition is giving staff auditors the ability to decide either to limit or to expand their 
work in areas not material to the accounts. In this way, staff auditors are showing 
commitment in compliance with audit methodology from one side and reducing quality 
audit (irregular auditing) from another side, but only in areas not material to the 
accounts. 
External auditors perceive that time deadlines are becoming very tight and practically 
unattainable (Q14 and Q16). The responses show a clear direction towards the “agree” 
answer. This could be due to the tough competition (Q9). It can be noticed here that due 
to the fact that time deadline is unattainable and becoming very tight, dysfunctional 
behaviour will take place if time deadline is needed to be met (Q10). Time deadline 
pressure is directly related to Premature Sign-Off (PSO) where audit firms have been 
imposing pressure to complete and to start another assignment (Pierce and Sweeney, 
2004). Also, Otley and Pierce (1996) found that time budgets were generally perceived 
as demanding targets. 
The responses in questions 15 and 17 show a clear agreement on the unattainability of 
time deadlines when it is set without consultation. When senior auditors and audit 
managers coordinate, time deadlines can be met ethically without committing 
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dysfunctional behaviour. These results highlight the issue of communication between 
auditors and their superior to manage an audit assignment and minimise time deadline 
pressure. The communication could be also extended include clients.  
Auditors perceive that meeting deadlines is becoming a demanding target and these 
deadlines are applicable when there is overstaffing but not in an employees’ shortage 
condition (Pierce and Sweeney). The shortage in the turnover of auditors at audit firms 
can be due to the tough competition in the accountancy profession (Q9). There is a lack 
of proper relationship between senior and junior auditors (Kelly and Margheim, 2002). 
Staff auditors (audit trainees) perceive more time pressure when seniors are involved in 
budget setting, while senior auditors believe that there is less time pressure on staff 
auditors when they are involved in budget planning and deadlines setting. For audit 
structuring, there is a negative relation between staff/auditor perception of time 
pressure. It is assumed in this finding that if there is less senior job structuring, there is a 
high staff auditorsꞌ perception of time pressure. Kelly and Margheim (2002) mentioned 
that these findings show a big gap between senior and staff auditors. While seniors 
believe if they participated in budget preparation, the pressure will be less on staff 
auditors, but the results showed exactly the opposite. Moreover, Otley and Pierre (1996) 
stated that if seniors are not involved in audit reduction behaviour and under-reporting 
of time, budgets would never be attained or less attained. 
The response to question 18 aligns with the response to question 5. There is no clear 
opinion whether a dysfunctional behaviour is committed if auditors are working fast. 
This question highlights the assumption that dysfunctional behaviour can be the result 
of an unintentional mistake when auditing procedures are performed quickly. It aligns 
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with the response about auditors and whether they are affected by other auditors 
working fast to meet deadlines (Q5). 
It can be concluded clearly from the above analysis of different questions that the 
hypothesis set for time deadline independent variable has been satisfied. There is a 
positive significant relationship between time deadline pressure and auditors’ 
dysfunctional behaviour. The dysfunctional behaviour is committed in certain audit 
cycles more, compared with other cycles as stated above. 
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Table 5.8 – Performance Evaluation 
 
Premature sign-off Mean 
(Median) 
01. To progress their careers (get promotions) auditors tend to build, maintain 
and utilise a network of clients and internal relationships to achieve a better 
performance rating. 
 
2.01 
(2) 
02. Strict audit firm methodology is less exercised by senior auditors in order 
that they receive positive feedback from clients. 
3.39 
(4) 
03. When there is a risk of losing an audit assignment, partners tend to 
compromise rather than comply fully with audit firm methodology and 
auditing standards. 
 
3.01 
(3) 
04. Auditors tend to sign-off an audit step prematurely when such a sign-off 
may positively affect their performance evaluation. 
2.94 
(3) 
05. Audit managers participate in the development of ways to meet client 
needs, increase clients’ portfolio and have more assignments so that they get 
better performance from their superiors. 
 
2.17 
(2) 
06. Partners/Directors tend not to report all material control weaknesses to get 
assigned at a later stage to a non-audit assignment.  
3.29 
(4) 
07. Auditors tend to rely less on subject matter experts even if the auditors 
themselves are not highly knowledgeable in a certain area to maintain a good 
recoverability rate.  
 
2.81 
(2) 
08. An auditor expecting a promotion may exercise less professional 
scepticism if this would harm assignment profitability. 
 
3.30 
(4) 
Under-reporting of chargeable time  
09. Auditors tend to choose the highest thresholds of sampling techniques for 
the sake of achieving a good recoverability rate. 
2.74 
(2) 
10. Senior auditors who assist in proposal preparation and research tend to 
lower the budgeted hours to increase their chances of winning a proposal for 
better evaluation from their superiors. 
 
2.66 
(2) 
11. Auditors are asked to under-report chargeable hours to achieve a good 
appraisal. 
3.32 
(4) 
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Table 5.8 – Performance Evaluation (Continued) 
 
5.3.3 Auditorsꞌ Behaviour and Performance Evaluation 
Table 5.8 includes a set of questions related to performance evaluation. The objective of 
these questions is to assess if auditors may commit a dysfunctional behaviour for the 
sake of receiving good performance evaluation. Two proxies are used as indicators of 
dysfunctional; premature sign-off and under-reporting of chargeable time. Performance 
evaluation is conducted within the audit firm but external factors are involved in this 
process, such as meeting clientsꞌ expectations, response to clientsꞌ requests promptly and 
contributing in increasing the clients’ portfolio. The results below support the stated 
hypothesis that there is a positive significant relationship between performance 
evaluation and auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour 
Auditors are aware that a good performance evaluation is accomplished by building, 
maintaining and utilising a network of clients, and building an internal professional 
relationship among other auditors within the firm (Q1). Since the survey is conducted in 
the UK and it covers auditors employed at the Big Four, mainly in London offices, the 
criteria of building an internal relationship among other auditors is based on the 
relationship within the audit team at a first level, and auditors working in the same line 
of service at a later stage. Big Four London offices hire huge number of auditors and it 
12. Auditors tend to work in their personal time rather than actual hours spent in 
order to maintain a profitable assignment. 
2.23 
(2) 
13. Finishing an audit assignment with a good recoverability rate is one of the 
most important factors for a good appraisal and performance evaluation.  
2.61 
(2) 
14. Audit managers delegate tasks based on the standard hourly rate of every 
team member rather than the skills needed for every cycle in order to achieve a 
good profitable assignments and consequently better appraisal. 
 
2.87 
(3) 
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will be difficult for auditors to be assessed based on their relationship with all 
colleagues in the firm. The performance evaluation questions are initiated by a question 
to assess auditorsꞌ perception (all levels) about the importance of the relationship with 
clients which will lead to a better performance appraisal at another stage. 
There is no tendency for auditors to exercise and apply less methodology for the sake of 
receiving good feedback from their clients (Q2). The result in this question can be 
linked to similar questions and scenarios when auditors face time-budget and time 
deadline pressure. Auditors do not insufficiently document light evidence when facing 
time-budget pressure, and they do not declare in their working papers that they have 
performed a control procedure when in fact they did not when facing time-deadline 
pressure. 
There is no clear opinion whether auditors perceive partners to manage audit 
assignments with full professional behaviour (Q3). It was interesting to notice that the 
mean and median scores for this specific question are the same (3). Normally, audit 
partners are considered to be the role model for auditors from different levels. 
Surprisingly, the result shows that the “role model” is not perceived as fully compliant 
with audit methodology and auditing standards. 
The same score is noted in question 4. There is no clear opinion if auditors may 
prematurely sign off audit steps if they believe that such dysfunctional behaviour would 
lead to a better performance evaluation by their superiors. It is worth mentioning that 
the mean score is 2.95. It can be concluded that there is a slight tendency to commit a 
dysfunctional behaviour if this would lead to better performance evaluation. 
Auditors believe that participating in increasing clientsꞌ portfolio and meeting clientsꞌ 
needs are essential for better performance appraisal (Q5). This conclusion can be linked 
192 
 
to the pressure auditors, at managerial levels, face to approach new clients especially 
during the recent financial crisis. Also it can be linked to the perception of auditors who 
believe that competition in the audit profession is a significant factor in dysfunctional 
behaviour when facing time-tight deadlines. It can be concluded that it is not enough for 
auditors to be sceptical, professional, qualified, hardworking, and possess good 
analytical skills but also they need to engage in increasing their firmsꞌ clients portfolio 
and market share for better performance evaluations and potential promotions. 
As part of conducting an audit assignment, auditors assess the internal control 
framework and governance mechanisms. Weaknesses in the design and effectiveness of 
internal control are stated in a supplement report in addition to the audited financial 
statements named as ꞌꞌLetter to Managementꞌꞌ report. This report includes auditor’s 
findings of control weaknesses, the impact of such deficiencies on the financial 
statements, recommendation by auditors, and a section for management response 
explaining the control weakness from their point of view. Controls weaknesses findings 
can have a significant or insignificant effect on the financial statements (ISA 265). Due 
to this fact, the findings are classified as High, Moderate, or Low findings according to 
the risk level and their implications on the financial statements. A report to management 
is not mandatory in a regular audit assignment but it depends on the auditorsꞌ 
assessment to communicate control findings to those charged of governance. The result 
shows that partners/managers do not have a tendency not to report control weaknesses 
for the sake of getting engaged in a non-audit assignment. Again this conclusion can be 
related to similar results that show auditors are not willing to harm technical procedures 
when facing time deadlines and time-budget pressures and also for the sake of receiving 
better performance appraisal. 
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It is surprising to find that auditors rely less on Subject Matter Experts ꞌꞌSMEꞌꞌ/Resource 
Matter Experts ꞌꞌRMEꞌꞌ even in audit cycles where they do not have enough knowledge 
about it (Q7). The result indicates that for the sake of good recoverability rate of an 
audit assignment, auditors may tolerate lowering audit quality by not delegating a task 
they do not have enough knowledge about. It is believed that introducing a new member 
to the initial audit team, who has not been included during the planning phase, would 
harm recoverability rate. Additional chargeable hours would be incurred leading to 
lower assignment profitability. 
The result also indicates that auditors may prematurely sign off an audit step regardless 
of whether they are fully knowledgeable about a specific task or not. This argument 
aligns with the result of audit communication with internal auditors (Table 6.7, Q11). 
To meet deadlines, auditors rely less on internal auditors, and to achieve a good 
recoverability rate auditors rely less on SMS(s). Both actions may lead to dysfunctional 
behaviour and consequently lower audit quality. 
There is no tendency for auditors to exercise less professional scepticism for the sake of 
accomplishing a good performance appraisal (Q8). The questionable mind skill is 
perceived to be significant in the audit profession regardless of difficulties faced. The 
result here is similar to the results of questions about accepting light audit evidence, 
insufficient documentation and reducing the sample size when facing tight deadlines 
(Table 5.7, Q1 and Q8). Hence, an audit trainee mentioned the following: 
“It depends on auditorsꞌ level. If manager and above my answer is yes. If at lower 
levels, this behaviour is not more often exercised.” 
The above audit trainee's comment is due to the fact that either audit trainees do not 
possess enough professional scepticism to exercise it or audit managers are keener to 
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receive better performance evaluations. Again, this comment can be linked to the fact 
that audit managers are in the most category of auditors who have stayed the minimum 
time period at their audit firms, since at manager level auditors start to be very 
'attractive' to job hunters. Accordingly, they are keener than audit trainees to receive a 
better performance evaluation to boost their profile that will lead to the better 
competitive package they are looking for.  
To receive a good performance appraisal, by working on and finishing profitable 
assignments, auditors select the highest thresholds of sampling techniques that may help 
them to spend less hours in fieldwork. A senior manager included the following 
comment regarding this question as follows: 
“I have answered that I agree with this if the thresholds are as per the methodology and 
no corners have been cut.  I am very much a fan of finding more efficient and smarter 
ways of conducting an audit.”  
The above comment implies that choosing the highest sampling thresholds is not always 
a dysfunctional behaviour activity. Some auditors continuously try to find new and 
smart techniques that will help them to reduce hours spent without affecting the audit 
quality. 
Sampling and materiality drivers are highly dependent on the professional scepticism of 
auditors. Sampling is based on the materiality thresholds in the first step, and the nature 
of findings at a later stage. The level of tolerance and the size of the sample is directly 
related to the clientsꞌ control environment, design, effectiveness and implementation of 
internal controls and the level of risk in different audit cycles (Elder et al., 2010). 
Auditors tend to lower the level of testing when there is an effective role of corporate 
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governance (Cohen et al., 2007). Auditors tend to minimise a sample when there is a 
low risk of misstatement (Coram et al., 2004). 
It is perceived that senior auditors have a tendency to increase client portfolio by 
participating in budget preparation. But their involvement is perceived that they lower 
budgeted hours to have better chances of winning a proposal and consequently receive a 
good performance evaluation. Lowering budgeted hours in a proposal may be one of the 
significant factors in creating time-budget pressure and unprofitable assignments. 
Because of the tough competition among audit firms, budget preparers tend to lower the 
budgeted proposed hours as much as they can to win a proposal. As a result of this 
behaviour, the audit team may experience time-budget pressure when starting the 
fieldwork and the big gap between budgeted hours and actual hours spent would be 
evidenced. While the main intention of budget preparers is to receive a good 
performance evaluation that will contribute to their professional progress, such 
behaviour would harm an audit assignment and may lead to adverse results against the 
budget preparers’ intention. 
There is no tendency for senior auditors to ask other audit team members to under-
report chargeable time for better performance appraisal (Q11). But question 13 indicates 
that finishing an assignment with a good recoverability rate is considered to be one of 
the most important factors for a good performance appraisal. An audit trainee 
mentioned the following comment regarding this question: 
“I heard about it, but I’ve never done it. It depends on each line of industry.” 
It can be concluded that superiors might not ask audit team members to under-report 
chargeable hours, but it is implied that profitability is a key factor for progress and 
promotion. This conclusion can be related to the result indicating that auditors tend to 
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work from their personal time rather than recording actual time spent on work when 
facing time-budget and time-deadline pressures. It has been proven that when auditors 
are expecting a performance appraisal, they also have the tendency to work in their 
personal time also to achieve it (Q5). 
Audit managers have a tendency to delegate tasks based on the standard hourly rate of 
audit team members rather than the skills required, to achieve profitable assignments 
and better performance appraisal at a later stage (Q14). This finding highlights the issue 
of proper allocation of auditors on different audit assignments. Assigning an auditor 
only because the hourly standard rate is lower than other team members may lead to 
deficiencies in audit quality. This kind of dysfunctional behaviour, in addition to 
minimising the number of chargeable hours, may lead to serious consequences in the 
accountancy profession. Auditors should be allocated based on the level of experience 
they possess related to every assignment rather than their standard hourly rate and the 
managers’ forecasts about assignment profitability and good performance appraisals. On 
the contrary, allocating auditors with relevant experience to audit tasks may lead to less 
chargeable hours as such auditors would be expert in what they are doing and need less 
time compared with others who do not have the same type of experience. As a result of 
this proper allocation based on the level of experience and skills needed, time deadline 
would be met, chargeable hours might be less and a good performance appraisal would 
be achieved without committing any kind of dysfunctional behaviour. 
It can be noted from the above analysis that audit trainees and senior auditors were the 
only two levels of auditors that included additional comments to the time budget set of 
questions. It is implied that audit trainees and senior auditors are exposed more to time 
budget pressure since majority of field work is conducted by those auditors. The 
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majority of those, especially audit trainees, are represents the largest group of auditors 
who have been employed at their audit firm; unlike audit managers who represent the 
least group of auditors who spent the least time with their employers. 
In the time deadline section, experienced auditors (audit seniors and senior managers) 
were the two categories of auditors who included additional comments about the survey. 
Due to the fact that the majority of those possess a professional qualification, they are at 
a level higher than audit trainees. These auditors are concerned more with time 
deadlines issues that will affect their career progress while auditors at a lower level are 
more frank in their opinions when it comes to time budget constraints.  
198 
 
5.4  Changes in Behaviour and Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 5.9 – Comparative Mean responses/Time-budget Pressure 
Under-reporting of chargeable time Audit  
Trainees 
 
Experienced 
Auditors 
Mann-
Whitney 
P-value 
01. Auditors should not employ the practice of 
under-reporting chargeable time, even in the face of 
tight time-budget constraints. 
 
1.70 1.68 0.96 
02. Senior and staff auditors knowingly under-report 
chargeable time. 
 
2.28 2.47 0.65 
03. When facing a tight budget, auditors shift 
chargeable time to non-chargeable categories on 
their time report/time sheet. 
 
2.92 2.68 0.21 
04. Sometimes auditors need to under-report 
chargeable time to meet budget constraints. 
 
2.68 2.75 0.87 
05. Sometimes new auditors need to under-report 
time, but with added experience, there is less of a 
need. 
 
3.49 2.90 0.00*#  
06. When facing a tight budget, auditors charge time 
to other clients that should have been charged to this 
client. 
 
3.47 3.25 0.36 
07. Under a tight budget, auditors tend not to pursue 
an unexpected problem occurring during a mission. 
 
3.38 3.26 0.64 
08. When facing a tight budget, auditors under-report 
chargeable time by performing chargeable work in 
their personal time. 
 
1.91 2.07 0.34 
Premature sign-off    
    
09. Under time-budget pressure, auditors 
prematurely sign-off a required audit step, which is 
not covered at other stages of the audit, without 
completing the work or noting the omissions of 
procedures. 
 
3.32 3.08 0.22 
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Table 5.9 – Comparative Mean responses/Time-budget Pressure (Continued) 
 
1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 no opinion, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
*p < .05(Mann-Whitney U test) 
#t < .05(t-test) 
5.4.1  Changes in Behaviour – Time Budget 
Table 5.9 summarises the significant differences between two groups of auditors. The 
sample has been stratified into two groups: audit trainees and experienced auditors. 
Audit trainees are those who possess not more than two years of experience in 
accountancy (Table 5.2) and experienced auditors represent the remaining sample of the 
survey (senior, managers/directors, partners). The Mann-Whitney test, which is 
equivalent to the Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to analyse the significant differences 
between the two groups. The Mann-Whitney test is considered the most appropriate test 
10. Under time-budget pressure, auditors tend to 
reduce the amount of work on a step beyond the 
normal. 
 
3 3.05 0.80 
11. Auditors tend to perform superficial reviews of 
clients’ documents to comply with budgeted time 
allocated to the audit assignment. 
 
3.47 3.28 0.45 
12. Under a tight budget, auditors may accept 
insufficient or light explanations from the client. 
 
3.11 2.96 0.45 
13. Under time-budget pressure, auditors 
insufficiently document a technical point needed for 
the execution of a step. 
 
3.32 3.08 0.24 
14. Under a tight budget, auditors declare in their 
working papers that they have performed a control 
that they did not actually perform. 
 
4.19 3.72 0.03*# 
15. Under a tight budget, auditors tend to handle 
substantive tests faster. 
 
2.47 2.82 0.10 
16. Under a tight budget, auditors tend to tick-mark 
audit schedules after an essentially superficial 
review of supporting client documents. 
 
3.25 3.28 0.79 
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to give higher efficacy in a non-parametric data (John and Priebe, 2006). In addition to 
the Mann-Whitney test, the t-test is used for sensitivity analysis purposes. The t-test is 
usually used to meet the assumption of normality. 
For the time-budget pressure set of questions, it can be noted that the responses in two 
questions varied significantly between audit trainees and experienced auditors (Q5 and 
Q14). In the first question, where it is mentioned that new auditor sunder-report 
chargeable time but with added experience they exercise less dysfunctional behaviour, 
the responses varied significantly. Experienced auditors perceive that audit trainees 
have more tendency to under-report chargeable time. It is one of the rare questions in 
this survey that is related solely to the behaviour of new auditors. It is expected that 
audit trainees, who are considered new auditors, would avoid replying or declaring they 
are under-reporting chargeable time .The significant variance can be also a result of 
knowledge and expertise of audit trainees in the audit profession. Some activities 
exercised might be considered a dysfunctional behaviour but audit trainees themselves 
might not perceive it as a dysfunctional behaviour, but with added experience they may 
notice and perceive more dysfunctional activities. 
The same argument applies at the premature sign-off scenario. There is a significant 
variance between audit trainees and experienced auditors on whether auditors declare in 
their working paper they have performed a control procedure while in fact they did not.  
This can be due to the fact that most field work and working paper documentations are 
performed by audit and trainees and junior auditors. Experienced auditors work less on 
working papers and focus more on managing the whole assignment, communication and 
meeting with management and their superiors, and managing other audit assignments at 
the same time. Experienced auditors have a tendency also to believe that audit trainees 
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prematurely sign-off audit steps as they are continuously reviewing the work of audit 
trainees and apparently they have evidenced a kind of dysfunctional behaviour 
committed.
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Table 5.10 – Comparative Mean responses/Time Deadline Pressure 
 
 
Premature sign-off Audit 
Trainees 
Experienced 
Auditors 
Mann-
Whitney      
p-value 
01. It is a common practice to reduce the sample 
size specified in the audit programme without 
noting the reduction to meet tight deadlines. 
 
 
3.89 
 
 
3.54 
 
 
0.20 
02. Auditors tend to declare in their papers that 
they have performed a control that they did not 
actually do to meet a tight deadline. 
 
 
4.13 
 
 
3.88 
 
 
0.41 
03. Auditors tend to believe that the nature of the 
audit methodology and the length of documentation 
of audit work is a factor determining premature 
sign off to meet tight deadlines. 
 
 
 
3.11 
 
 
 
2.95 
 
 
 
0.47 
04. Completing work to meet a time deadline 
typically means the auditor does not have a break 
or have any personal life beyond work.  
 
 
2.09 
 
 
2.39 
 
 
0.28 
05. Auditors tend to exercise premature sign off for 
some audit steps if everyone in the audit team is 
working too fast to meet the time deadline. 
 
 
3.06 
 
 
3.23 
 
 
0.41 
06. Auditors are asked by their superiors to handle 
substantive tests and generally operate faster to 
meet time deadlines.  
 
 
2.08 
 
 
2.46 
 
 
0.04*# 
07. The length of time booked for audit assignment 
is adequate. 3.19 
 
3.45 
 
0.18 
08. Auditors are given a margin of insufficient 
documentation on a technical point needed for the 
execution of a step to meet a deadline. 
 
 
2.94 
 
 
3.14 
 
 
0.23 
09. Time deadline pressure is the result of increased 
competition in the audit market. 2.57 
 
2.58 
 
0.98 
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Table 5.10 – Comparative Mean responses/Time Deadline Pressure (Continued) 
1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 no opinion, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
*p < .05(Mann-Whitney U test) 
#t < .05(t-test) 
5.4.2  Changes in Behaviour – Time Deadline 
Table 5.10 summarises the significant differences in responses between audit trainees 
and experienced auditors when facing time-deadline pressure. It is interesting to identify 
a significant difference in responses between audit trainees and experienced auditors 
when a question is directed towards to a specific group of auditors rather than on a 
pooled basis. There is a significant difference in responses regarding question 6 
10. Time deadline pressure interferes with the 
proper conduct of an audit. 2.79 
 
2.43 
 
0.06 
11. Auditors tend to rely on internal auditors’ work 
to save time.  3.57 
 
3.15 
 
0.06*# 
12. Auditors tend to focus on risky areas to save 
time. 2.47 
 
2.36 
 
0.25 
13. Premature sign off usually occurs when 
auditing non-risky cycles rather than critical ones. 2.66 
 
2.53 
 
0.28 
14. Time deadlines have become tighter in recent 
years. 2.30 
 
2.17 
 
0.13 
15. Time deadlines tend to be given without 
consultation. 2.38 
 
2.42 
 
0.79 
16. Time deadlines are very tight, practically 
unattainable. 2.58 
 
2.66 
 
0.69 
17. Normally, time deadlines are met ethically 
when the manager and the senior coordinate things 
together in setting up the budget. 
 
 
2.53 
 
 
2.29 
 
 
0.06* 
18. There is a tendency for auditors to prematurely 
sign off audit steps if auditors are working quickly 
to meet a time deadline. 
 
3.02 
 
2.97 
 
0.70 
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“Auditors are asked by their superiors to handle substantive tests and generally operate 
faster to meet time deadlines” .It can be noticed that experienced auditors’ responses 
indicate that they have less tendency to ask auditors to perform tasks faster to meet 
deadlines. On the other hand, audit trainees responses indicate more significant 
direction towards the “agree” answer. Since this question is directed towards the 
behaviour of senior (experienced) auditors only, audit trainees may reply with clearer 
perception as they are not considered to be involved in such behaviour. Experienced 
auditors may believe that declaring that they ask audit trainees to perform tests faster 
may expose them to potential liability as a result of possible dysfunctional behaviour at 
a later stage. 
There is also a significant difference (p≤0.5) between audit trainees and experienced 
auditors’ responses when it comes to reliance on internal audit work (Q11). Again, such 
variance is expected due to the nature of the question. Experienced auditors tend to rely 
more on internal audit work compared with audit trainees. When external auditors 
decide to rely on the work of internal auditors, it is their responsibility to assess the 
competency of the internal audit team and the quality of their work (ISA 610). Such 
assessment and the level of reliance is mainly the role of experienced auditors rather 
than audit trainees. As part of conducting scoping meetings with clients at the 
acceptance/continuation stage, experienced auditors assess the complexity of clients, 
volume of transactions and the competency of employees involved in the process of 
financial statements preparation. Based on this assessment, experienced auditors decide 
or not to rely on internal auditors’ work. Audit budget and audit plan would be prepared 
taking into consideration the level of reliance on internal auditors where some audit 
steps might be excluded from being performed by external auditors. This whole 
assessment and planning process is prepared by experienced auditors rather than audit 
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trainees that may justify the significant difference in responses between audit trainees 
and experienced auditors. 
There is a significant difference in responses between audit trainees and experienced 
auditors when it comes to meeting deadlines ethically when managers and seniors 
coordinate (Q17). Experienced auditors perceive that deadlines are ethically met when 
managers and senior auditors, both are considered experienced auditors, coordinate. 
Audit trainees have less tendency to agree on this assumption giving the fact their 
minimal involvement in budget setting and preparation. Normally, budget preparation is 
prepared by the engagement leader and the engagement manager based on the required 
skills and level of experience needed for every assignment. It is believed that 
coordination between the senior staff in budget preparation may lead to less pressure 
faced by audit team members. Audit trainees are not involved in any step of the budget 
preparation; rather they are notified only about their assignment and tasks to be 
accomplished. Probably experienced auditors prepare budgets and their main concern is 
to abide by the set budget. They might not take into consideration different factors 
facing audit trainees leading to increased pressure and justifying the significant 
difference in responses (Q17).  
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Table 5.11 – Comparative Mean responses/Performance Evaluation 
Premature sign-off Audit 
Trainees 
 
Experienced 
Auditors 
Mann-
Whitney 
p-value 
01. To progress their careers (get promotions) 
auditors tend to build, maintain and utilise a 
network of clients and internal relationships to 
achieve better performance rating. 
 
1.98 
 
 
2.02 
 
 
 
0.88 
02. Strict audit firm methodology is less exercised 
by senior auditors in order that they receive 
positive feedback from clients. 
 
 
3.21 
 
 
3.50 
 
 
0.05* 
03. When there is a risk of losing an audit 
assignment, partners tend to compromise rather 
than comply fully with audit firm methodology and 
auditing standards. 
 
3.21 
 
 
2.90 
 
 
0.10 
04. Auditors tend to prematurely sign-off an audit 
step when such sign-off may positively affect their 
performance evaluation. 
 
 
3.23 
 
 
2.77 
 
 
0.01*# 
05. Audit managers participate in the development 
of ways to meet client needs, increase clients’ 
portfolio and have more assignments so that they 
get better performance from their superiors. 
 
 
 
2.26 
 
 
 
2.11 
 
 
 
0.04* 
06. Partners/Directors tend not to report all material 
control weaknesses to get assigned at a later stage 
to a non-audit assignment.  
 
 
3.36 
 
 
3.25 
 
 
0.61 
07. Auditors tend to rely less on subject matter 
experts even if the auditors themselves are not 
highly knowledgeable in a certain area to maintain 
a good recoverability rate.  
 
2.87 
 
 
2.77 
 
 
0.49 
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Table 5.11 – Comparative Mean responses/Performance Evaluation (Continued) 
1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 no opinion, 4 disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. 
*p < .05(Mann-Whitney U test) 
#t < .05(t-test) 
 
 
Under-reporting of chargeable time    
01. An auditor expecting a promotion may exercise 
less professional scepticism if this would harm 
assignment profitability. 
 
 
3.30 
 
 
3.3 
 
 
0.82 
02. Auditors tend to choose the highest thresholds 
of sampling techniques for the sake of achieving a 
good recoverability rate. 
 
 
2.89 
 
 
2.65 
 
 
0.17 
03. Senior auditors who assist in proposal 
preparation and research tend to lower the budgeted 
hours to increase their chances of winning a 
proposal for better evaluation from their superiors. 
 
 
 
2.64 
 
 
 
2.67 
 
 
 
0.94 
04. Auditors are asked to under-report chargeable 
hours to achieve a good appraisal. 
 
3.57 
 
3.17 
 
0.07 
05. Auditors tend to work in their personal time 
rather than actual hours spent in order to maintain a 
profitable assignment. 
 
 
2.25 
 
 
2.22 
 
 
0.71 
06. Finishing an audit assignment with a good 
recoverability rate is one of the most important 
factors for a good appraisal and performance 
evaluation.  
 
2.51 
 
 
2.66 
 
 
0.76 
07. Audit managers delegate tasks based on the 
standard hourly rate of every team member rather 
than the skills needed for every cycle in order to 
achieve a good profitable assignments and 
consequently better appraisal. 
 
 
2.68 
 
 
 
2.98 
 
 
 
0.20 
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5.4.3  Changes in Behaviour – Performance Evaluation 
Table5.11 highlights the significant differences in responses between audit trainees and 
experienced auditors and how they behave when they are expecting a performance 
evaluation. Experienced auditors have clearer perception that senior auditors do not 
apply less methodology for the sake of receiving positive feedback from a client (Q2). It 
can be concluded that audit trainees rely less on the client’s feedback for the sake of 
receiving good feedback from clients when they are dealing with audit methodology 
issues. This question is related to the behaviour of a specific group of auditors only 
(experienced auditors); it is expected that this group of auditors is more conservative in 
replying about their behaviour.  
Experienced auditors perceive that auditors tend to prematurely sign-off an audit step 
when such sign-off may positively affect their performance evaluation (Q4). It can be 
noted that senior auditors believe that receiving a good performance evaluation is a 
valid reason for them to commit dysfunctional behaviour through prematurely signing 
off an audit step. Audit trainees’ responses almost indicate the opposite direction. Audit 
trainees may believe that the nature of work they are doing in their early stages in the 
audit profession is not that significant to have an impact on their performance 
evaluation; and consequently they believe it is not needed to commit dysfunctional 
behaviour. It can be due also to the fact that experienced auditors are the group of 
auditors who are involved in preparing performance evaluation to junior auditors. 
Experienced auditors might evidence dysfunctional behaviour while reviewing the work 
of audit trainees that was committed to receive a good performance appraisal and to 
meet senior staff expectations.  
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The level of participation by audit managers in the development of ways to meet client 
needs, increase clients’ portfolio and have more assignments is perceived more by 
experienced auditors to be a significant factor to receive performance evaluation (Q5). 
Since audit trainees are not involved in increasing the clients’ portfolio, it can be 
justified why there is such significant variance. Approaching clients and developing 
many ways to satisfy clients’ needs is mainly the role of experienced auditors, 
specifically managers and above. Audit trainees are responsible for executing and 
performing audit procedures as planned by experienced auditors. Due to this fact, audit 
trainees might not feel they are involved in this process that might not affect their 
performance evaluation leading to this significant variance in responses (Q5). 
5.5 Conclusion 
The results of the above list of questions show clearly that dysfunctional behaviour is 
exercised by most auditors. Auditors’ perception related to dysfunctional behaviour is 
analysed in three different scenarios: time budget, time deadline, and performance 
evaluation. 
The survey highlights certain facts related to the accountancy profession. It is noted that 
audit firms are currently giving the vacancy priority for qualified auditors rather than 
auditors with graduate degrees. This can be supported by the decline in graduate degrees 
holders in the UK. It is also shown that the more auditors accumulate experience, the 
less audit firms can retain this group of auditors. 
It was interesting to notice that auditors knowingly, and not unintentionally, commit 
dysfunctional behaviour, although the results show that auditors believe that they should 
not commit any under-reporting of chargeable time when facing time budget 
constraints. It is evidenced that auditors facing the three different scenarios tend to work 
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heavily in their personal time. One of the most common audit problems, “box-ticking 
exercise”, is not proven to be exercised heavily as per the survey results. It can be due to 
the increase in awareness among auditors to mitigate audit failures and to a better 
review by experienced auditors over the work of audit team members.  
It is perceived that working in one's personal time might give an advantage for audit 
staff to finish an audit assignment. It is the responsibility of the audit firm to inform and 
to highlight this critical concern. Working in personal time may lead to indirect losses 
for the audit firm in the long term as the firm will not be aware of the actual hours spent 
on every assignment. 
The survey was conducted in collaboration with the Big Four accountancy firms in the 
UK, and the audit methodology of these firms showed no significant impact of 
dysfunctional behaviour (mean and median 3). It can be concluded that audit 
methodology is being transmitted to auditors via massive number of training events 
where they got familiar with methodological issues. There trainings are helping all line 
auditors in minimising dysfunctional behaviour when it comes audit firm methodology.  
The coordination between different lines of auditors in preparing budgets and allocating 
tasks showed a negative relationship with dysfunctional behaviour and to minimise such 
behaviour. It is proven that communication among auditors plays an important role in 
minimising dysfunctional behaviour. The communication with those charged of 
governance proved to have no significant impact on dysfunctional behaviour. It is 
implied that external auditors still prefer to do the job themselves with no heavy 
reliance on other parties, though it is allowed by the standards. 
The Mann-Whitney test indicates significant differences between experienced auditors 
and audit trainees. It is shown that when a question is targeting a specific group of 
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auditors, the other group reply with less conservatism. Experienced auditors have a 
tendency to blame audit trainees more for dysfunctional behaviour and vice versa for 
audit trainees about experienced auditors. Also, some differences were due to the nature 
and responsibilities held by every type of auditor. It can be noted that by added 
experiences, auditors tend to perceive more dysfunctional behaviour acts. 
In an agency relationship, a principal is expected to increase agent's efforts by more 
monitoring, but heavy monitoring has some hidden costs affecting interpersonal 
relationships and reducing social distance (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). The increase 
monitoring through tight budgets, tight deadlines and performance evaluation 
procedures push agents (auditors) to act against principals' interest. The results align 
with the concept that managerial integrity and managerial competency are two types of 
failures that may restrict agents to behave in alignment with principals' 
objectives/interests. Managerial integrity is related to managers' behaviour that has a 
negative consequence on the appropriation of organisations' assets. Managerial 
competencies are related to hiding some information as a result of control deficiencies 
(Moldoveanu and Martin, 2001).  
As a result of the above findings, the empirical evidence and results answer the research 
questions of this research that are related to auditors’ behaviour. It also supports the 
stated hypotheses of this study. It is proven that there is a significant positive 
relationship between auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour in relation to time budget, time 
deadline and performance evaluation factors. Interesting findings were noted and new 
factors were found to play a significant role in auditors’ behaviour. Also, behaviour 
among two types of auditors have been noted to be different, mainly between 
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experienced auditors and audit trainees. These findings differentiate this empirical study 
from other studies conducted to analyse to auditors’ behaviour.  
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Chapter Six 
Level and Determinants of Audit Quality 
6.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this model is to investigate the determinants of audit quality 
associated with selected corporate governance and companies’ characteristics in the UK 
context. In other words, the companies’ selected corporate governance mechanisms, 
mainly boards of directors, audit committees, and ownership concentration are analysed 
to assess and study their relationships with audit quality. This study empirically 
investigates the relationship between companies' internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (role duality, board of directors and audit committee size and 
independence, and ownership concentration) and audit quality in the context of 
corporate governance in the UK. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. First, it covers the measurement and 
level of determinants of audit quality. Second, descriptive statistics and collinearity 
schedules are presented which lead to defining the data to be non-parametric data (not 
normally distributed) due to possible fluctuations in companies’ financial and non-
financial figures as a result of economic and financial crisis. Third, a regression of data 
collected is presented using the fixed-effects regression model with robust standard 
error term to analyse the level of significance between the dependent and independent 
variables, in addition to identifying the direction of the relationship (coefficient). 
Fourth, a sensitivity test is conducted to support the results obtained from the initial 
fixed-effects regression model. For sensitivity purposes, a random effects GLS 
regression is used. The same level of significance and insignificant relation was 
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obtained in addition to the same adjusted R-squared in both regression tests which 
supports the strength of the model.  
6.2  Measuring Level and Determinants of Audit Quality 
 The model is examining the relationship between audit quality and corporate 
governance and companiesꞌ characteristics. The selected corporate governance 
characteristics are defined to be the independent variables. They are board of directors 
size, role duality, percentage of non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit 
committee number of meetings, audit committee independence, audit committee 
members having financial experts and block holders. Companiesꞌ characteristics, mainly 
selected financial characteristics and ratios, are defined to be control variables. 
Companies’ characteristics are leverage, size, profitability, liquidity and line of industry. 
The table below summarises the measurement and proxies of independent variables 
used. 
Table 6.1 Independent Variables Definition and Measurement 
Variable Description Proxy/measurement  
RD Role duality 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
 
NED Non-Executive 
Directors 
The percentage of outside directors of the 
board; 
 
BS Board of Directors size number of members serving at board of 
directors; 
 
ACS Audit committee size number of audit committee directors; 
 
ACI Audit Committee 
Independence 
the percentage of outside directors on an audit 
committee; 
 
ACM Audit Committee 
Effectiveness 
Frequency/number of audit committee 
meetings; 
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FINEXP Financial literacy of 
audit committee 
directors 
the percentage of audit committee members 
who are accounting financial experts as defined 
by  UK CG code C.3.1; 
 
OC Ownership 
concentration/Block 
holders 
Ratio of shareholders owning 5 per cent of 
equity against company's equity; 
 
LnTA Companies’ size log of total assets; 
 
LEV Leverage the ratio of long-term debt over total assets; 
 
ROA Profitability the ratio of net income over total assets; 
 
LQD Liquidity the ratio of current assets over total assets; 
 
InD Industry Type of industry from FTSE 350 schedules.  
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6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample of this model is made up of companies listed on the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange (FTSE 350). Excluded from the list of companies are financial 
institutions and utilities industries due to their intense regulations and to have a 
homogenous sample. Four years' data was collected from annual reports of 907 
companies excluding omitted and missing data. 
Figure 6.1 describes the sample of this model based on line of industry.  
2007-2010 
 
As noticed from the above pie chart, 59 per cent of the companies in the sample are 
industrial and consumer service companies. The remainder are consumer goods, basic 
material, oil and gas, technology, healthcare and telecommunication companies 
respectively. 
To ensure a normal distribution of companiesꞌ line of industry over the four years, pie 
charts 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.1.4 support the consistent distribution over the sampled 
period. 
8% 
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Figure 6.1.1 2007     Figure 6.1.2 2008 
 
Figure 6.1.3 2009     Figure 6.1.4 2010 
 
Companies were classified based on Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) and Dow Jones 
Industrial (DJI) Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) as follows: 
FTSE / DJI INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION BENCHMARK 
(ICB) 
 
0001  Oil and Gas 77 
1000  Basic Materials 88 
2000  Industrials 285 
3000  Consumer Goods 103 
4000  Health Care 31 
5000  Consumer Services 253 
6000  Telecommunications 21 
9000  Technology 50 
  908 
Source: FTSE Client Services 
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Table 6.2 summarises the descriptive statistics of the second model. 
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum 
(Maximum) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Standard 
Deviation 
AF 28,000 
39,649,416 
1,854,190 
(700,000) 
5.792 
 
43.967 
 
3,918,626 
 
LnAF 10.000 
(17.000) 
13.551 
(13.000) 
0.271 3.031 1.299 
RD 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.042 
(0.000) 
4.576 21.938 0.200 
BS 5.000 
(22.000) 
9.340 
(9.000) 
1.110 4.881 2.485 
NED 0.000 
1.000 
0.584 
(0.570) 
0.024 3.405 0.126 
ACS 2.000 
(8.000) 
3.629 
(3.000) 
1.236 5.339 0.862 
ACI 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.855 
(1.000) 
-1.906 5.156 0.300 
ACM 1.000 
(15.000) 
4.031 
(4.000) 
2.362 13.697 1.462 
FINEXP 0.000 
1.000 
0.348 
(0.330) 
1.416 5.990 0.181 
OC 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.294 
(0.260) 
0.760 3.263 0.194 
TA (£ꞌ000) 34,130 
(206,042,797) 
6,362,582 
(1,408,132) 
6.733 
 
54.936 
 
19,600,000 
 
LnTA 10.000 
(19.000) 
14.313 
(14.000) 
0.611 3.426 1.494 
ROA -1.270 
(1.140) 
0.070 
(0.060) 
-0.361 39.042 0.118 
LQD 0.030 
(0.980) 
0.395 
(0.370) 
0.620 2.954 0.207 
LEV 0.000 
(1.180) 
0.298 
(0.270) 
0.706 3.530 0.193 
OG 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.085 
(0.000) 
2.981 9.885 0.279 
BMAT 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.097 
(0.000) 
2.725 8.425 0.296 
CoNGDS 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.113 
(0.000) 
2.438 6.943 0.317 
Indus 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.313 
(0.000) 
0.808 1.652 0.464 
ConSeR 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.279 
(0.000) 
0.988 1.975 0.449 
Telecomm. 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.023 
(0.000) 
6.345 41.262 0.150 
HC 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
5.131 27.326 0.182 
Tech. 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.055 
(0.000) 
3.899 16.198 0.228 
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Regarding standard kurtosis statistics, it shows that the data has a non-parametric nature 
(not normally distributed). To define a parametric data, kurtosis statistics are said to be 
between ± 3 (Hannifa and Hudaib, 2006; Gujarati, 1995). Kurtosis statistics results 
varied between 1.652 and 41.262. As for standard skewness statistics, data is defined to 
be normally distributed if the results are between ± 1.96 (Hannifa and Hudaib, 2006). 
The standard skewness statistics results ranged between -0.361 and 6.345. These results 
led to define the four years' data to be non-parametric data. As a result of this non-
parametric data nature, a spearman collinearity test is used to test for multi-collinearity 
among variables. Moreover, Pearson collinearity test (Table 6.4), which is normally 
used to test parametric data, is used to support Spearman test results. 
The non-parametric nature of the collected data may be a result of the economic 
financial crisis that leads to major variances in financial and non-financial results. Due 
to this fact, robust analysis is used to test the hypotheses. 
The median of audit fees is 700 thousand British Pounds. Among governance variables, 
the median of role duality (RD) indicates that the majority of companies do not have 
major role duality issues between the chairman of the board and the chief executive 
officer. The average size of board of directors (BS) is nine board members. The mean 
value of non-executive directors (NED) is 0.584 indicating that almost more than half of 
the companies had non-executive directors serving on the board of directors. 
The median of audit committee members is three. This explains that the majority of 
companies tested complied with the governance code to establish audit committees of a 
minimum of three members. But it can be noticed also that some companies had two 
audit committee members which is allowed for smaller companies. For audit committee 
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independence (ACI), a median result of one indicates that the majority of companies 
tested have independent audit committee members. 
Among governance variables that measure audit committee effectiveness is audit 
committee number of meetings (ACM). Audit committee meetings varied significantly 
in different companies. Some audit committees met once per year while other audit 
committees met 15 times per year. The financial literacy of audit committee directors 
(FINEXP) results indicate that some companies do not have any audit committee 
members with a financial expertise; while other companies have audit committees with 
all members possessing financial expertise. The ownership concentration (OC) median 
is 26 per cent. This means that the average block-holders owning more than five per 
cent of company’s ordinary shares is 26 per cent. 
As for control variables, 27 per cent is the average leverage ratio while the average 
profitability ratio (ROA) is 6 per cent. The median of companiesꞌ size is 
£1,408,132thousands British Pounds. The liquidity results show a big variance between 
highly liquid companies (98 per cent) and low liquid companies (3 per cent). 
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Table 6.3 Yearly Descriptive Statistics 
  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Min. 
(Max.) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Min. 
(Max.) 
Mean 
(Median) 
AF 32,000 
(31,600,000) 
1,614,057 
(700,000) 
28,000 
(39,600,000) 
2,012,622 
(800,000) 
31,000 
35,300,000 
1,906,704 
(700,000) 
32,000 
(34,500,000) 
1,881,898 
(700,000) 
LnAF 10.000 
(17.000) 
13.475 
13.000 
10.000 
(17.000) 
13.598 
(14.000) 
10.000 
(17.000) 
13.586 
(13.000) 
10.000 
(17.000) 
13.540 
(13.000) 
RD 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.048 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.048 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.039 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.031 
(0.000) 
BS 5.000 
(22.000) 
9.519 
9.000 
5.000 
(20.000) 
9.454 
(9.000) 
5.000 
(20.000) 
9.213 
(9.000) 
5.000 
(18.000) 
9.171 
(9.000) 
NED 0.250 
(0.900) 
0.570 
0.560 
0.200 
(0.920) 
0.582 
(0.570) 
0.290 
(1.000) 
0.590 
(0.570) 
0.000 
(0.910) 
0.594 
(0.590) 
ACS 2.000 
(8.000) 
3.665 
3.000 
2.000 
(7.000) 
3.624 
(3.000) 
2.000 
(7.000) 
3.595 
(3.000) 
2.000 
(7.000) 
3.630 
(3.500) 
ACI 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.868 
1.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.870 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.842 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.839 
(1.000) 
ACM 1.000 
(14.000) 
3.969 
4.000 
2.000 
(13.000) 
3.986 
(4.000) 
2.000 
(13.000) 
4.104 
(4.000) 
1.000 
(15.000) 
4.063 
(4.000) 
FINEXP 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.349 
0.330 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.357 
(0.330) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.336 
(0.330) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.347 
(0.330) 
OC 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.283 
0.250 
0.000 
(0.920) 
0.301 
(0.270) 
0.000 
(0.920) 
0.293 
(0.260) 
0.000 
(0.920) 
0.297 
(0.260) 
TA (£'000) 34,130 
(135,000,000) 
5,048,131 
(1,206,200) 
48,856 
(196,000,000) 
6,650,742 
(1,524,800) 
53,743 
(181,000,000) 
6,398,642 
(1,401,182) 
50,743 
(206,000,000) 
7,372,034 
(1,503,089) 
LnTA 10.000 
(19.000) 
14.202 
14.000 
11.000 
(19.000) 
14.336 
(14.000) 
11.000 
(19.000) 
14.308 
(14.000) 
11.000 
(19.000) 
14.405 
(14.000) 
ROA -0.380 
(0.660) 
0.086 
0.070 
-1.270 
(0.520) 
0.056 
(0.060) 
-0.180 
(0.790) 
0.057 
(0.050) 
-0.170 
(1.140) 
0.080 
(0.060) 
LQD 0.030 
(0.980) 
0.409 
0.390 
0.030 
(0.980) 
0.392 
(0.370) 
0.040 
(0.970) 
0.388 
(0.355) 
0.040 
(0.960) 
0.390 
(0.365) 
LEV 0.000 
(0.990) 
0.289 
0.270 
0.000 
(1.040) 
0.304 
(0.290) 
0.000 
(1.180) 
0.309 
(0.285) 
0.000 
(0.900) 
0.286 
(0.260) 
OG 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.079 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.087 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.078 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.094 
(0.000) 
BMAT 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.088 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.096 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.091 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.112 
(0.000) 
CoNGDS 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.114 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.104 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.117 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.117 
(0.000) 
Indus 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.339 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.318 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.313 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.283 
(0.000) 
ConSeR 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.281 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.288 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.278 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.265 
(0.000) 
Telecomm. 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.022 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.021 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.021 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.027 
(0.000) 
HC 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.026 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.039 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.036 
(0.000) 
Tech. 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.048 
0.000 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.048 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.060 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.063 
(0.000) 
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Table 6.3 presents the yearly descriptive statistics of data collected for four years. It can 
be noted that the median of the audit fees over the four years is between 700,000-
800,000. The highest amount of audit fees paid by UK listed companies is in 2008 (£ 39 
million). Board size is on average nine members over the four years. Regarding non-
executive directors, companies are in full compliance with the non-executive criteria in 
2010. All boards of directors in 2010 have at least one board member considered non-
executive. It is worth mentioning that, on average, non-executive directors constitute 
half of boards of directors. 
The median and mean of audit committee size is three. It can be noted that all 
companies have audit committees during the four years period (2007-2010). Although 
some audit committees do not constitute independent directors, the median results show 
that the majority of audit committee members are considered independent. The average 
number of audit committeesꞌ meetings show that they meet four times a year even 
though some audit committees are more active compared to others. 
All audit committees, on average, constitute at least one member considered to be 
financial expert. It can be noted that some audit committees are not complying fully 
with the governance code since, up to 2010; there are still audit committees with no 
financial expertsꞌ directors. 
Table 6.4 Companiesꞌ Characteristics 
 OG BMAT CoNGDS Indus ConSeR Telecomm. HC Tech. Pooled 
RD - 8 1 9 13 4 0 3 38 4% 
ACI 2 1 6 17 22 3 0 3 54 6% 
FINEXP 8 0 2 6 14 2 0 4 36 4% 
 
Table 6.4 presents some facts about companiesꞌ characteristics. It can be noted that four 
per cent of companies are experiencing a role duality situation where one individual is 
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holding the positions of chief executive officer and chairman titles. Six per cent of 
companies established audit committees with no existence of independent audit 
committee directors. For financial experts, only four per cent of audit committees are 
established with no existence of financial experts. 
6.2.2 Results 
The Spearman correlation matrix is used to test multicollinearity assumption. The 
Spearman correlation matrix is reported in Table 6.5.  
It can be noticed that there are no significant multicollinearity problems among 
variables as correlations values are relatively low. It is said that a correlations value up 
to 80 per cent is accepted (Gujarati, 1995). The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 
included as additional evidence that no major multicollinearity problems exist. The rule 
of thumb for VIF values is said that any variable with a <10 value is considered highly 
collinear with other independent variables (Oꞌbrien, 2007). 
It is also useful to highlight the correlation between explanatory variables that will be 
used in the regression tests at a later stage. It can be noted that companiesꞌ size 
(measured by log of total assets) is significantly correlated with board of directors and 
audit committee explanatory variables (BS, NED, ACI, ACS, ACM, and FINEXP). It is 
expected that the bigger companies are, the wider their board of directors and audit 
committees. It can be also noted that profitability (measured by ROA) is significantly 
correlated with FINEXP. It is expected that the more profitable companies are, the 
better their ability to hire/assign financial experts within audit committees. 
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Table 6.5 – Correlations 
Spearman correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables (n=908) 
* Significance at confidence level of 95% 
 
 
 
VIF 
LnAF RD BS NED ACS ACI ACM FINEXP OC LnTA ROA LQD LeV OG BMaT ConGDS Indus ConSeR Telecom HC Tech 
LnAF  1.000 
 
                    
RD 1.05 -0.091* 
 
1.000                    
BS 1.72 0.428* 
 
-0.003 1.000                   
NED 1.30 0.270* 
 
-0.042 0.100* 1.000                  
ACS 1.49 0.316* 
 
-0.071* 0.454* 0.219* 1.000                 
ACI 1.11 0.073* 
 
0.024 0.134* 0.192* 0.018 1.000                
ACM 1.33 0.410* 
 
-0.012 0.312* 0.253* 0.247* 0.145* 1.000               
FINEXP 1.14 -0.160* 
 
0.063 -0.157* -0.088* -0.508* 0.015 -0.108* 1.000              
OC 1.27 -0.286* 
 
0.086* -0.177* -0.038 -0.145* -0.112* -0.085* 0.042 1.000             
LnTA 2.25 0.670* 
 
-0.020 0.520* 0.237* 0.332* 0.131* 0.367* -0.182* -0.309* 1.000            
ROA 1.07 -0.095* 
 
0.042 -0.050 0.040 -0.021 0.008 -0.016 0.040 -0.047 -0.243* 1.000           
LQD 1.47 -0.119* 
 
-0.007 -0.181* -0.041 -0.046 0.031 -0.010 0.044 -0.006 -0.320* 0.224* 1.000          
LEV 1.39 0.169* 
 
-0.031 0.129* 0.031 0.055 0.035 0.033 -0.075* -0.154* 0.310* -0.235* -0.447* 1.000         
OG 3.32 -0.079* 
 
-0.064 0.092* -0.031 0.014 0.018 -0.011 -0.073* 0.003 -0.013 0.017 -0.016 -0.067* 1.000        
BMAT 3.71 0.036 
 
0.080* 0.026 0.182* -0.011 0.062 0.044 0.102* 0.161* 0.092* 0.088* -0.101* -0.070* -0.099* 1.000       
CoNGDS 4.08 0.008 
 
-0.057 0.073* -0.046 0.079* 0.075* -0.006 -0.012 -0.053 0.119* -0.054 0.119* -0.007 -0.108* -0.117* 1.000      
Indus 7.34 0.072* 
 
-0.035 -0.152* -0.145* -0.086* 0.011 -0.084* 0.038 -0.117* -0.200* 0.024 0.234* 0.024 -0.204* -0.221* -0.242* 1.000     
ConSeR 7.01 -0.076* 
 
0.030 0.038 0.018 -0.001 -0.074* -0.027 -0.068* 0.056 0.103* -0.089* -0.248* 0.194* -0.188* -0.204* -0.223* -0.420* 1.000    
Telecomm 1.77 0.119* 
 
0.114* 0.121* 0.016 0.125* -0.155* 0.102* -0.077* -0.023 0.128* -0.056 -0.133* 0.021 -0.047 -0.051 -0.055 -0.104* -0.096* 1.000   
HC 1.65 0.062 
 
-0.039 0.006 0.119* 0.057 0.031 0.117* 0.042 -0.089* 0.008 0.027 0.005 0.021 -0.057 -0.062 -0.067* -0.127* -0.117* -0.029 1.000  
Tech 2.60 -0.089* 
 
0.022 -0.096* 0.019 -0.067* -0.008 0.033 0.041 0.080* -0.155* 0.076* 0.082* -0.273* -0.073* -0.079* -0.087* -0.163* -0.150* -0.037 -0.045 1.000 
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Table 6.6 – Correlations 
Pearson correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables (n=908) 
* Significance at confidence level of 95% 
 
 
LnAF RD BS NED ACS ACI ACM FINEXP OC LnTA ROA LQD LeV OG BMAT CoNGDS Indus ConSeR Telecomm HC Tech 
 
LnAF 
1.000                     
 
RD 
-0.093* 1.000                    
 
BS 
0.488* -0.029 1.000                   
 
NED 
0.261* -0.017 0.081* 1.000                  
 
ACS 
0.344* -0.070* 0.428* 0.245* 1.000                 
 
ACI 
0.069* 0.033 0.100* 0.177* 0.031 1.000                
 
ACM 
0.424* -0.031 0.326* 0.259* 0.232* 0.137* 1.000               
 
FINEXP 
-0.087* 0.074* -0.045 0.019 -0.277* 0.030 -0.062 1.000              
 
OC 
-0.264* 0.103* -0.085* 0.010 -0.140* -0.085* -0.080* 0.016 1.000             
 
LnTA 
0.710* -0.029 0.556* 0.264* 0.374* 0.110* 0.404* -0.083* -0.290* 1.000            
 
ROA 
-0.104* -0.009 -0.060 0.060 -0.040 0.018 -0.020 0.071* 0.030 -0.169* 1.000           
 
LQD 
-0.171* -0.011 -0.162* -0.074* -0.085* 0.022 -0.036 0.059 -0.026 -0.307* 0.154* 1.000          
 
LEV 
0.111* -0.028 0.120* 0.005 0.048 0.038 0.010 -0.051 -0.121* 0.240* -0.140* 0.415* 1.000         
 
OG 
-0.046 -0.063 0.099* -0.031 0.020 0.029 0.062 -0.062 0.008 0.035 0.049 0.002 -0.072* 1.000        
 
BMAT 
0.047 0.080* 0.015 0.218* -0.001 0.079* 0.052 0.115* 0.189* 0.114* 0.019 -0.111* -0.082* -0.099* 1.000       
 
CoNGDS 
0.014 -0.058 0.056 -0.037 0.106* 0.065 -0.027 -0.007 -0.073* 0.111* -0.061 0.185* -0.021 -0.108* -0.117* 1.000      
 
Indus 
0.048 -0.034 -0.177* -0.162* -0.098* 0.006 -0.104* 0.023 -0.148* -0.206* 0.011 0.181* -0.004 -0.204* -0.221* -0.242* 1.000     
 
ConSeR 
-0.073* 0.030 0.070* 0.005 -0.014 -0.078* -0.028 -0.069* 0.082* 0.054 -0.019 -0.244* 0.238* -0.188* -0.204* -0.223* -0.420* 1.000    
 
Telecomm 
0.110* 0.114* 0.115* 0.016 0.109* -0.162* 0.047 -0.040 0.007 0.159* -0.030 -0.122* 0.026 -0.047 -0.051 -0.055 -0.104* -0.096* 1.000   
 
HC 
0.060 -0.039 0.013 0.115* 0.067* 0.034 0.133* 0.048 -0.090* 0.026 -0.012 -0.013 0.002 -0.057 -0.062 -0.067* -0.127* -0.117* -0.029 1.000  
 
Tech 
-0.095* 0.022 -0.084* 0.023 -0.070* -0.007 0.028 0.008 0.071* -0.157* 0.043 0.090* -0.250* -0.073* -0.079* -0.087* -0.163* -0.150* -0.037 -0.045 1.000 
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Test of Hypotheses 
Table 6.7 Hausman Test 
 Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b –B) 
RD -0.364 -0.361 -0.003 
BS 0.079 0.079 -0.000 
NED 0.911 0.917 -0.005 
ACS 0.017 0.016 0.001 
ACI -0.191 -0.189 -0.001 
ACM 0.112 0.112 -0.000 
FINEXP -0.209 -0209 -0.000 
OC -0.273 -0.270 -0.003 
LnTA 0.516 0.515 0.000 
ROA 0.029 -0.005 0.035 
LQD -0.095 -0.093 -0.002 
LeV -0.378 -0.369 -0.008 
OG -0.498 -0.403 -0.095 
BMAT -0.221 -0.128 -0.093 
CoNGDS -0.288 -0.194 -0.094 
Indus 0.335 0.432 -0.096 
ConSeR -0.299 -0.203 -0.095 
Telecomm -0.188 -0.095 -0.092 
 
b=consistent under H0 and Ha;  
B=inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0 
Test: H0 - difference in coefficient not systematic 
Chi(2)= 1.85 
Prob>ch2= 1.000 
 
The Hausman test is presented to justify the use of either random-effects regression 
(GLS) or the fixed-effects regression test. If the result shows a rejection of the null 
hypothesis (H0), fixed effects is recommended. Otherwise, the random-effects 
regression (GLS) is to be used as the main regression test. As mentioned above, the 
result shows that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected since the coefficients differences 
are not systematic. Accordingly, the random-effects regression is used. 
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OLS Cross Sectional Panel Regression Using Robust Standard Error 
(Random - Effects GLS regression) 
Table 6.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01  
 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
LnAF Coefficient z-statistics 
   
Intercept 
 
4.846 14.680*** 
RD 
 
-0.361 -3.230*** 
BS 
 
0.079 9.130*** 
NED 
 
0.917 12.480*** 
ACS 
 
0.016 0.940 
ACI 
 
-0.190 -1.490 
ACM 
 
0.112 5.260*** 
FINEXP 
 
-0.209 -2.800** 
OC 
 
-0.270 -2.450** 
LnTA 
 
0.515 33.230*** 
ROA 
 
-0.006 -0.020 
LQD 
 
-0.093 -0.820 
LEV 
 
-0.370 -1.340 
OG 
 
-0.403 -3.340*** 
BMAT 
 
-0.128 -1.250 
CoNGDS 
 
-0.194 -2.140** 
Indus 
 
0.432 4.830*** 
ConNSeR 
 
-0.204 -1.990** 
Telecomm. 
 
-0.095 -0.400 
HC 
 
0.097 0.470 
Tech. 
 
(omitted)  
R-squared 
 
0.601 
Number of groups 
 
4 
N 908 
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Table 6.8 reports the result of the regression model. Multiple regressions with Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) time series panel regression is used. As per the results shown in 
skewness and kurtosis statistics, data is defined to be of a non-parametric nature (not 
normally distributed); OLS is used with a robust standard error to have the OLS fits 
with non-parametric data. The R-squared of the regression model (0.601) indicates the 
model fit which aligns with previous studies, but with different scope, related to the 
concept of audit quality (Basiruddin, 2011:0.789; Carcello et al., 2002:0.69 ꞌꞌAdjusted 
R
2ꞌꞌ; O’sullivan, 2000: 0.803; Zaman et al., 2011:0.718). 
Consistent with the expectation, there is a negative significant relationship between 
audit quality and role duality. It is concluded that when a chief executive officer is not 
holding the chairman of the board of directorsꞌ tasks and responsibilities, audit quality 
would be better. It is due to the fact that role duality may give excessive power to the 
individual holding the two positions which may lead to lower audit quality. This 
conclusion aligns with the Bliss et al. (2001) study. They conclude that intensive audit 
work is required when role duality exists. The result aligns with the agency theory 
concept which identifies that non-role duality of CEO and chairman of the board 
positions help to reduce the gap between directors and external auditors (Uang et al., 
2006). As a result of role duality, the decision-making process is facilitated easily 
towards a good stewardship role. But on the other hand, this ease of decision making, 
due to certain corporate governance characteristics, may harm shareholdersꞌ interest as it 
is considered to be working to the benefit of agents rather than principals (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991).  
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This reduced gap consequently helps to increase audit quality. Companies with weak 
corporate governance tend to hire lower audit quality auditors (Lin and Liu, 2009). This 
contradicts with H2a since weak corporate governance is defined by having RD. Such 
companies (Chinese sample) tend to protect the vagueness advantage for having weak 
corporate governance by hiring lower quality auditors.  
Also, consistent with expectation, there is a positive significant relationship between 
Non-Executive Directors (NED) and audit quality. This result indicates that the more a 
board of directors is comprised of non-executive directors, the more audit quality can be 
achieved. NED is defined to be directors taking part in the board with more 
independence than executive directors. In theory, more agency cost through heavy 
monitoring from directors, leads to a variance of audit quality (Dickinson and Villeval, 
2008). The results align with the argument that agency cost is minimised by the 
existence of more non-executive directors that will help in reducing the gap with 
external auditors (Uang et al., 2006) and consequently better audit quality. Also, Chen 
and Sun (2007) concluded that more independent directors demand better auditor 
reputation, a reputation of better audit quality. Uang et al. (2006) stated that the NED 
variable shows an insignificant role in reducing dissonance between external auditors 
and management regarding going-concern disclosures. The sample of this study was 
limited to companies with going-concern disclosures. This research sample is made up 
of FTSE 350-listed companies where the majority of companies do not have any going 
concern issues. 
The last proxy of board of directors shows a positive significant relationship between 
board of directors size and audit quality. This result supports the expected relationship 
between board of directors size and audit quality (H2c). The bigger board of directors, 
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the more diversified backgrounds boards will possess and consequently more 
communication with external auditors to achieve better audit quality. This aligns with 
the argument stating that companies with a larger board of directors were likely to 
dismiss Andersen at an earlier stage before the Enron scandal (Chen and Zhou, 2007) as 
larger boards tend to achieve better audit quality by dismissing risky auditors. In theory, 
larger boards have an advantage of being more diversified and possess different 
technical and educational backgrounds (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Canyon and Peck 
(1998) mention that companies with larger boards face higher agency cost leading to 
more agency problems. Dey (2008) mentions that due to competitive pressure on 
capital, goods, and labour markets, companies facing high agency problems have good 
corporate governance mechanisms. In the current research, the results show that bigger 
boards are related to an increase in audit quality. This is due to the fact that the Canyon 
and Peckꞌs (1998) study analysed board of directors’ size against corporate 
performance. Corporate performance is an endogenous variable within the company 
itself while audit quality is performed by an external body (external auditors) and better 
audit quality is achieved through this statistical relationship with corporate governance 
mechanisms and companies characteristics.  
Audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee meetings, and 
audit committee financial experts are selected as characteristics of audit committees to 
be analysed against audit quality. Contrary to the expectation (H2d), there is a positive 
but insignificant relationship between audit committee size and audit quality. In theory, 
audit committees are established by the board of directors (UK corporate Governance 
code, 2010). All audit committee members are initially members of the board of 
directors. This result is consistent with Carcello and Nealꞌs (2000) study which stated 
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that there is no significant relationship between audit committee size and auditor 
reporting.  
Contrary to the expectation also (H2e), audit committee independence has no significant 
influence on audit quality. This result aligns with Kent and Stewart's (2008) study that 
showed an insignificant relationship between audit committee independence and level 
of disclosures; which are an essential part of audited financial statements. Also, Piot and 
Janin (2007) stated that audit committee independence has no significant relationship 
with earning management. This is in contrast to the US finding (Carcello and Neal, 
2003) that showed a significant role of audit committee independence when receiving a 
going-concern audit opinion. This result questions the role of independent audit 
committee directors in the British model of corporate governance. Specifically, the 
“collegiality” principle stated in the Smiths report (2003) that that audit committees 
(sub-committees of the board of directors) have a consultative role that does not 
substitute board responsibilities. Boards of directors are collectively responsible for 
financial reporting quality which “hampers” the individual monitoring incentives of 
independent audit committee directors. 
Consistent with the expectation (H2f), there is a positive significant relationship 
between audit committee frequency of meetings and audit quality. In other words, 
effective audit committees, measured by number of meetings, lead to an increase of 
audit quality. This result is due to the nature of audit committees' tasks that are closely 
inter-related with external auditors’ work. Chen and Suny (2007) indicate that more 
active audit committees assign Big Four external auditors, perceived as better auditor 
quality. Also, the levels of disclosures are positively related to the frequency of audit 
committee meetings (Kent and Stewart, 2008). More frequent audit committee meetings 
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help to reduce potential financial reporting problems (Farber, 2005). This result aligns 
with the theoretical agency framework where audit committee meet more to mitigate 
potential agency problems (Sharma et al., 2009) and to maintain good quality audit. 
Contrary to the expectation (H2g), the random-effects regression results show a negative 
significant relationship between audit quality and audit committee members with 
financial expertise. This result indicates that external auditors incur additional time to 
achieve a better quality to cover the absence and gap of financial experts within an audit 
committee. One of the main objectives for establishing audit committees is to enhance 
the monitoring tool of shareholders over management from an agency theory 
perspective. The attributes of audit committees cannot be ignored since audit 
committees are comprised of individuals. Financial experts are expected to contribute to 
the effectiveness of monitoring (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Thus, in the absence of 
financial experts within audit committees; that the role of external auditors is considered 
an important factor in the classic agency problem between shareholders and 
management (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011) and to compensate the absence of financial 
experts. The existence of financial experts may help auditors to incur less time on 
certain audit cycles as they can rely on the work of internal auditors (ISA 610) who are 
required to meet at least annually with the audit committee (Smiths report, 2003). 
Consistent with the expectation (H2h), there is a negative significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and audit quality. Block holders are defined to be 
shareholders owning a minimum of five per cent of a company’s shares (Fan and Wong, 
2005; Lin and Liu, 2009; Dao et al, 2008). Block holders are perceived to possess a 
controlling and voting power which enables them to enforce corporate contracts with 
different parties (Fan and Wong, 2005). This result indicates that since block holders 
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have a controlling power and more access to companies’ information, they do not 
demand excessive work from external auditors as all data needed is obtained from the 
company itself. Subsequently, when block holders/ownership concentration exists, 
higher audit quality may not be very demanding from those block holders. This result 
aligns with Lin and Liu’s (2009) where there is a positive significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and a change to a lower audit quality auditor. Also, 
audit fees are higher in companies characterised by more agency problems. One of these 
agency problems is the existence of ownership concentration (Fan and Wong, 2005). 
Such agency problems cannot be resolved by an internal control mechanism but through 
a reputable external auditor. A reputable auditor is expected to bill higher audit fees and 
to produce a better quality audit. Big Four audit firms are perceived to provide better 
audit quality and charge higher audit fees than non-Big Four audit firms due to their 
competence and independence (Khurana and Roman, 2004). 
As for control variables, companiesꞌ size (LnTA) results in a positive significant 
relationship with audit quality. It can be concluded that larger companies demand better 
audit quality due to the fact that larger companies may consist of a larger number of 
shareholders than smaller companies. They tend to demand better audit quality for 
better reputation among stakeholders. This better audit quality helps large companies to 
obtain and maintain a good line of credit with financial institutions (Francis and Wilson, 
1988; Haskin and Williams, 1990). Profitability (ROA), liquidity (LQD), and leverage 
(LEV) show no significant statistical relationship with audit quality. Contrary to the 
results of Chenet et al. (2010) indicate that leverage shows to have a negative significant 
relationship with firm performance. Also contrary to the results, executive 
compensation and remuneration is positively and significantly affected by profitability 
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(Basu, 2007). Along with the results of liquidity variables, it has been noted that there is 
no significant relationship between the change of auditors and liquidity levels.  
As for Line of industry; oil and gas, consumer services and consumer goods line of 
industries have a negative significant relationship with audit quality. Such industries are 
expected to have better governance mechanisms that may allow them to demand less 
from auditors and rely more on their internal monitoring processes. Industrial 
companies show to have positive significant relationship with audit quality. It can be 
noted that industrial companies demand more audit quality which is evidenced in the 
positive significant direction along with audit fees. 
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6.2.3  Sensitivity Analysis  
OLS Cross Sectional Panel Regression Using Robust Standard Error 
(Fixed–Effects regression) 
Table 6.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01  
LnAF Coefficient t-statistics 
   
Intercept 
 
4.937 20.210*** 
RD 
 
-0.364 -3.230** 
BS 
 
0.080 9.540*** 
NED 
 
0.911 13.900*** 
ACS 
 
0.017 0.980 
ACI 
 
-0.192 -1.520 
ACM 
 
0.112 5.170** 
FINEXP 
 
-0.210 -2.980* 
OC 
 
-0.273 -2.400* 
LnTA 
 
0.516 30.330*** 
ROA 
 
0.029 0.120 
LQD 
 
-0.095 -0.840 
LEV 
 
-0.378 -1.380 
OG 
 
-0.498 -5.450** 
BMAT 
 
-0.221 -1.240 
CoNGDS 
 
-0.288 -2.160 
Indus 
 
0.335 2.790* 
ConNSeR 
 
-0.299 -2.380* 
Telecomm. 
 
-0.188 -1.070 
HC 
 
(omitted)  
Tech. 
 
-0.095 -0.460 
R-squared 
 
0.601 
Number of groups 
 
4 
N 
 
908 
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The main objective of the sensitivity test is to investigate the robustness of the study 
which includes some forms of statistical modelling. Initially, the random-effects GLS 
panel regression has been used to assess the relationship between audit quality and 
corporate governance and companies’ characteristics. The panel data helps in 
controlling for variables not observed or measured in business practices across 
companies or variables that may change over the time period but not in a consistent 
manner. The random-effect regression model (GLS) assumes that variations across 
entities are random and uncorrelated within the independent variables included in a 
model. The fixed-effects regression, which has been used as a sensitivity test, controls 
for time-invariant differences. It helps to mitigate for any biased assumptions in the 
estimated coefficients as a result of omitted time-invariant characteristics (Torres-
Reyna, 2010).   
The results of the fixed-effects regression support the results obtained from the random-
effects GLS regression. It showed the same significant and insignificant relationship 
between audit quality and its determinants. 
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6.2.3.1 Additional Tests 
2SLS Regression Test 
Table 6.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
  
LnAF Coefficient z-statistics 
   
Intercept 
 
5.682 9.500*** 
RD 
 
-0.337 -1.570 
BS 
 
0.137 5.860*** 
NED 
 
1.867 4.020*** 
ACS 
 
-0.055 -1.030 
ACI 
 
-0.339 -2.330** 
ACM 
 
0.097 3.630*** 
FINEXP 
 
-0.565 -2.060** 
OC 
 
-0.594 -2.240** 
LnTA 
 
0.432 10.110*** 
ROA 
 
-0.523 -0.520 
LQD 
 
-0.335 -1.450 
LEV 
 
-0.512 -1.990** 
OG 
 
-0.265 -1.370 
BMAT 
 
-0.031 -0.170 
CoNGDS 
 
0.010 0.050 
Indus 
 
0.579 3.560*** 
ConNSeR 
 
-0.164 -0.980 
Telecomm. 
 
0.158 0.560 
HC 
 
0.225 0.950 
Tech. 
 
(omitted)  
R-squared 
 
0.588 
N 
 
619 
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Table 6.10 presents the statistical relationship among variables using the 2SLS 
regression test. It can be noted that the number of observations in the 2SLS regression 
test are lesser than other regression tests (n=619). This is due to the fact that the lagged 
technique has been used as part of running the 2SLS regression test. Through the use of 
Durbin-Wu Hausman test, the industry and control variables are lagged. Accordingly, 
an average of one year will be excluded. What is meant by ''Lag model'' is that the 
regression is used to predict current value of dependent variable based on the current 
and past values of explanatory variables. D.S.G. Bollock (2010) mentions that the 
lagged technique is used to retain the validity of ordinary Least-square regression. 
Except for RD and ACI; all independent variables show the same results to those stated 
for the results reached since it is better to rely on ordinary least square tests when 
variables are exogenous (Soderbom, 2009). 
Controlling for firm industry and employing the fixed-effect panel data regression 
(sensitivity test, Table 6.9) is a proper method to control for endogeneity that might be 
caused by an omitted variable, which is one of the main prospects of endogeneity 
problem (Yermack, 1996; Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, Durban-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity is used to have further assurance. The test reported (p=0.14xx) indicating 
no threat of endogenous variables.  Baum (2006) argues that a strong rejection of the 
null hypothesis will lead to a more reliance on 2SLS test instead of the OLS model 
estimates. In this research model case, the results are in favour of the OLS model 
estimates. 
 Some studies have used different liquidity proxies compared to the proxy used in 
this research. One of the used proxies for liquidity is the current ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities (Cahan et al., 2011; .Basiruddin, 2011) while other studies use 
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the current to total assets ratio. Liquidity is measured in this research by the ratio of 
current assets over total assets (Lin and Liu, 2009). This proxy is controlling not only 
for current liabilities and whether companies are able to pay their short term debts from 
their currents assets; but also for their liabilities that might have a short term 
characteristic but it has been re-scheduled to have a long-term balance (bank over 
drafts). The proxy also controls for any potential dividends payments to shareholder that 
are included in the equity balance.  
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OLS Cross Sectional Panel Regression Using Robust Standard Error 
 (Random - Effects GLS regression) 
Table 6.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
1
 Liquidity is measured by current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) for 
resultsꞌ sensitivity purposes.  
 
LnAF Coefficient z-statistics 
   
Intercept 
 
4.944 18.760*** 
RD 
 
-0.351 -3.040** 
BS 
 
0.079 8.480*** 
NED 
 
0.932 18.290*** 
ACS 
 
0.013 0.710 
ACI 
 
-0.180 -1.420 
ACM 
 
0.109 5.260*** 
FINEXP 
 
-0.210 -2.560*** 
OC 
 
-0.267 -2.630*** 
LnTA 
 
0.509 36.280*** 
ROA 
 
-0.033 -0.130 
LQD1 
 
-0.032 -2.340*** 
LEV 
 
-0.393 -1.620 
OG 
 
-0.358 -2.740*** 
BMAT 
 
-0.022 -0.190 
CoNGDS 
 
-0.172 -1.780* 
Indus 
 
0.437 4.620*** 
ConNSeR 
 
-0.195 -1.950* 
Telecomm. 
 
-0.073 -0.310 
HC 
 
0.120 0.580 
Tech. 
 
(omitted)  
R-squared 
 
0.607 
N 
 
908 
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Table 6.11 presents the statistical relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables using different proxy of liquidity control variable for robustness/sensitivity 
check. It is noted that the results of all independent variables are the same as discussed 
previously in table 6.8. The model fit of this econometric model (0.607) is very close to 
the R-squared presented at the initial regression test (0.601). The consistency of results 
between the two econometric models using different proxy for one of the control 
variables (liquidity) gives more robustness for the results discussed. 
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OLS Cross Sectional Panel Regression Using Robust Standard Error 
(Random - Effects GLS regression with financial crisis variable) 
Table 6.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01  
 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
LnAF Coefficient z-statistics 
   
Intercept 
 
4.879 15.430*** 
RD 
 
-0.362 -3.250*** 
BS 
 
0.079 9.200*** 
NED 
 
0.918 13.860*** 
ACS 
 
0.019 0.990 
ACI 
 
-0.191 -1.510 
ACM 
 
0.112 5.300*** 
FINEXP 
 
-0.212 -2.940*** 
OC 
 
-0.267 -2.420** 
LnTA 
 
0.513 29.720*** 
ROA 
 
-0.004 -0.020 
LQD 
 
-0.095 -0.860 
LEV 
 
-0.367 -1.330 
OG 
 
-0.410 -3.490*** 
BMAT 
 
-0.126 -1.240 
CoNGDS 
 
-0.195 -2.200** 
Indus 
 
0.431 4.860*** 
ConNSeR 
 
-0.203 -2.030** 
Telecomm. 
 
-0.092 -0.390 
HC 
 
0.098 0.480 
Tech. 
 
(omitted)  
crisis -0.019 -0.470 
   
R-squared 
 
0.5978 
Number of groups 
 
4 
N 908 
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Table 6.12 is presented as another sensitivity test taking into consideration the financial 
crisis impact over the tested sample. A dummy variable is included to split between two 
periods; 2007-2008 and 2009-2010. A zero value is given to observations of 2007 and 
2008 and one value is given to observations of 2009 and 2010. The objective of splitting 
the sample into two categories is to identify post and pre-period financial crisis group of 
observations. 
It can be noted that the results in the above regression table are relatively the same 
results of the GLS regression test table presented in table 6.8. This is due to the fact that 
the period between 2007 and 2010 is embedded with financial crisis consequences. Jin 
et al. (2013) state that a period before 2007 is said to be a pre-financial crisis period. 
Also Davydov (2013) mentions that the year of 2010 is considered a financial crisis 
period. In conclusion, the above arguments support the similarity of results between the 
two regression tests (Table 6.8 and table 6.12). The inclusion of a financial crisis 
variable did not make any major difference in the results of the regression tests. The 
tested sample of this study is embedded with financial crisis characteristics; accordingly 
financial crisis variable would not affect the robust results.  
6.3 Conclusion 
The chapter includes the results of the statistical relationship between audit quality and 
corporate governance mechanism and companies’ characteristics. It includes a 
description and analysis of different industries tested. The descriptive statistics are 
presented which helped to identify the non-parametric nature of the sampled data. The 
chapter also includes collinearity schedules test using a Spearman correlation matrix. 
The regression test, random-effects GLS regression with robust standard error, shows 
that the majority of hypotheses were supported by the statistical results.  
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Audit quality showed a significant positive relationship with board of directors' size and 
independence and a negative relationship with role duality. It can be concluded that 
within the British context, a bigger board of directors with diverse backgrounds leads to 
better audit quality. Also, more independent directors lead to better audit quality. It is 
said that independent directors demand better audit reputation (Chen and Sun, 2007). 
The results show that role duality, within British companies, is not preferable as it 
lowers audit quality, since two positions are being managed by one individual. 
As for audit committee variables and their impact on audit quality, the results show that 
there is no significant statistical relationship between audit committee independence and 
size and audit quality; but there is a positive significant relationship between audit 
committee meetings and audit quality. This result gives an indicator that more active 
audit committees in British companies, the better audit quality is achieved. Financial 
experts within an audit committee are negatively related to audit quality. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, this result indicates that auditors incur additional time in a company when 
the audit committee lacks financial experts. 
Finally, the chapter empirically shows that audit quality is higher in larger companies. 
The larger the companies, the bigger potential number of shareholders and stakeholders 
and consequently the more audit quality is demanded from management and 
shareholders. 
The empirical study investigates the relationship between audit quality and corporate 
governance characteristics.  Previous studies have been conducted to assess audit fees in 
relation with different governance mechanisms. Oꞌsullivan (2000) concludes that role 
duality and block holders have no impact on audit fees. The first corporate governance 
code was established by that period (Cadbury Report, 1992) as the sample of this study 
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was from a period between 1992-1994. Audit committee characteristics are excluded 
from this study which is not the case in this research. Four proxies are used in this 
research to analyse audit committee characteristics in relation to audit quality. Zaman et 
al., (2011) argue that the wider the audit scope, the better audit quality. The researchers 
analysed non-audit fees to support the argument of the study that was conducted 
covering a period from 2001 to 2004.  
Hussianey (2009) states that investors perceive higher audit quality if the financial 
statements are audited by Big-Four audit firms. This argument cannot be applicable in 
the current research. The sample consists of listed companies at the FTSE 350 where 97 
per cent of these companies are audited by Big-Four. Non-audit fees and specialised 
auditors are used as measures for audit quality in addition to audit quality. Previous 
literature show different results. Non-audit fee is a proxy for auditorsꞌ independence 
(Knap, 1985) and specialised auditors could be a biased proxy for audit quality (Cahan 
et al, 2011). The previous two studies contradict with the argument that audit quality 
reduces manipulated earnings (Basiruddin, 2011) since audit quality has been measured 
by non-audit fees in relation to earning management. 
It is noted that most of the previous literature focused on audit fees inclusive voluntary 
and mandatory audit and non-audit services. When considering audit firmsꞌ size, the 
majority of researchers did not differentiate between audit market share from mandatory 
audit services and market share from voluntary audit services that can include many 
other services besides financial audit (Advisory, consultancy, transaction services, and 
tax services).  
It has been empirically tested and verified that corporate governance plays a significant 
role in audit quality. The results give a clear answer to the research question related to 
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the impact of corporate governance on audit quality. As for mechanisms, the study 
highlights different corporate governance mechanisms that have a significant 
positive/negative relationship with audit quality. The mechanisms give an answer to the 
second research question about what mechanisms in particular affect audit quality. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion
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Chapter Seven–Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis is contributing to the knowledge in different aspects. The main 
objective of this thesis is to highlight the accountancy profession challenges, their 
impact on the market after the recent crisis witnessed and to highlight some gap in the 
previous literature. The research has critically identified certain gaps in the literature 
related to corporate governance and the role of external auditors, and the audit 
profession. Mainly, some studies summarised auditors’ behaviour against factors 
embedded at audit firms and different scenarios auditors may face during their 
employment at audit firms. This group of studies covered mainly senior and audit staff 
levels’ behaviour only employed at Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms. 
Previous literature related to corporate governance is classified into many groups. One 
group of studies explained and researched corporate governance mechanisms and their 
effect on corporations’ performance and the relationship between agency cost to be 
incompliant with corporate governance code. Another group defined the role of external 
auditors. Another group of studies covered the area of corporate governance 
characteristics and its relationship with audit quality and type of auditors to be assigned.  
Due to the fact that no studies, to the best of my knowledge to date, have been 
conducted to relate between auditors’ behaviour and audit firm factors, and audit quality 
and companies’ governance characteristics. Moreover, behaviour of auditors have been 
analysed among different group of auditors, unlike previous studies that limited their 
research by studying the behaviour of audit trainees or senior auditors. This research 
specifically analyses the relationship between auditor quality and companies’ corporate 
250 
 
governance characteristics, mainly those characteristics which interact with external 
auditors’ tasks and nature of work. Clients’ corporate governance characteristics are 
obtained from companies listed on the FTSE 350. The second empirical study analyses 
the behaviour of auditors and how they potentially commit dysfunctional behaviour 
when they face time deadline, time deadline and performance evaluation scenarios 
The methods used in the previous studies varied depending on the nature of each study. 
Some studies used the questionnaire method to analyse auditors’ feedback against a set 
of questions. Other studies conducted interviews with different audit levels and analysed 
their replies. Reviewing previous literature through an interpretative framework was 
also used in studies that avoided the questionnaire and interview methods. As for studies 
related to corporate governance, most of these studies used a data-collection method, 
secondary data, by using different applications and data hubs for sampled companies. 
7.2 Theory and Methods 
Different theories frame the auditing practice in general, and audit quality and 
auditors’ behaviour in particular. The agency theory is used to manage the relationship 
between a principal (shareholder) and an agent (management). It is said that an 
improper balance in this relationship leads to an increase in agency costs. Agency costs 
are summarised by monitoring cost, bonding cost, and residual loss. Moreover, a 
misbalanced relationship between a principal and an agent leads to different conflicts, 
from an agency theory perspective, as managerial hazard agency conflict, earnings 
retention agency conflict, time horizon agency conflict and managerial risk aversion 
conflict. As a result of the above agency cost, agency conflicts and potential information 
asymmetry, external auditors are considered a tool to solve these issues. 
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Companies assign external auditors, especially Big Four audit firms, to have credible 
financial statements that are audited by a credible accountancy firm. Although external 
auditors are assigned by the board of directors, their daily communication is with 
organisations’ management. 
Conflict between shareholders and management is expected to be solved through 
auditors. The better the audit quality, the more conflicts are expected to be solved. The 
signalling theory, in addition to the agency theory and the stakeholder-agency theory, is 
introduced into this study to label the theoretical approach of audit quality. Companies 
(buyers) are willing to pay more for an audit service which is perceived to be performed 
by a credible high quality audit firm (seller). The more audit fees are paid, the more 
signals are perceived showing that financial statements are audited with better quality. 
 The stakeholder theory governs the relationship between an organisation and its 
external environment. In particular, it helps in framing the relationship between auditors 
(employees) and their firms. Due to the fact that this relationship is between one 
stakeholder only (employees/auditors) and audit firms, then a principal-agent 
relationship (agency theory) is also framing the second empirical study. Audit firms 
should treat all auditors the same and no pressure should be exercised that may lead to 
dysfunctional behaviour. 
It is also said the going concern of an organisation is highly related to the support of 
stakeholders. The life of an audit firm is also highly related to the behaviour of its 
auditors. It was evidenced through the famous Enron scandal where we witnessed 
severe dysfunctional behaviour by auditors that led to the collapse of the giant firm of 
Arthur Andersen. 
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Auditors’ behaviour and audit quality and are the main variables that are studied in this 
research. Auditors’ behaviour is analysed to highlight internal factors affecting it in 
addition to companies’ characteristics that may affect audit quality. Exploring the 
determinants of auditors’ behaviour, the second model is included to complement with 
the first model. Previous studies have used different proxies for audit quality, but rare 
ones have used the audit fees proxy supported by the theoretical and professional 
argument. 
As explained thoroughly in the research methodology chapter, objectivist 
ontological position and the positive epistemology are the selected justified 
philosophical and methodological approaches used in this research. The agency theory 
is the selected justified theory associated for this research. It is considered part of the 
positive accounting theory embedded in the objective ontology. As a result of this 
theoretical philosophical framework, the hypothetico-deductive (testing) approach is the 
appropriate approach to be used in this study. 
There are two surveys included in this research. The first empirical model uses a 
valid and reliable questionnaire. The questionnaire has been reviewed, validated and a 
pilot study was conducted to assess its appropriateness to meet the model’s objective. It 
measures and analyses the perception of auditors’ behaviour in different scenarios. 
Mainly auditors’ behaviour is analysed against time budget, time deadline, and 
performance evaluation factors. 
The second survey is made up of a designed data collection checklist for a selected 
variables collected from a secondary data source. This model tests the set hypotheses 
and analyses the determinants of audit quality against corporate governance 
mechanisms. The methodology of the second empirical model tests the hypotheses 
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against corporate governance characteristics, board of directors’ independence, board of 
directors’ size, role duality, audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit 
committee effectiveness, audit committee with financial experts, and ownership 
concentration. It also tests audit quality against companies’ characteristics, companies’ 
size, profitability, leverage and line of industry as selected control variables. 
In addition to the primary source of data collection for this model, observations are 
analysed using quantitative analysis and some qualitative analysis from respondents’ 
interpretations. 
The sample of the first model is comprised of non-financial companies listed on the 
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE 350). The sample of the second model 
comprises auditors employed at the UK Big Four firms. 
The relationship between theoretical perspective and the empirical analysis is 
linked using research methodology. The deductive methodology explains that a 
researcher is testing a theory by conducting empirical work and analysing related 
results. Due to the previous explanation, the research is directed to the hypothetico-
deductive methodology. This type of methodology helps the main purpose of the 
research as it is based on a theory rather than establishing a theory (inductive approach). 
7.3 Results and Findings 
The thesis consists of two empirical studies where both studies have been 
conducted in the UK context. The first empirical results’ show clearly that dysfunctional 
behaviour is exercised by most auditors. Auditors’ perception related to dysfunctional 
behaviour is analysed in three different scenarios: time budget, time deadline, and 
performance evaluation. 
254 
 
The survey highlights certain facts related to the accountancy profession. It is noted that 
audit firms are currently giving the vacancy priority to qualified auditors rather than 
auditors with graduate degrees. This can be supported by the decline in graduate degree 
holders in the UK. It is also shown that the more auditors accumulate experience, the 
less audit firms can retain this group of auditors. 
It was interesting to notice that auditors knowingly, and not unintentionally, commit 
dysfunctional behaviour. Although the results show that auditors believe that they 
should not commit any under-reporting of chargeable time when facing time-budget 
constraints. It is evidenced that auditors facing the three different scenarios tend to work 
heavily in their personal time. One of the most common audit problems, “box-ticking 
exercise”, is not proven to be exercised heavily as per the survey results. It can be due to 
the increase in awareness among auditors to mitigate audit failures and to a better 
review by experienced auditors over the work of audit team members.  
It is perceived that working in one's personal time might give an advantage for audit 
staff to finish an audit assignment. It is the responsibility of the audit firm to inform and 
to highlight this critical concern. Working from personal time may lead to indirect 
losses for the audit firm in the long term as the firm will not be aware of the actual 
hours spent on every assignment. 
The survey was conducted in collaboration with the Big Four accountancy firms in the 
UK and the audit methodology of these firms shown to have no significant impact of 
dysfunctional behaviour (mean and median 3). It can be concluded that audit 
methodology is being transmitted to auditors via a massive number of training events 
where they become familiar with methodological issues. The training is helping all 
auditors to minimise dysfunctional behaviour when it comes to audit firm methodology.  
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The coordination between different lines of auditors in preparing budgets and allocating 
tasks showed to have a negative relationship with dysfunctional behaviour and to 
minimise such behaviour. It is proven that communication among auditors plays an 
important role in minimising dysfunctional behaviour. The communication with those 
charged with governance proved to have no significant impact on dysfunctional 
behaviour. It is implied that external auditors still prefer to do the job themselves with 
no heavy reliance on other parties, though it is allowed by the standards. 
A Mann-Whitney test indicated significant differences between experienced auditors 
and audit trainees. It is shown that when a question is targeting a specific group of 
auditors, the other group reply with less conservatism. Experienced auditors have a 
tendency to blame audit trainees more for dysfunctional behaviour and vice versa for 
audit trainees about experienced auditors. Also, some differences were due to the nature 
and responsibilities held by every type of auditor. It can be noted that with added 
experience, auditors tend to perceive more dysfunctional behaviour acts. 
As a result of the above findings, the empirical evidence and results support the stated 
hypotheses for this study. It is proven that there is a significant positive relationship 
between auditors’ dysfunctional behaviour with relation to time budget, time deadline 
and performance evaluation factors. Interesting findings were noted and new factors 
were found to play a significant role in auditors’ behaviour. These findings differentiate 
this empirical study from other studies conducted to analyse to auditors’ behaviour. 
The second empirical work includes the results of the statistical relationship 
between audit quality and corporate governance mechanism and companies’ 
characteristics. It includes a description and analysis of different industries tested. The 
descriptive statistics helped to identify the non-parametric nature of the sampled data. 
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The chapter also includes a collinearity schedules test using a spearman correlation 
matrix. The regression test, fixed-effects with robust standard error, showed that the 
majority of hypotheses were supported by the statistical results.  
Audit quality showed a significant positive relationship with board of directors’ size and 
independence and a negative relationship with role duality. It can be concluded that 
within the British context, a bigger board of directors with diverse backgrounds leads to 
better audit quality. Also, more independent directors lead to better audit quality. It is 
said that independent directors demand a better audit reputation (Chen and Sun, 2007). 
The results showed that role duality, within British companies, are not preferable as it 
lowers audit quality since two positions are being managed by one individual. 
As for audit committee variables and their impact on audit quality, the results showed 
that there is no significant statistical relationship between audit committee independence 
and size and audit quality; but there is a positive significant relationship between audit 
committee meetings and audit quality. This result gives an indication that the more 
active audit committees in British companies, the better audit quality is achieved. 
Financial experts within an audit committee are negatively related to audit quality. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, this result indicates that auditors incur additional time in a 
company when the audit committee lacks financial experts. The insignificant 
relationship of audit committee size and independence is due to the collegiality 
principle. Most of audit committee members are at the same time board of directors 
members. The statistical relationship obtained with BoD characteristics compensates the 
insignificant relationship with some audit committee variables (independence and size).   
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Finally, the results show that audit quality is higher in larger companies. The larger the 
companies, the bigger potential number of shareholders and stakeholders and 
consequently more audit quality is demanded from management and shareholders. 
7.4 Incremental Contribution 
The current research about audit quality dynamics contributes to the literature of 
accountancy in different perspectives. From behavioural point of view, the results 
support the argument that in an agency relationship, a principal is expected to increase 
agents' efforts by more monitoring. But heavy monitoring will lead to incur some 
hidden costs that affect interpersonal relationships and reduce social distance 
(Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Excessive monitoring on auditors, unfeasible budgets 
and tough performance appraisal measures; are factors which push auditors to behave 
dysfunctionally. Consequently, an agency conflict will arise and agency cost will 
increase as a result of the dysfunctional behaviour. It is the first study, as to my 
knowledge, that combine time budget, time deadline and performance evaluation factors 
to be analysed in relation with auditorsꞌ behaviour. The sample tested covers all levels 
within audit firms in the UK (audit trainees, senior auditors, managers, partners). 
Some studies researched board of directors only in relation with audit fees; others 
researched the impact of audit committees on audit and non-audit fees. Also audit fees 
have been assessed in relation to different performance measures (earning management, 
profitability). The measurement of audit quality aligns with the framework of the first 
model. Many factors have been identified that impact auditorsꞌ behaviour when facing 
time deadline, time budget, and performance evaluation scenarios. Dysfunctional 
behaviour is measured by under reporting of chargeable time and pre-mature sign off. 
Accordingly, any dysfunctional behaviour will impact audit budgets for the subsequent 
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year. Auditors responsible for setting up budgets will be relying on a previous year 
deflated number of chargeable hours. Such deflated budgets will lead to different kind 
of pressures auditors will face on field and consequently lower audit quality. 
Different sensitivity tests have been conducted to support the findings and conclusions. 
Also, the selection of the primary tests have been diagnosed to have the nature of the 
sample tested complies with the regression tests used. The Mann-Whitney test, which is 
equivalent to the Wilcoxon rank sum test, is used to analyse the significant differences 
between the two stratified groups; audit trainees and experienced auditors. The Mann-
Whitney test is considered the most appropriate test to give higher efficacy in non-
parametric data (John and Priebe, 2006). This analysis highlights on certain factors that 
are causing dysfunctional behaviour for some auditors while it is not the case with 
another auditors. 
The random effects regression test (GLS) is used as the primary test to analyse the 
relationship between audit quality and companies' characteristics. The Hausman test has 
been used to support the use of the GLS test. In addition to the previous studies that 
state collinearity threshold to be acceptable up to 80% (Gujarati, 1995), the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) has been included in the correlation matrix indicating no major 
problems in multicollinearity among variables. Additional sensitivity tests have been 
conducted to give more robustness to results; 2SLS regression test and fixed effects 
regression tests. Also, another GLS test has been conducted using different proxy for a 
control variable. 
The research helps in understanding the principal-agent theoretical concept. It supports 
the argument that dispersed ownership has a positive impact on audit quality. Other 
studies conclude that role duality and board size have no impact on audit fees 
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(O’sullivan, 2000). The results in this research show that role duality and board size are 
positively related to audit quality. The non-existence of role duality helps in reducing 
the gap between directors and external auditors (Uang et al., 2006). 
7.4  Research Implications 
The thesis includes empirical studies that are related to the accountancy profession in 
general and auditing in particular. The research sample consists of surveys sent to 
auditors employed at the UK Big Four audit firms and non-financial listed companies 
on the FTSE 350. The results derived from this thesis can be used as a tool for decision 
makers, whether employed at corporations or audit firms. 
Different conclusions are reached for internal factors affecting auditors’ 
behaviour that will potentially affect audit quality. It is proven that auditors 
intentionally and knowingly commit dysfunctional behaviour in different ways. 
Working from personal time has been committed in three different scenarios: time 
deadline, time budget and performance evaluation. Audit firms’ top management and 
managing partners should conduct massive training to spread awareness regarding this 
issue. I was informed by one audit partner that they have been conducting many training 
events for the last year on the disadvantages of auditors working in their personal time. 
Audit firms should encourage their experienced auditors to coordinate with clients’ 
internal audit teams. The results show that audit teams do not rely on some internal 
audit work, as allowed by the international standards on auditing, to save time and to 
meet deadlines. 
It is interesting to notice that the famous “box-ticking” exercise is less exercised by 
auditors. This kind of exercise is considered as dysfunctional behaviour where auditors 
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tend to tick-mark certain audit procedures as accomplished while in fact they did not 
work through them. Although the results did not show a clear direction for this question, 
at least it did not show a clear tendency that it had been committed. It is recommended 
that audit firms should include in their Learning and Development (L&D) programmes 
a yearly online training session about this issue to keep it at its lowest levels. Another 
surprising finding audit firms might be interested in is that audit methodology shows not 
to have a direct impact on dysfunctional behaviour. This result might be due to the 
effective induction period audit trainees spend when they join audit firms. It might be 
helping them to excel in the audit methodology and to perform a proper audit without 
committing dysfunctional behaviour when it comes to complying with audit 
methodology. 
Comparing the behaviour of experienced auditors and audit trainees, some differences 
are noted.  With added experience, auditors tend to perceive dysfunctional behaviour 
more. Audit firms should encourage different levels of auditors to communicate better. 
From one side it helps to mitigate dysfunctional behaviour and from the other side it 
minimises the gap between group of auditors blaming each other when it comes to 
dysfunctional behaviour activities. A significant difference in replies is noted between 
the two groups: audit trainees and experienced auditors. This difference is noted when a 
question from the survey is targeting another group of auditors.  
As for corporate governance mechanisms and companies’ characteristics, it is 
recommended that companies should push to have more independent board members 
and to expand its board of directors. Results show that companies with such board 
characteristics benefit from a better audit quality. Also, companies operating in the 
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British context should avoid having the CEO and the Chairman positions held by one 
individual, as results show that role duality has a negative impact on audit quality. 
It is not enough for companies to establish audit committees for compliance purposes; 
audit committees should be active to reach their objectives. Corporations willing to 
compete in different markets and looking to have better financial reporting should have 
active audit committees. Audit committees follow up on the work of external auditors 
and review internal audit reports as well. Compliance with the above findings helps 
companies and audit firms to mitigate any possible audit failure. The audit failure could 
be the result of dysfunctional behaviour committed by auditors in fieldwork or 
embedded improper mechanisms that are negatively affecting audit quality. 
The above findings help in filling some gap in the audit profession and previous 
literature. It helps audit firms to understand some of the real reasons behind 
dysfunctional behaviour. It also helps corporations to receive better audit quality by 
highlighting selected corporate governance mechanisms that have a significant 
relationship with the audit quality and audit related matters. 
7.5  Limitations and Future Research 
Although the results and findings have highlighted different facts related to 
accountancy, this research still has some limitations. Audit quality, actual rather than 
perceived, could have been measured by an alternative proxy. Auditors' time sheets 
would be gathered to analyse the recoverability and utilisation rate of every assignment, 
comparing chargeable to non-chargeable hours. This task is not feasible for this research 
as confidentiality constraints for Big Four audit firms would prevent disclosing such 
data. 
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For the questionnaire survey, some respondents may not have taken the study seriously. 
This was the main the reason why auditors employed at Big Four audit firms were 
selected to participate in the survey. It is perceived that auditors employed at the Big 
Four audit firms are more qualified and competent than other auditors and consequently 
their responses would be more reliable. Due to data availability and access to other audit 
firms, a future research may compare the behaviour of non-Big Four auditors for any 
possible differences. Also a comparison between developing and developed countries 
would be an interesting study to highlight any differences that are due to 
cultural/country changes. The experiment technique would indicate additional factors 
that may lead to dysfunctional behaviour. An audit case study might be prepared and 
distributed to different group of auditors inclusive audit instructions on how to audit the 
given case. Different groups might be exposed to different deadlines (time and budget 
deadlines) and their audit behaviour might be diagnosed to highlight their audit results 
under different circumstances.  
Governance mechanisms that are related to audit scope are included in this study. It is 
worth researching other mechanisms for any hidden impact on audit quality of other 
governance mechanisms that are perceived to have no impact on audit quality. The 
research scope is about the challenges facing the accountancy profession especially after 
many accounting scandals have taken place. It would be interesting to conduct a study 
on one of the evolving markets (Russia, Brazil, China, South Africa, and India) to 
identify any potential variances between a developed country and an evolving market 
country. This would give a broader idea about the levels of audit quality between a 
leading country in governance codes and other evolving marketsꞌ countries.  
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Another way to identify audit quality in relation with governance mechanisms and 
companies' characteristics might be through conducting a survey (questionnaire or 
interviews) with companies' personnel. This may help in understanding the perception 
of management and staff about the impact of governance mechanisms on audit quality. 
It will give additional evidence on factors affecting audit quality in addition to the 
factors and results concluded through the use of an econometric model and regression 
tests.  
Financial expert variable is used by referring to disclosure in the annual reports; audit 
committees section. Future studies might simplify the measurements of financial experts 
by categorising it to industry segments. Relevant experience rather than a general 
financial experience can be used to assess relevant experience on audit quality. This is 
pending the level of disclosures and availability of such data in annual reports and other 
databases. 
Additional variables and different proxies supported by arguments different from the 
stated arguments could be used to measure the relationship between audit quality and 
different corporate governance mechanisms.  
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Appendix 
Audit Quality Reduction Behaviours 
Auditors should not employ the practice of underreporting chargeable time, even in 
the face of tight time-budget constraints. 
When facing a tight budget, auditors shift chargeable time to non-chargeable 
categories on their time report/time sheet. 
Under time-budget pressure, auditors prematurely sign-off a required audit step, 
which is not covered at other stages of the audit. 
Under time-budget pressure, auditors tend to reduce the amount of work on a step 
beyond the normal. 
Under a tight budget, auditors may accept insufficient or light explanations from the 
client. 
Under a tight budget, auditors tend to handle substantive tests faster. 
Under a tight budget, auditors tend to tick mark audit schedules after an essentially 
superficial review of supporting client documents. 
It is a common practice to reduce the sample size specified in the audit programme 
without noting the reduction to meet tight deadlines. 
Auditors tend to focus on risky areas to save time. 
Pre-mature sign off usually occurs when auditing non risky cycles rather than critical 
ones. 
Auditors tend to choose the highest thresholds of sampling techniques for the sake of 
achieving a good recoverability rate. 
Senior auditors who assist in proposal preparation and research tend to lower the 
budgeted hours to increase their chances of winning a proposal for better evaluation 
from their superiors. 
 
Team Mismanagement 
Sometimes new auditors need to underreport time but with added experience, there is 
less of a need. 
When facing a tight budget, auditors underreport chargeable time by performing 
chargeable work in their personal time. 
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Auditors tend to believe that the nature of the audit methodology and the length of 
documentation of audit work is a factor determining pre-mature sign off to meet tight 
deadlines. 
Completing work to meet time deadline typically means the auditor does not have a 
break or have any personal life beyond work. 
Auditors tend to exercise pre-mature sign off for some audit steps if everyone in the 
audit team is working too fast to meet the time deadline. 
Auditors are asked by their superiors to handle substantive tests and generally operate 
faster to meet time deadlines. 
Time deadlines have become tighter in recent years. 
Time deadlines tend to be given without consultation. 
Auditors are asked to underreport chargeable hours to achieve a good appraisal. 
Auditors tend to work in their personal time rather than actual hours spent in order to 
maintain a profitable assignment. 
Audit managers delegate tasks based on the standard hourly rate of every team member 
rather than the skills needed for every cycle in order to achieve a good profitable 
assignments and consequently better appraisal. 
 
Non-Professional Behaviours 
Senior and staff auditors knowingly underreport chargeable time. 
Sometimes auditors need to underreport chargeable time to meet budget constraints. 
When facing a tight budget, auditors charge time to other clients that should have 
charged to this client. 
Under a tight budget, auditors tend not to pursue an unexpected problem occurring 
during a mission. 
Auditors tend to perform superficial reviews of clients’ documents to comply with 
budgeted time allocated to the audit assignment. 
Under time budget pressure, auditors insufficiently document a technical point needed 
for the execution of a step. 
Auditors are given a margin of insufficient documentation on a technical point needed 
for the execution of a step to meet a deadline. 
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Time deadline pressure is the result of increased competition in the audit market. 
Time deadline pressure interferes with the proper conduct of an audit. 
There is a tendency for auditors to pre-maturely sign off audit steps if auditors are 
working quickly to meet a time deadline. 
Strict audit firm methodology is less exercised by senior auditors in order that they 
receive positive feedback from clients. 
Audit managers participate in the development of ways to meet client needs, increase 
clients’ portfolio and have more assignments so that they get better performance from 
their superiors. 
Auditors tend to rely less on subject matter experts even if the auditors themselves are 
not highly knowledgeable in a certain area to maintain a good recoverability rate. 
An auditor expecting a promotion may exercise less professional scepticism if this 
would harm assignment profitability. 
 
Unethical Behaviour 
Under a tight budget, auditors declare in their working papers that they have 
performed a control that they did not actually perform. 
Auditors tend to declare in their papers that they have performed a control that they 
did not actually do to meet a tight deadline. 
Normally, time deadlines are met ethically when the manager and the senior 
coordinate things together in setting up the budget. 
When there is a risk of losing an audit assignment, partners tend to compromise rather 
than comply fully with audit firm methodology and auditing standards. 
Auditors tend to pre-maturely sign-off an audit step when such sign-off may 
positively affect their performance evaluation. 
Partners/Directors tend not to report all material control weaknesses to get assigned at 
a later stage to a non-audit assignment. 
 
